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Holding the Stick at Both Ends: The Design of Network Administrative Organizations  
Susanna Salvador: 
 (Under the direction of Dr. Angel Saz-Carranza) 
 
The focus of this Ph.D. dissertation is the design of Network Administrative 
Organizations (NAOs), the separate units purposefully set up by public inter-
organizational goal-directed network partners for to govern and manage it. Despite the 
interest shown by both public management and organizational scholars in the field of 
Goal-Directed networks governance, few theoretical studies have built on Provan and 
Kenis’s (2008) seminal contribution. As a result, this field remains a promising avenue 
for research. By bringing together the literature on networks, inter-organizational 
collaborations, organizational design, and corporate governance, this Ph.D. dissertation 
sheds light on two factors intimately associated with the design of Network 
Administrative Organizations: strategic interdependence and outcome uncertainty 
avoidance.  
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the Ph.D. thesis topic and provides a general overview of the 
Ph.D. content and structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
13 
 
   
14 
 
  
1.1.Introduction to the topic of the Ph.D. thesis 
If a single word could be used to define modern societies, a good candidate would be the 
“network” concept. As Castells (2000) has pointed out, for the last decades, humanity has 
embraced its networked features as an almost inevitable consequence of modern 
transformations of the economy and geo-political context, and of a redefinition of human 
interactions at all levels (Powell, 1990; Child, Faulkner, and Tallman, 2005; Raab and 
Kenis, 2009). The pervasiveness of the network approach in research mirrors the need to 
understand how individual units, whether firms, organizations, groups, or public 
agencies, interact with other units in their field of human activity (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003).  
Public Management and Public Policy Research has not been immune to these 
developments. The proliferation of public inter-organizational goal-directed networks, as 
alternative governance mechanisms, has captured the attention of public management 
scholars in recent years (Agranoff, 2007). For Public Management researchers, the 
network concept not only acknowledges the interdependency among the actors within a 
specific policy arena but also questions the role, authority, legitimacy, competence, and 
capacity of isolated public agencies and organizations to process and decide unilaterally 
on most of the complex, borderless, and multilayered phenomena confronting modern 
societies (Klijn 2007). It is blithely assumed that public goal-directed networks are 
needed to solve “wicked problems” in many public policy domains (Turrini et al., 2009; 
Gray, 2000). As Isset et al. (2011, i166) have argued, the creation of public value is no 
longer the realm of standalone governments; against a background of mission expansion 
and remarkable levels of government de-legitimization, networks have become 
commonplace in the public domain. Consequently, public inter-organizational goal-
directed networks are nowadays present in such varied fields as public service delivery 
(Provan and Milward, 1995), local economic development (Agranoff and McGuire, 
15 
 
 2003), crime prevention (Raab, Mannak and Cambré, 2013), national security (Whelan, 
2012), the fight against drugs (Ysa, Colom et al., 2016), emergency and recovery efforts 
(Vasavada, 2013), and regulation (Levi-Faur, 2011) among others. The optimistic view 
is that such networks are an effective way of providing public goods in a more flexible 
and less bureaucratic manner (Provan and Milward, 2001; Provan and Kenis, 2008; 
O’Toole, 1997; Isset et al, 2011).  
The promise of networks depends on achieving the so-called collaborative advantage 
(Kantar, 1994; Huxham and Vangen, 2000). The rationale assumes that by building links, 
in a coupled net of interactions, among interdependent organizations (Thomson, 1967),  
institutions and/or government agents, positive outcomes will be granted. However, this 
may well be a naïve argument. The connections and interplay among actors do not 
inevitably lead to the achievement of network level goals. In addition, they do not always 
occur within a flat, horizontal organizational arrangement in which contributions, control, 
and benefits are equally or equitably distributed among partners. At the end of the day, 
public goal-directed networks, whether voluntary or mandated (Rodríguez et al., 2007) 
are created to pursue network-level goals that no single organization is able to achieve 
individually; these goals are aligned, to a greater or lesser extent, with the organizational 
aims of the network nodes. The downside is that collaborative endeavors can compromise 
an individual organization’s resources, agenda, decision-making, and potentially, even its 
future. How then are public inter-organizational goal-directed networks able to hold the 
stick at both ends?  
This paradox converts the need for mechanisms and institutions to coordinate joint action 
to attain whole-network goals (Provan and Kenis, 2008) into a cornerstone, regardless of 
the network’s purposes (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2011; Dyer et al, 2007). As Kenis and 
Provan (2008) argue in their seminal piece, instead of assuming that a collaborative 
16 
 
  
advantage can be gained for free, it is crucial to understand how networks actually 
function—not only whether network-level outcomes are achieved, but also how 
interdependences are managed, decisions made, conflicts handled, and eventual tensions 
resolved. Provan and Kenis’s (2008) piece represents a theoretical milestone in the 
analysis of whole-network governance. This Ph.D. thesis builds on their important 
contribution. 
When studying public inter-organizational networks, researchers (perhaps grappling with 
methodological constraints and limitations) have generally focused on analyzing 
individual actors and their connections, rather than the network as a unit of analysis—in 
other words—the network as a whole. One explanation for this situation is the difficulty 
researchers face in gaining access to and collecting data from multiple networks. Thus, 
while Provan and Kenis’s (2008) contribution on the three ideal types of network forms 
of governance (i.e., shared governance, lead organization, and network administrative 
organization) stands nowadays as a milestone, there is much to uncover about the exact 
mechanisms and processes designed and deployed to govern public-goal directed 
networks (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2003).  
Network Administrative Organizations (NAOs) represent the more organizationally 
sophisticated and demanding mode of network governance, entailing the creation of an 
utterly new and differentiated unit to steer the network. The Network Administrative 
Organization brokers the network but is not itself a member, so the network is governed 
externally. In place of the popular imagination of a flat, horizontal, hierarchy-less 
network, we face the existence of an external unit to oversee, coordinate, and govern the 
network.  
17 
 
 Provan and Kenis’s (2008) contribution opens the door to analyzing and exploring in 
detail the nuances and variations that characterize this mode of governance (i.e., the 
NAO). So far, qualitative research on networks and their governance has partially 
identified the main building blocks of NAOss (boards; directors or coordinators; working 
groups) and, even more important, pointed out the existence of different institutional 
designs for these organizations (Agranoff, 2007; Saz-Carranza, 2012; Saz-Carranza and 
Ospina, 2011; Saz-Carranza and Longo, 2012). One should note that, while scholars have 
made some conceptual and theoretical contributions to research in this field, findings are 
still very thin on the ground, opening up new avenues of enquiry (McGuire and Agranoff, 
2007; Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007). 
This Ph.D. thesis empirically explores a specific universe of goal-directed networks: 
European Regulatory Networks (Levi-Faur (2011). First, regardless of the specific policy 
arena in which they operate, regulatory networks within the European Union share 
membership and size, thus making this subset suitable for comparisons (Coen and 
Tatcher, 2008). At the same time, European regulatory networks face specific challenges 
and carry out different tasks to achieve network-level goals. The subset therefore offers a 
nicely diverse niche in which to conduct an empirical analysis. Second, previous 
qualitative analysis (Saz-Carranza, 2012) shows that the NAOs of European regulatory 
networks differ in organizational design (for example, in relation to their number of 
boards or decision-making mechanisms). Last but not least, the subset of European 
Regulatory networks is a medium-n universe through which to study the governance of 
inter-organizational goal-directed networks, thereby adding to the small set of empirical 
contributions that go beyond case-by-case analysis.  
1.2. Overarching research objective and expected contributions 
18 
 
  
Using a comprehensive methodological approach that combines a systematic literature 
review and both qualitative and quantitative research methods, this Ph.D. dissertation’s 
overarching research objective is to empirically shed light on the design of Network 
Administrative Organizations by unveiling some of the determinants and processes 
affecting the organizational choices made to govern European Regulatory Networks. 
More specifically, this thesis aims to unveil the role of power, resource interdependences, 
and uncertainty in the design of Network Administrative Organizations.  
We aim to provide a sound step forward in our understanding of the rationale for the 
existence of distinct organizational design choices for Network Administrative 
Organizations. Up to now, apart from acknowledging the existence of a variety of 
different examples of Network Administrative Organizations, research has neglected the 
analysis of this phenomenon. The following questions can open a relevant avenue for new 
research insights:  
Does design of Network Administrative Organizations associate to certain factors that 
can be empirically examined, or is it just the result of idiosyncratic variables that only 
allow understanding the phenomenon on a case-by-case basis? 
In either case, which factors play a role when deciding on NAOs?  
Does the interplay of power and/or uncertainty help to explain the appearance of NAOs? 
Building on literature that explores public goal-directed networks, organizational design, 
and corporate governance, this disseration aims to produce relevant results that not only 
make an academic contribution, but also have managerial implications for policy makers, 
managers, and other actors playing a role in the design of public networks.  
The expected contributions to the design of network administrative organizations will 
cast light on the key factors associated with NAO design, offering an empirically based 
19 
 
 explanation of the different types of network administrative organizations. We aim to 
contribute to the goal-directed network management literature by advancing existing 
knowledge on network governance modes.  
In addition, as a second contribution, we will explore the rationale behind the design of 
NAOs for European regulatory networks. As supranational regulations permeate the 
regulatory space, it is crucial to understand how and why the organizations in charge of 
regulations (i.e., networks of regulators) are designed as they are; these details can help 
us understand their functioning, legitimately influence them, and foster or hinder their 
creation and evolution.  
Last but not least, NAOs appear to be distinct organizations with multiple principals and, 
potentially, multiple agents. The findings of this thesis may help managers and board 
members in some of the situations discussed below to deal more effectively with this 
complex scenario. Beyond theoretical issues, in terms of practical implications, policy 
makers, European regulators, and national political and economic agents will benefit from 
the insights provided by this research project.  
  
20 
 
  
1.3. Structure and content of the Ph.D. thesis 
This thesis takes the form of a monograph based on articles. Its main chapters are derived 
from articles that have not necessarily been published. Below, we present a detailed 
structure and brief overview of this research project. 
Chapter 1 conveys the overarching framework of the Ph.D. thesis, presenting and 
discussing its theoretical framework. More specifically, in the first chapter, we establish 
theoretical connections and provide an overview that links our overarching research 
objective with the specific research questions and methodologies applied in Chapters 3, 
4, 5, and 6. This chapter builds on a Master’s Thesis for the degree of Master of Research 
in Management Sciences.  
In Chapter 2, we present and depict a specific subset of public inter-organizational goal-
directed networks to develop our empirical analysis of the design of NAOs: European 
Regulatory Networks. This chapter describes the findings derived from a custom-built 
database containing more than thirty elements of information for each of the networks 
studied. This dataset was built using a two-fold approach. It contains publicly available 
information on the networks analyzed in this study. In collaboration with ESADEgeo’s 
research units, the bylaws and legislative acts establishing the networks were codified 
using a thematic analysis approach (Boyatzis, 1998). The final dataset contains 
information on the number of boards, decision-making processes, staff members, voting 
arrangements, and seats on boards, among other institutional characteristics related to 
network governance. At the same time, it also includes data related to the function, tasks, 
age, sector, and mandated or voluntary nature of each network, as well as information on 
the governance bodies, structure, and resources of 378 Goal-Directed European 
Regulatory Networks. This chapter has been written in collaboration with Mr. Adrià 
21 
 
 Albareda and Dr. Angel Saz-Carranza, and has been published as a book chapter in The 
Global Context: How Politics, Investment, and Institutions Impact European Businesses 
edited by Javier Solana and Angel Saz-Carranza.  
Chapter 3 includes a systematic literature review on the concept of interdependence in 
public management. Based on the reviewed literature from top peer-reviewed public 
management journals, we propose a preliminary theoretical model for analyzing 
interdependence that considers both antecedents and consequences at different levels of 
analysis. This chapter was written in collaboration with Mr. Adrià Albareda and Dr. 
Angel Saz-Carranza. It suggests avenues for research that are covered in more detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
Chapter 4 is the first of two empirical sections of this Ph.D. dissertation: a case study of 
four European public networks of regulators belonging to two different regulatory 
regimes: Energy and Telecommunications. The paper empirically explores the 
establishment and development of the governance structures of both networks in order to 
analyze the source of their differences, focusing on the role of power and dependence in 
the final design of NAOs. This paper, “The Power Dynamics of Mandated Network 
Administrative Organizations (NAOs),” has been written in collaboration with Dr. Angel 
Saz-Carranza and Mr. Adrià Albareda. This chapter was accepted for publication on July 
14, 2015 in Public Administration Review (Impact Factor: 2.636; ISI Journal Citation 
Reports Ranking: 2015: 5/47 (Public Administration)) 
Chapter 5 presents our second empirical contribution: a quantitative analysis carried out 
using a database of 37 public goal-directed networks. In the chapter, a set of hypotheses 
is developed and tested using Item Response Modelling and Bayesian Statistics to 
investigate factors that associate with the design of Network Administrative 
22 
 
  
Organizations. This chapter, entitled  “The Governance of Goal-Directed Networks: An 
Empirical Analysis of European Regulatory Networks” has been written in collaboration 
with Dr. Angel Saz-Carranza, Dr. Xavier Gimenez-Marín, and Mr. Adrià Albareda. It has 
been submitted to The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (Impact 
Factor: 3.893), where it is currently undergoing a second round of review.  
Chapter 6 concludes this research study. In particular, it provides an integrated discussion 
of the theoretical contributions, managerial implications, limitations, and further research 
challenges posed by the findings of this dissertation. 
A unique and combined list of references for all of the chapters is included at the end of 
this monograph. 
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Chapter 2:  
Overarching framework: Network Administrative 
Organizations and the Governance of Goal-Directed 
Networks 
This chapter discusses the theoretical background, identifies research gaps, and presents 
the research objectives and methodologies used in the articles that constitute Chapters 3, 
4, 5 and 6. 
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2.1. Goal-Directed Networks in Public Management 
2.1.1. Goal-Directed Networks: a working, theory-based definition 
Beyond the traditional dichotomy between markets and hierarchies as economic forms of 
organization (Williamson, 1975), networks are now recognized as a viable approach to 
public and private governance, economic relationships, collaborative public management, 
and resource allocation mechanisms—falling somewhere between the make-or-buy 
alternatives (Powell, 1990; Child, Faulkner, and Tallman, 2005; Agranoff, 2006; Miles 
and Snow, 1992). However, given that networks can be understood from various 
theoretical perspectives (Salanick, 1995; Klijn, 1998; Scott and Davis, 2007), the term 
can prove misleading (Provan et al., 2007; Agranoff, 2006). Hence, there is a need to 
define and clarify the nature of networks in general and to identify the key features of 
public-goal directed networks in particular. 
At the simplest level, networks can be defined as systems of relationships among parts 
(Scott and Davis, 2007). Taking a more precise approach, Powell (1990) argues that 
networks are characterized by mutual and reciprocal patterns of communication and 
exchange among units that are independent but relate to other units. These units, 
organizations, agencies, or groups of organizations (whether public, non-profit or private) 
cooperate beyond their own boundaries, engage in mutual action to achieve a common 
goal, and are structurally interdependent, although no organization is subordinate to the 
others (O’Toole, 1997; Agranoff, 2006; Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007).  
As a first step, we must clearly distinguish between ego-networks (i.e., social networks) 
and public goal-directed networks as two different forms of public management activity 
(Agranoff, 2007). Accordingly, even as inter-organizational relationships, networks can 
be broadly understood from two perspectives (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). On the one hand, 
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 networks can be analyzed by focusing on the ties and characteristics of individual players; 
these are egocentric networks (Brass et al., 2004). This micro-level perspective aims to 
explore individual players’ motives for joining networks, and the consequences of that 
participation. It covers the player’s position within the network and the number and 
strength of his or her ties. Social Network Analysis focuses on the patterns of connectivity 
and cleavage among nodes (ego-networks) that integrate a social network, focusing on 
exploring its social structure (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003; Wellman, 1988). The following key 
features characterize a network’s partner relationships (i.e., ego-network relationships), 
determining how partners are connected to each other: centrality (its degree determined 
by the number of connections a player has to others); density (expressing the ratio 
between the network’s present connections and its total potential connections); and 
betweenness (the extent to which a player is positioned between others in a network) 
(Freeman, 1979; 1982). 
Networks can also be analyzed as a whole. In this approach, used in this dissertation, the 
focus is not on the individual organization but on the network, exploring how the 
network’s features and characteristics may help or hinder the achievement of outcomes. 
Networks are seen as collaborative modes of production that strive towards common 
goals that may not be fully aligned with the individual goals of each network partner. 
These goals result from the synergies and added value offered by the collaborative 
advantage derived from collaboration (Huxham, 1993; Kanter, 1994). 
In a complementary approach, Kilduff and Tsai (2003) argue that networks also differ in 
their processes, goal-direction, and serendipity, shaping their emergence and evolution 
over time. In serendipitous networks, connections and collaboration have no undergirding 
or specific rationale; the actors’ choices do not reflect a common purpose. By contrast, 
goal-directed networks emerge because members do share a common aim, and most of 
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the network’s activities are focused on it. Goal-directed networks are usually set up 
through a third-party mandate (Rodríguez et al., 2007) or by network members. They are 
established to achieve complex multi-organizational outcomes and goals, especially in 
the public sector, where collaboration and cooperation are needed to yield an optimal 
solution to social challenges and problems at the network level (Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
In this Ph.D. thesis, we focus on inter-organizational goal-directed networks. Table 2.1 
summarizes different perspectives on the study of networks, briefly summarized in this 
section. 
Table 2.1 Various theoretical approaches to networks  
  Unit of analysis 
   Ego network Whole network 
Phenomenon 
studied 
Serendipitous 
networks 
Social relations of 
a single node  
Whole social network 
Goal-directed 
networks 
Single 
organization 
within a GDN 
Management/Governance 
of a whole GDN  
Source: author’s own  
Networks allow players to realize mutual goals without relying on rigid hierarchies 
(Dachau, 2012). They are particularly suitable where there are complementary strengths 
among partners that require a medium-to-high degree of commitment (Powell, 1990). 
Rather than relying on individual efforts, conscious collaboration and cooperation among 
interdependent groups working to provide complex public and community-based services 
may enhance effectiveness (Alter and Hage, 1993; O’Toole, 1997). The use of 
collaboration in networks improves the likelihood that individual organizations will be 
able to cope with settings in which there is greater uncertainty (Gulati and Gargiolu, 
1999). When there is uncertainty, shared risk makes the alternative of collaboration 
attractive (Alter and Hage, 1993). Networks are considered, despite their potential 
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 problems, to be a positive option for overcoming the failures of markets and hierarchies. 
The presumed flexibility of networked organizations allows them to respond more rapidly 
to competition and other threats, as they enable a more efficient use of resources, 
including an increased capacity to plan and address complex problems (Provan and Kenis, 
2007). Following Child (2005), networks here are understood to be long-term cooperative 
and collaborative inter-organizational arrangements or agreements among partners, who, 
while retaining control over their own resources, decide as a group how to use them (Brass 
et al., 2004) in a more or less formal and explicitly institutionalized fashion (Isset et al., 
2011). 
Hitherto, theoretical studies of networks as inter-organizational agreements have mainly 
dealt with their origin, determinants of existence, and evolution; they have been linked to 
contextual, structural, and behavioral determinants and dimensions (Oliver, 1991; Saz-
Carranza and Ospina, 2010). The tensions in a networked form of governance determine 
how networks are built and managed. Provan and Kenis (2007) state that networks are 
sensitive to conflicts between efficiency and inclusiveness, internal and external 
legitimacy, and flexibility versus stability. Saz-Carranza and Ospina’s (2010) analysis of 
the behavioral dimensions of networks sheds light on the tension between unity 
(understood as the absence of tensions), and diversity (defined as variability in structural 
and behavioral traits within and across organizations). This tension is a crucial dimension 
that configures networks and their governance. As Saz-Carranza and Ospina (2010) 
argue, understanding how goal-directed networks perform requires an analysis of both 
the behavioral and structural dimensions of whole networks (Dyer at al., 2007). The 
behavioral dimension deals with the actions of groups that aim to control joint actions, 
whereas the structural dimension encompasses the institutions and resources designed to 
control the networks’ joint activities (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2010).  
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2.1.2. Public Management Networks and Goal-Directed Networks 
Public management networks refer to those agencies and/or organizations (both 
governmental and nongovernmental, profit and non-profit) involved in public policy-
making, as well as to the structure that plans, designs, produces and/or delivers public 
goods and services (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). These are broadly labelled 
“collaborative networks” in the public management research field on networks (Agranoff 
and McGuire, 2001; O’Toole, 1997). Public networks develop their work in policy 
scenarios where linkages, cooperation, partnering and boundary spanning are crucial to 
their core mission (Agranoff, 2007). When considering the realm of public management 
networks, we should note that the literature also uses “network” to refer to policy 
networks (Klijn and Kopenjan, 1997). In this theoretical approach, the concept links a 
collaborative view of policy decision-making with the collaborative provision of public 
goods, fusing public policies with the strategic and institutionalized context (Kicker, 
Klijn, and Kopenjan, 1997). 
In this Ph.D. dissertation, we will consider public goal-directed networks as inter-
organizational networks encompassing a group (i.e., at least three partners) of 
autonomous, legally independent organizations (either government agencies or other 
profit or non-profit organizations) that either formally decide or are mandated to work 
together towards a collective goal that they would be unable to achieve on their own 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007). The literature has found widespread use of this specific type 
of network, not only to deliver public health, education, and social services, but also as a 
way of fostering local economic development and other municipal services (Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2003; Provan and Milward, 1995; Provan and Sebastian, 1998; Rethemeyer 
and Hatmaker, 1998; Krätke, 2002).  
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 Public goal-directed networks, in particular, can be categorized by their overarching aims, 
as well as by their operational and structural complexity. Informational networks recruit 
partners who take part solely to exchange information (i.e., programs, technologies, or 
possible solutions). Action is taken on a voluntary basis. One step further, “developmental 
networks” deliver a certain degree of education and membership services to boost the 
partners’ ability to implement solutions in their own organizations. Outreach network 
activities include information and technology, providing new, interactive programming 
opportunities, and establishing a strategic blueprint for implementation by the partners. It 
is worth mentioning that outreach networks do not engage in collective action but do 
collectively point out courses of action. Finally, the most sophisticated type of public 
network—the action network—attempts to make inter-partner adjustments and to 
formally adopt collective courses of action, which typically involve service delivery along 
with knowledge exchanges (Agranoff, 2007). 
Public goal-directed networks do not benefit from a centralized superordinate unit 
wielding authority over network members (Agranoff, 2007). At the same time, goal-
directed networks cannot operate without a mechanism for ensuring that the network 
achieves its goals, operates effectively, and articulates relationships (whether these lie 
within or outside the network’s often blurred boundaries) (Huxham and Vangen, 2005; 
Sandfort and Milward, 2008). 
Public goal-directed networks therefore need a form of inter-organizational governance 
to both leverage the network’s ability to achieve its goals and to govern the network while 
allowing its members to independently pursue their missions. Even so, collaboration is 
hard to coordinate and manage (Dyer, 1996; Wang et al., 2005). The structural and 
behavioral properties of a network may either help or hinder it in achieving its aims 
(Huxham and Vangen, 1993). Hindrances include the lack of centralized authority 
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structures affecting the decision-making processes and resulting in so-called 
“collaborative inertia” (Huxham, 1993). Thus, designing and setting up the right 
governance structures is crucial to reaping the benefits of collaboration (Grey, 1989; 
Huxham and Vangen, 2005). As Provan and Kenis (2007) have noted and we contend, 
the governance structure of whole networks has not received the research attention and 
theoretical study it so richly deserves.  
 
2.2. The governance of public goal-directed networks 
The next section looks at the scant literature on the governance of goal-directed networks. 
The public network phenomenon has been thoroughly analyzed and researched, both 
empirically and theoretically, as the one most paradigmatic forms of governance in the 
hollowing state (Milward and Provan, 2001; Klijn, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). 
However, little research has been done on how networks are born, how they evolve, and 
how they work (McGuire and Agranoff, 2007; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
Irrespective of their purpose, goal-directed networks must somehow be governed to 
ensure coordinated actions to achieve their goals (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2011). Public 
goal-directed networks do not benefit from authoritative relationships among units 
(Agranoff, 2007). Therefore they need a governance mechanism that both leverages the 
network’s ability to achieve its goals and governs the network, while allowing its 
members to independently pursue their own missions. 
It is well known that governing networks—or any other kind of inter-organizational 
body—is an inherently difficult task (Dyer, 1996; Dyer et al. 2006; Human and Provan, 
2000). Business scholars estimate that more than 50% of alliances fail (Kelly, Schaan, 
and Jonacas, 2002; Park and Ungson, 2001). The failure rates of public networks are not 
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 available, but Huxham and Vangen (2000) have shown that collaboration often succumbs 
to what they term, “collaborative inertia.” 
A network’s form of governance implies its use of institutions, mechanisms, and 
resources to coordinate and control its collective action (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Saz-
Carranza and Ospina, 2010). In governing inter-organizational alliances, there is a need 
to balance control and trust when dealing with the inherent risks of managing an inter-
organizational setting (De Man and Roijakkers, 2009). Governing a network implies 
setting up processes and systems to achieve the network’s goals; fostering cooperation; 
monitoring and controlling behavior; establishing safeguards for partners; and 
determining the overall functioning of the system (Child, 1990). Network governance 
thus has both a behavioral dimension (covering individual and group actions within the 
network) and a structural one (dealing with formal government institutions) (Saz-
Carranza and Ospina, 2010). The latter is the focus of this Ph.D. dissertation. In this vein, 
we aim to build on Provan and Kenis’s (2008) seminal study, which provided a typology 
of the forms of governance found in goal-directed networks.  
Provan and Kenis’s (2008) contribution to research on the three modes of network 
governance has driven academic discussions about the governance of whole-networks 
since its publication. Proof of this are several recent contributions that, to various extents, 
build on Provan and Kenis’s (2008) three ideal types. Vasudeva (2013), in his analysis of 
a recovery and emergency network in the Indian state of Gujarati, uses Provan and 
Kenis’s contingency model to explore the governance structure and effectiveness of the 
network. Raab, Mannack, and Cambré (2013) in turn explore the effectiveness of a set of 
crime prevention networks in the Netherlands. Although their hypothesis, that being 
governed by a NAO is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effectiveness, is not 
supported, the authors suggest that the degree of centralized integration within a network, 
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in relation to governance, may impact its effectiveness, depending on the type of services 
the network aims to provide (i.e., a full package of services to clients). Saz-Carranza and 
Ospina (2011) point out that Network Administrative Organizations are the key to 
managing the unity-diversity tension inherent to networks.  
2.2.1. Provan and Kenis’s model  
According to Provan and Kenis’s (2008) theoretical mode (Figure 2.1): governance in 
goal-directed networks takes one of three forms: shared governance, lead organization 
governance, and Network Administrative Organization (NAO) governance, defined using 
two criteria—the extent to which governance: 1) is brokered, and 2) is led by network 
partners. These three forms allude to the structural dimension of network governance, i.e., 
the formal institutions and resources designed to coordinate and control joint action (Saz-
Carranza and Ospina, 2010; Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that “the successful adoption of a particular form of 
governance will be based on four key structural and relational contingencies. These are: 
trust, size, goal consensus, and the nature of the task (i.e., “the need for network-level 
competencies,” p. 237). The contingencies are garnered from network literature and 
considered relevant when choosing a given form of governance. Table 2.2 summarizes 
Provan and Kenis’s contingency model. As the authors point out, the four contingency 
factors included in this model are not exhaustive; it should be noted that they represent 
mainly inherent structural or network design elements that can be supplemented, building 
on the extant body of network literature, with other contextual or environmental factors 
(such as complexity or uncertainty), which affect how the network is managed (Provan 
and Milward, 1995; Milward and Provan, 2000; McGuire and Agranoff, 2003).  
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 Table 2.2 Provan and Kenis’s contingency model  
 Participant-governed Externally Governed 
 Non-Brokered Brokered 
Contingencies Shared Governance Lead Organization NAO 
Trust (Density) Widely shared (high-
density and 
decentralized) 
Narrowly shared 
(low-density, highly 
decentralized) 
Moderately to widely 
shared (moderate 
density) 
Size Moderate Moderate Moderate to multiple 
Goal Consensus Few Moderately low Moderately high 
Network 
Competences 
Moderate Moderate High 
Source: compiled by the author 
On one end, the shared governance structure entails a cooperative, non-brokered, and 
collaborative management approach, in which members participate directly as equals in 
both its operative and strategic decision-making processes. Hence, the network is 
participant-governed and decentralized; no formal governance structure is set up or 
required, since the network’s overall functioning depends on its members’ commitment 
and involvement. 
On the other end, governance can either be brokered by a partner (i.e., the lead 
organization) or by a single formalized, external administrative unit set up for this purpose 
(i.e., an NAO). Highly-centralized networks typically have lead organizations; this is a 
brokered and participatory form of governance. In this case, the network is led by one of 
its members for reasons of power, legitimacy, resources, or other asymmetries, because 
it is mandated by an external player, or because partners recognize this structure as the 
most efficient approach to network management. The lead organization provides network 
administration and assumes a facilitating role in pursuing network goals, which are often 
sharply aligned with its own.  
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Finally, the focus of this Ph.D. thesis, the Network Administrative Organization (NAO), 
is a completely external and brokered form of governance, set up specifically to oversee, 
govern, and coordinate the network (Provan and Kenis, 2008:236). 
An NAO’s main purpose is thus to lead the network, rather than to carry out a network-
level goal or mission. The Network Administrative Organization (which can be a single 
individual or a broader and more formalized entity) is not a member of the network by 
nature. The NAO, usually established when a network has broad and complex goals, is in 
charge of executing the operational decisions required to attain them. Table 2.3 
summarizes the characteristics of the aforementioned forms of network governance. 
Table 2.3. Characteristics of goal-directed networks’ modes of governance  
Shared Governance  Lead Organization  NAO  
PARTICIPANT-GOVERNED: by network’s members with no 
separate or unique governance entity.  Externally Governed  
Non-Brokered  Brokered 
Involvement and 
commitment of partners is 
key 
Potentially closely aligned with the 
goals of the LO 
The NAO is not a member 
Collective Decision-making All major activity levels 
coordinated by a single participant 
(LO) 
Externally governed through the 
NAO 
Collective Management LO provides 
administration/facilities 
Set up to stimulate network 
growth and to ensure that network 
goals are met 
Symmetrical power Asymmetrical power Scale: single individual to formal 
organization 
No distinct administrative 
formal unit /decentralized 
Highly centralized and brokered Centralized 
Source: compiled by the author 
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 Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that “the successful adoption of a particular form of 
governance will be based on four key structural and relational contingencies: trust, size, 
goal consensus, and the nature of the task (i.e., “the need for network-level 
competencies,” p. 237). Provan and Kenis’s (2008) underlying assumption is that the 
above-mentioned contingency factors are key predictors that determine the choice of 
governance form in goal-directed networks. The contingencies are garnered from the 
network literature and considered of relevance in choosing a form of governance. As the 
authors point out, the four contingency factors included in this model are not exhaustive. 
These factors represent mainly inherent structural or network design elements that can be 
supplemented, building on the extant body of network literature, with other contextual or 
environmental factors—such as complexity, power, or uncertainty—that affect how the 
network is managed (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Milward and Provan, 2000; Provan 
and Milward, 1995).  
 
2.3. The design of Network Administrative Organizations 
While Provan and Kenis’s (2008) classical triad is a solid stepping stone toward 
understanding network governance, it has some shortcomings with respect to our research 
aims. Provan and Kenis’s (2008) ground-breaking work on network governance does not 
explicitly provide a specific set of defining elements found in the structure of this form 
of governance. In particular, their framework stops short of developing a precise 
characterization of NAOs; it does not specify how or why NAOs differ in form and 
structure. This is precisely the overarching research objective we aim to explore.  
Having taken stock of the previous literature on goal-directed networks and their forms 
of governance, we may also bring into play the contributions of scholars in the inter-
organizational field. Here, one should sound a note of caution. We are fully aware of the 
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challenges arising from this interplay. They stem largely from the governmental nature 
of some of the agencies involved in public goal-directed networks, the type of goods and 
services provided, and the utterly different effectiveness measures applied. Even so, 
following Isset et al. (2011), we argue that the public management literature on networks 
will benefit from findings drawn from disciplines such as management and sociology, 
which are more advanced in their network research. Furthermore, we wholly agree with 
Isset’s statement (Isset, 2011, i168): “our field (public management) needs to be more 
cognizant of the network literature in other disciplines and to employ this research to 
advance our own understanding of network issues in public sector contexts.” In particular, 
we focus on Contingency Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, and Agency Theory, as 
applied to contexts with multiple principals.  
 
2.3.1. Contingency Theory and the Design of Network Administrative Organizations 
In particular, we first take on the literature on contingency theory applied to new 
organizational forms. Simply stated, contingency theory, or structural contingency theory 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Donaldson, 2001; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 
1967), an outgrowth of system design, contends that there is no best, universally 
applicable way of organizing, and that different ways of organizing will not be equally 
effective (Galbraith, 1973). Developed as a behavioral theory to assess the effectiveness 
of different leadership styles in various contextual situations (Fiedler, 1972), contingency 
theory applied to organizational structures assumes that organizations whose internal 
characteristics better match their environmental demands will tend to achieve a higher 
degree of adaptation (Scott and Davis, 2007). The term was coined in 1967 by Lawrence 
and Lorsch, who argued that the amount of uncertainty and rate of change in an 
environment had an impact on the development of internal features in organizations. 
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 Contingency theory is deterministic, assuming that the best design is that which fits an 
organization’s key contingencies, allowing it to better achieve its goals. Moreover, it 
holds that the “fit” between the two has a direct positive and causal relation with 
organizational performance (Donaldson, 2001; Miles and Snow, 2006; Mintzberg, 1983).  
Complex organizations, such as goal-directed networks, are better understood when the 
study of their internal mechanisms (i.e., their NAOs) is linked to the demands of their 
organizational settings (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). As posited by Miles and Snow 
(1986), organizations must first achieve a high degree of external fit (i.e., with the 
environment). Second, the structure of the organization and its managerial activities must 
align with its strategy (i.e., internal fit). Third, an organization must dispose of elements, 
in order to continuously adapt and maintain fit over the long run (i.e., dynamic fit). Thus, 
the most effective organizations exhibit a fine-grained match between their structure and 
activities and the uncertainty and/or complexity of their environments (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). 
Contingency theory provides an influential framework for analyzing the structural design 
of organizations (Luo and Donaldson, 2013). Given our interest in how and why NAOs 
are designed as they are, it is only logical to draw on classic organizational design and 
contingency theory when exploring the factors associated with NAO design.  
2.3.2. Resource Dependence Theory and the design of Network Administrative 
Organizations 
In this Ph.D. thesis, we also draw on Resource-Dependence Theory. According to the 
tenets of Resource-Dependence Theory, organizations are characterized as open systems 
that depend on their external contexts (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
theory takes up Emerson’s (1962) exchange-based power approach and assumes the 
existence of interdependences among organizations.  
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Resource-Dependence Theory builds on three core ideas: a) the organization’s social 
environment matters; b) within a given context, organizations have at their disposal 
different tactics to pursue their interests and maintain autonomy; and, c) power is key to 
understanding these actions (Davis and Cob, 2009). Social control is understood as a 
process in which both the influencer and the actions of the focal organization affect the 
governance of the influence process. Thus, resource dependences linked to the 
environment and to specific individual goals convey both interdependence and conflict 
(Scarp, 1978).  
From a more political perspective, as Hennart (2011) argues, autonomy, dependence, 
cooperation, conflict, control, coordination, coercion, and force are determined by the 
interplay, generation, and distribution of power among organizations. Resource-
Dependence Theory argues that organizations will seek less constraining devices to 
govern their relationship with their environment, thus managing dependence and 
uncertainty while safeguarding autonomy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Environmental uncertainty is defined by Pfeffer and Salancik as “the degree to which 
future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted” (p. 67). When 
uncertainty is coupled with a situation of critical interdependence, organizations are 
forced to cope with it to stabilize the environment and reduce uncertainty (Thompson 
1967). As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue, power is “the ability to organize activities 
to minimize uncertainties and costs” (p. 284).  
We expect power and interdependences (generated by both context and the tasks a 
network must perform) to play a role in the design of NAOs, especially when determining 
access to critical resources for network members and the adoption or change of beneficial 
norms related to network governance mechanisms.  
2.3.3. Multiple Principals and Agency Theory and the design of Network 
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 Administrative Organizations 
In NAO-governed networks, the collaborative dimension is salient. An NAO has multiple 
principals, who must collaborate among themselves, as well as an agent, the NAO 
executive. Thus, networks face a “multiple principals” scenario (Miller, 2005; Whitford, 
2005), as their governance arrangements need to accommodate and deal with multiple 
network members (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Grossman, 2002; Child and Rodrigues, 
2003). To theoretically deal with this multiple principals’ context, we draw on a third 
literature stream, Corporate Governance. As defined by Aguilera and Jackson (2010), 
Corporate Governance elucidates the “power and influence over decision making within 
the corporation” (p. 487), a critical dimension when analyzing the design of NAOs. This 
approach allows us to analyze how governance structures are designed to serve different 
interests and needs within a goal-directed network. In a broad sense, corporate 
governance is concerned with the structure and processes that facilitate and determine 
how an organization, especially at its apex, is managed; how the decision-making 
processes are designed; how the organization is held to account; and which tools are used 
to monitor and control effective management (Davis, 2005). These arrangements help to 
define the relationship between governing bodies (i.e., boards of directors), shareholders 
(i.e., owners), stakeholders, and top management, and to establish how power is both 
limited and delegated (Urhig, 2003). The effectiveness of an organization’s governance 
structures and mechanisms appears to affect its ability to attain goals and create value for 
its stakeholders (Jensen, 1993; John and Senbet; OECD, 1999, 2004; Vishny and Shleifer, 
1997). For private sector organizations, the interplay between management and 
ownership is the main vector driving the rationale for governance choices (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Gillan, Hartzel, and Starks, 2011; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Although 
these variables do play a role in public sector corporate governance arrangements, others, 
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such as transparency, compliance, stewardship, accountability, and a stronger focus on 
stakeholders appear to be core and more relevant (Edwards and Clough, 2005).  
Within corporate governance literature, we build on Agency Theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), to explore the issue of governance/management design. The difficult 
equilibrium between power and control, pointed out by Berle and Means (1965), stands 
at the core of Agency Theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Principals delegate management responsibilities to agents, who are responsible for 
running the business in the best interest of the owners (Clarke, 2004). However, this 
alignment may not always apply, due to information asymmetries or incongruences 
among principals and their agents, opportunistic and/or self-interested behavior by agents, 
or, simply, different assessments of risk. Therefore, the main function of a board of 
directors is to adequately monitor and reward management (Fama and Jensen, 1976), in 
order to dissuade agents from pursuing interests other than those of the company’s 
shareholders.  
However, when it comes to contexts involving multiple principals, such as Network 
Administrative Organizations, the assumption that principals direct agents based on 
coherent preferences (Miller, 2005) does not totally hold. According to Moe (1984) public 
agencies are often caught between warring principals. This may sometimes be the case in 
NAO-governed networks, in which multiple principals (i.e., network members), meet at 
different points in time to make collective decisions and supervise the NAO executive. 
This multilateral decision-making occurs though a specific organizational unit: an 
assembly or board. One of the most important issues for boards, in particular network 
boards, is decision-making (Agranoff, 2007), since the board’s most important function 
is to provide a space where major decisions can be collectively taken, and where the NAO 
director general and his or her executive staff are monitored. Accordingly, the design of 
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 NAOs, including their governance bodies and decision-making mechanisms, reflects the 
competing preferences of multiple principals, casting a shadow toward the future.  
To explore this area further, we also draw on Transaction-Cost Theory, which provides a 
framework for choosing the optimum mode for coping with incomplete contracts and 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1975). In the business alliance literature, Transaction-Cost 
Theory has been successfully applied to the choice of governance mechanism, enabling 
managers to choose between contract and joint-venture alliances (Hennart, 1988; Talman, 
2009). In dealing with potential opportunistic behavior, partners in an inter-organizational 
relationship seek to reduce transaction risks by establishing the right monitoring and 
steering mechanisms. Provan and Kenis (2008) draw on Transaction-Cost Theory when 
developing contingency factors for the network form of governance, and, in particular, 
when predicting that networks with more members—i.e., with higher coordination 
costs—are best governed by NAOs. Thus, Transaction Cost Economics may help 
researchers better understand the antecedents and factors associated with the design of 
Network Administrative Organizations.  
 
2.4. The theoretical framework in context  
The following table establishes connections between the literature reviewed, the 
overarching research aim of the thesis, the specific research questions addressed in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and the methods used. 
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Table 2.4. Summary of the theoretical framework 
 
Overarching 
research aim 
To explain the design of Network Administrative Organizations by revealing some of the factors 
and processes associated with the organizational governance choices made by European 
Regulatory Networks.  
More specifically, this Ph.D. aims to unveil the role of power, resource interdependences, and 
uncertainty in the design of Network Administrative Organizations.  
 
Key factors 
affecting the 
design of Network 
Administrative 
Organizations 
(derived from the 
overarching 
framework) 
(i) the partial delegation of 
governance to a broker (i.e., agent) and the 
existence of multiple principals (i.e., 
network members),  
Agency Theory (multiple principals); Contingency 
Theory; Transaction Costs  
(ii) the interplay of power and 
resource interdependences,  
Contingency Theory; Resource Dependence 
Theory; Bargaining Power  
(iii) the risk of opportunistic behavior 
(both from members and from the agent) 
Agency Theory (multiple principals); Transaction 
Costs 
(iv) the safeguards established to 
manage uncertainty in relation to network 
tasks, future decisions, and NAO 
monitoring and steering 
Contingency Theory; Resource Dependence Theory  
(v) the collective decision-making 
process among members 
Contingency Theory; Collective Action 
Research 
Questions 
Chapter 4: What are the 
antecedents and 
consequences of 
interdependence? How has 
the construct been 
operationalized?  
Chapter 5: How does power 
bargaining affect the NAO’s 
ability to develop mandated 
networks? 
Chapter 6: What factors affect the 
structural complexity of network 
administrative organizations 
(NAOs)?  
Methodologies and 
techniques applied 
Systematic literature 
review 
Qualitative: Specifically, we 
analyze differences or 
similarities among various 
cases, using a grounded and 
inductive strategy (Glasser and 
Strauss, 1967). The cases are 
built using an inductive coding 
strategy (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) involving documents 
relating to the creation and 
design of networks and 
transcripts of interviews with 
the main actors involved in the 
process. This strategy allows 
us, after several types of 
coding, to reunite a corpus of 
material on tension, conflict, 
and the role of power in the 
design phases of Network 
Administrative Organizations. 
Quantitative: Specifically, we 
apply an Item Response 
Modeling technique that assigns 
different weights to each 
institutional characteristic in an 
iterative process, and is able to 
discriminate among organizations 
(i.e., networks) and to rank 
institutional characteristics. 
Afterwards, using Bayesian 
Statistics, this score is used to 
infer associations among 
institutional characteristics, and 
variable-related tasks, age, sector, 
and the institution’s mandated or 
voluntary nature. This analysis 
aims to quantitatively assess the 
relationships among a set of 
contingent elements (tasks, age, 
sector and mandated or voluntary 
nature) and a set of institutional 
characteristics of NAOs to 
determine the factors affecting 
their design. 
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 2.5. Regulatory Goal-Directed Networks 
Nowadays, goal-directed networks are increasingly used as a tool for achieving 
international regulatory harmonization (Levi-Faur, 2011; Raustiala, 2002). In an 
interconnected and interdependent world, the need for common regulatory frameworks is 
central to the political, economic, and social arenas (Levi-Faur, 2011; Mattli and Woods, 
2009). Nation-states find themselves at a crossroads. While their will to delegate 
sovereignty is by nature limited, national governments acknowledge a decreasing 
capacity to tackle crucial phenomena in isolation (Keohane and Nye, 2000). In this 
context, international networks of independent national regulators provide a feasible and 
acceptable mechanism for fostering regulatory coordination regionally or globally 
(Kahler and Lake, 2009). Regulatory networks offer a middle way between full delegation 
to a superordinate level and full autocracy. The subset of regulatory public goal-directed 
networks constitutes the object of study of this dissertation. 
The European Union and the so-called Single European Regulatory Space perfectly 
illustrate the proliferation of different types of networked regulatory organizations (Levi-
Faur, 2011). Although both networks and agencies (Coen and Thatcher, 2008) have been 
implemented as institutional regulatory solutions in the EU, as Levi-Faur (2011) points 
out, from a functional point of view (beyond terminology) the distinction is not 
straightforward. Network-like forms of regulatory coordination are commonplace in the 
European Union.  
According to Levi-Faur (2011), there are thirty-six different regulatory regimes in the 
European Union. Levi-Faur builds on Jordana et al.’s (2011) initial taxonomy of fifteen 
regimes. A regulatory regime encompasses norms, a mechanism for decision-making, and 
the various institutions and the networks of actors involved in regulation (Levi-Faur, 
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2001:811). The role played by these networks as supranational governance entities has 
recently been explored (Coen and Thatcher, 2008; Kelemen and Tarrant, 2001; Levi-Faur, 
2011). Within the Single European Regulatory Space (SERS) (Levi-Faur, 2011), 
cooperation among member states, national regulatory agencies, and EU institutional 
players (i.e., mainly the European Commission, but also the European Parliament and 
Council) is commonly achieved through networks of regulators, whose final aim is to 
harmonize the implementation of rules across the EU.  
The choice of European networks of regulators as the empirical material for this 
dissertation has involved both theoretical and practical considerations. First of all, as 
mentioned, the effervescence of phenomena in the European institutional landscape 
makes it possible to explore the governance of these networks and the design of their 
NAOs as a relevant object of analysis. As public networks, regulatory networks have 
specific legal, political, and accountability characteristics that, in contrast to for-profit 
networks, act as a constraint when such networks are formed (Herranz, 2008), potentially 
affecting the design of network governance structures. More concretely, most of the 
European networks of regulators targeted in this dissertation are mandated networks, set 
up as consultative bodies by a legislative European act. The mandate and the supporting 
legislation define their main rules, units, procedures, and other important design elements. 
The capacity to modify them autonomously is limited, as this would require a new 
legislative act. The mandate establishes who belongs to the network; normally, named 
entities have a right to participate (Kelemen and Tarrant, 2011), and cannot with withdraw 
from or avoid the network.  
Finally, the subset of European networks of regulators offers a real-world illustration of 
the wide array of purposes and tasks these networks may perform. Following Agranoff 
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 (2007), we expect public networks (including networks of regulators) to at least carry out 
some information-sharing activities. In addition, networks may implement joint-action 
activities, which stretch collaboration to its maximum. With respect to regulatory 
networks in particular, Levi-Faur (2011) identifies four functional tasks: information 
gathering, rule setting, monitoring, and enforcement tasks.  
To summarize, the subset of European networks of regulators is an ideal object for study 
because it offers sufficiently various purposes, tasks, sectors, and institutional 
development to enable us to tackle the overarching research objective of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 3:  
Regulating through networks1  
This chapter explores the configurational design of European Regulatory networks 
using insights derived from a custom-built database. 
 
  
1 Salvador, Susanna, Adrià Albareda, and Angel Saz-Carranza. "Regulatory Agencies and Regulatory 
Networks in the European Union." The Global Context (2015): 178. 
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3.1. The Boom in Regulatory Activity in the EU 
Throughout the last decades, the EU has significantly increased its regulatory capacity, a 
development that has run parallel to the more traditional trend of European member states 
delegating powers to EU institutions. As a result, the European regulatory landscape is 
plagued with a surfeit of agencies and networks with regulatory responsibilities that cover 
a wide array of policy domains (Levi-Faur, 2011a). Almost all aspects of human social 
and economic activity fall under the influence and control of these regulatory tools of EU 
meta-governance.  
The use of autonomous regulatory mechanisms to foster market integration and market 
correction policies in the EU reveals a complex picture, involving both governance 
mechanisms and tasks (ranging from the mere exchange of information to the power of 
sanctioning or even autonomously enacting new rules and norms), resources (staff, 
decision-making structures, and professionalization), and levels of autonomy and 
discretion in pursuing their objectives. This chapter provides an overview of the current 
state of regulatory networks and agencies in Europe by analyzing 40 European regulatory 
agencies and networks and their main characteristics. 
The data used in this chapter comes from a data-set built by the authors, which includes 
information about structural characteristics relating to the governance (membership, 
board characteristics, and voting mechanisms), age, staff, budget, and tasks of 40 
European regulatory agencies and networks. The data covers all regulatory regimes in 
Europe including utilities (energy and telecommunication), health, medicine, chemical 
products, food, aviation, fisheries, postal services, transportation, security, judicial 
cooperation, and environmental issues.  
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 Our results are consistent with previous findings, which show that regulatory agencies 
and networks actually do co-exist in Europe. In fact, our analysis of structural 
characteristics shows that, beyond labels, regulation in Europe is undergoing a process of 
hybridization and orchestration that must be acknowledged by all economic, social, 
administrative, and political players both within and outside the EU.  
This process is critical of our times and must be studied and recognized for many reasons. 
First, as regulation begins to determine economic and social activities of any kind, 
practitioners need to know who is regulating that sector or industry. More importantly, 
they need to delve more deeply, increasing their awareness of how and through which 
mechanisms a particular agency or network decides which regulatory tasks should be 
carried out at the European level and which at a national level. Such decisions impact the 
professionalization of certain agencies and networks. In addition, many European 
regulatory devices have been established by mandate, in contrast to voluntary devices, 
encompassing national regulatory agencies, which have generally been created from a 
bottom-up process. This contrast makes it a challenge to understand regulation 
complexity. 
Second, it is widely recognized that non-market strategies—defined as coordinated 
actions undertaken by firms in public policy arenas—are becoming increasingly relevant 
(Baron 1995; Bonardi, Holburg, and Vanden Bergh, 2006). The current governance 
framework (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh, 2012) assumes a more cooperative 
relationship between private and public actors. In this exchange, regulation and 
information flows are pivotal. Regulatory decisions and activities affect and have 
important consequences for firms and companies. Economic, corporate, and social agents 
must consider that, beyond the state’s traditional redistributive role (Lowi 1964; Majone 
1997), where the flow of resources can be identified, regulation defines arenas in which 
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interests are confronted, and the costs and benefits are much more difficult to track (Levi-
Faur, 2011a). Thus, actively managing the regulatory environment requires an in-depth 
knowledge of the regulatory activities carried out by European players at various 
administrative and political levels. 
This discussion proceeds as follows. First, we briefly summarize the developments and 
trends in the widespread use of regulatory agencies and networks all over the world. Next, 
we focus on the case of the EU, reflecting on the existence of both agencies and networks 
in the European regulatory landscape. Finally, we consider the tasks these regulatory 
agencies and networks are performing.  
 
3.2. Present-day Shifts in Governance and Regulation 
Our world is networked (Castells, 2001). The dynamics of business, social, and economic 
interactions revolve around interdependences, which determine the nature of exchanges 
and the mechanisms needed to govern them (Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009). In 
parallel, modern organizations of all kinds are becoming more complex, challenging 
traditional responses to corporate, social, and policy issues (Farazmand, 2002).  
Two intertwined features define today’s reality. On the one hand, the trends of 
regionalization, internationalization, and globalization are unstoppable. On the other 
hand, regardless of whether you are a company manager, politician, social activist, or 
common citizen, the problems you encounter and tackle will be complex (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973), and not easily bounded by regional or national borders. 
In this scenario, the old hierarchical system in which state authorities governed civil 
society from the top down no longer exists (Mayntz 1998). Previously, policy formulation 
and implementation fell into the exclusive realm of governments; now, non-state actors 
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 play an active and central role in these activities (Rhodes, 1997). In addition, the state is 
no longer considered omnipotent or capable of unilaterally resolving societal problems; 
it must therefore establish a more balanced relationship with corporate and social actors 
(Mendoza and Vernis, 2008). 
Regulation and regulatory activities have not been immune to these changes and 
challenges. Nowadays, the regulatory role of the state, in its relation to private sectors of 
society, is diverse. Its responsibilities range from creating rules (on its own or by 
delegation), to monitoring them (for example, through investigation or sanctions). The 
tipping point is the role of courts in resolving conflicts or offences (Freiberg, 2010).  
However, regulatory activities are no longer solely performed by the state. Hancher and 
Moran (1989) have noted the existence of the so-called “regulatory space.” The image of 
a regulatory space makes it possible to illustrate the interplay between traditional norms 
and legal rules with other frameworks in the design, implementation, and even 
enforcement of regulations, in which private and autonomous actors have an active role. 
The contribution of private actors to governance and regulation has been analyzed from 
the perspective of de-centering (Black, 2001; Scott, 2004; Parker and Braithwaite, 2003; 
Gunningham, 2009). As Wolf (2006) signals, private actors make issue-specific 
contributions to governance (identifying problems, providing information, articulating 
rules, implementing initiatives, monitoring conduct, and carrying out arbitration and 
sanctions) as well as more general contributions, such as when they help to avoid negative 
externalities or support common societal goals. As mentioned, some of these activities 
are identifiable with regulation (as is the case with authoritative decision-making or 
accreditations), a capacity that not long ago was an exclusive property and prerogative of 
the sovereign state (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, 1999). 
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Following Freiberg (2010), we argue that regulation is a pervasive activity inherently 
related to power, influence, and control. It represents the way in which power, influence, 
and control are used to achieve compliance with agreed-upon behaviors that otherwise 
would not be observed. This comprehensive view of regulation assumes that diverse 
mechanisms can be used to implement regulatory activities, either individually or 
complementarily, in all social and economic policy arenas and all human activities and 
relationships. As an illustration, Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) propose the following 
categories for regulatory activities: “command and control,” self-regulation, voluntarism, 
education and information, and economic methods and markets. Others, such as Parker 
and Braithwaite (2003), cite co-regulation, corporate compliance systems, incentive-
based systems, authorizations, and third-party accreditations in relation to standards.  
Some of the activities related to this broad concept of regulation (including rule-making, 
accreditation, research activities to inform policy, information diffusion, sanctioning, 
authorization, standard-setting, and cross-border interaction management) have, over the 
last decade, increasingly been delegated to autonomous regulatory agencies. Jordana, 
Levi-Faur, and Fernández-i-Marin (2010) show the global diffusion of these agencies 
over recent decades (from fewer than five per year created before the 1980s, to more than 
20 per year between 1996 and 2002). The authors argue that regulation by autonomous 
regulatory agencies has become the dominant governance model, at least in the advanced 
capitalist economies, in most social and economic sectors.  
The increasing number of regulatory agencies is also related to the emergence of the 
paradigm of New Public Management, which requires public services to be restructured 
both vertically and horizontally, and scales back government (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2011). For decades, regulatory activities in Europe have been ideologically linked to an 
active government role in shaping the economy (Levi-Faur, 2011a). Establishing 
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 regulatory agencies with strong autonomy and professional values represents a 
paradigmatic shift. However, as counterintuitive as it may appear, the initial attempt to 
deregulate (in order to devolve autonomy and control to other economic and social 
agents), underlying the New Public Management reforms has resulted in new hyper-
regulation, fragmentation, and turf-wars among public organizations (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2011).  
At the same time, at the international level, globalization has prompted a need for the 
multilateral provision of goods and services, requiring transnational and global regulatory 
agreements (Levi-Faur, 2011b; Mattli and Woods, 2009). Nowadays, special purpose 
organizations coordinate regulatory activities that supersede national or regional 
boundaries in an increasing variety of domains. These organizations constitute not only a 
political challenge, since they aim to harmonize regulatory practices in countries whose 
interests and constituencies may collide, but also a public management novelty, as the 
OECD has pointed out.  
Although there are evident shifts towards globalized governance, national governments 
and national sovereignty still play a dominant role. This has positioned networks of 
regulatory authorities as means to achieve inter-organizational transnational coordination 
(Kahler and Lake, 2009). Networked forms of regulation perform three basic functions 
(Slaughter 2004): information-sharing, rule harmonization, and cross-national 
enforcement of regulatory policies. As the next section will show, the functions of EU 
regulatory agencies and networks seem to be affected by the fields in which they operate; 
this has direct implications for their governance structures. 
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3.3. EU Regulatory Agencies and Networks 
Recent decades have witnessed an impressive spread of regulatory agencies throughout 
Europe (Gilardi, 2005). The emergence of the “regulatory state” (Majone, 1997) also 
known as, “regulatory capitalism” (Levi-Faur 2005), has led to the foundation of national 
regulatory agencies across countries and sectors. According to Majone (1997), since the 
1970s, there has been a shift from the positive, interventionist state to a regulatory state. 
This shift can be explained by increasing international competition and economic and 
monetary integration within the EU, as well as by governments’ strategic choices since 
the 1970s, which have led to new styles of policy-making and “more complex standards 
of legitimacy and methods of accountability” (Majone 1997, 163). 
While the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were characterized by the creation of independent or 
semi-independent regulatory agencies at the national level, the Europeanization process 
of the 1990s and 2000s favored the establishment of EU agencies and networks (Levi-
Faur, 2011b). These EU networks and agencies, created in the sectors of energy, transport, 
environment, finance, health, and justice, aim to deal with regulatory issues at the EU 
level.  
Regulatory agencies are responsible for implementing EU legislation at the national level. 
As noted by Coen and Thatcher (2008), the many difficulties that national regulatory 
agencies face when implementing EU regulations led to the establishment of formal and 
informal networks of regulators. In this study, we take into account two important 
institutions that have recently appeared: agencies and networks (Levi-Faur, 2011a; Coen 
and Thatcher, 2008; Majone, 1997). 
The foundation of EU agencies implies: first, that national governments delegate part of 
their sovereignty to EU institutions, and second, that the European Commission delegates 
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 responsibility to independent, professional institutions (i.e., EU agencies). Thus, national 
governments delegate part of their sovereignty to these supranational regulatory bodies. 
EU agencies are comparable to mandated public networks, where a legislative 
superordinate actor—in this case the EU—may impose coordination and collaboration on 
various actors obliged to participate (Rodríguez et al., 2007; Isset and Provan, 2005; 
Moynihan, 2009). EU agencies are established through EU law, which also determines 
their functions and tasks. They are “hybrid bodies that link the EU and national 
levels…namely the Commission and national regulatory agencies” (Coen and Tatcher, 
2008, 52). Following Levi-Faur’s characterization (2011b, 813), we define an agency as 
“an administrative organization with a distinct, formal identity, an internal hierarchy, 
functional capacities, and—most important—at least one principal.” 
In contrast to EU agencies, voluntary networks are an effort to “harmonize the fragmented 
institutional landscape” (Levi-Faur, 2011b, 811). Voluntary networks are defined as a set 
of stable relationships of “a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature which link a 
variety of actors” (Levi-Faur, 2011b, 813). The main feature that distinguishes EU 
agencies from EU networks is the mandated party (i.e., the European Commission), which 
is not present in EU networks.  
This study takes into account 40 regulatory agencies and networks. Our sample is based 
on Lev-Faur’s 36 regulatory regimes (Levi-Faur, 2011b) and on the European Union’s 
official list of decentralized agencies. More specifically, we include 29 out of the 34 EU 
decentralized agencies and 11 out of the 51 networks cited in Levi-Faur’s study. In this 
chapter, we analyze the governance structure characteristics of these organizations. 
Although regulatory networks and agencies could be expected to have different 
governance mechanisms, we analyze the top decision-making structures of each 
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organization without taking into account the label used to identify them (i.e., authority, 
agency, or network).  
In our enquiry, we use one of the ideal types of network governance identified by Provan 
and Kenis (2008), the “Network Administrative Organization,” focusing on the unit 
deliberately created to govern the organization. Only those networks with NAOs were 
included in the sample. We have not included organizations under the direct control of 
EU-level institutions.  
The figure below illustrates the emergence of agencies and networks. Although one 
regulatory agency was founded in 1975, it was not until the 1990s, and particularly since 
the beginning of the 2000s, that the establishment of agencies and networks really took 
off.  
Figure 3.1. The number of EU Agencies and Networks 
  
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on an original dataset 
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 Research into the organizations captured in this study reveals how EU agencies and 
networks are organized to accomplish goals. First, each agency or network holds a plenary 
meeting at which representatives from national regulatory agencies come together to 
discuss its main guidelines. Second, most agencies and networks have a management or 
executive committee—elected during the plenary meeting—to monitor the 
implementation of the plenary guidelines. Third, most of the organizations have an office 
or secretariat responsible for daily management. In addition, almost half of the agencies 
or networks have working groups or expert committees that deal with specific issues and 
policies. Finally, most of these organizations have a chairperson and an executive 
director, regardless of whether they are agencies or networks.  
Figure 3.2. The Governance Structure of EU Agencies and Networks (%) 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation  
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Although Levi-Faur (2011b) describes the modes of governance used by EU networks as 
less hierarchical and more open and collegial than those of EU agencies, our empirical 
data show that the main difference between voluntary and mandated networks is that only 
the EU agencies have expert committees and boards of appeal.  
The presence or absence of a board of appeal relates not only to the nature of the 
organization (i.e., whether it is an agency or a network), but also to the sector in which it 
operates and (as discussed below), with the functions of the network. A high level of 
market integration seems to correlate with the establishment of a board of appeal. In this 
vein, we found that agencies in the economy and finance sector (i.e., banking, insurance, 
and harmonization of internal markets) were more likely to have boards of appeal.  
The creation of the EU internal market has increasingly generated a new agenda. Upwards 
delegation to the EU, weak as it may be, reduces national governments’ ability to shape 
and implement policies, thus constraining the extent to which national authorities can 
directly influence economic, social, and environmental activities. At the same time, 
businesses and social actors are obliged to operate in a larger and far more distant market, 
in which the Europe-wide activities of regulatory agencies and networks play a crucial 
role harmonizing rules, standards and norms, and fostering economic liberalization. 
However, market integration needs to be balanced with market correction initiatives that 
tackle, at the European level, urgent demands, crises, and complex social, economic, and 
environmental issues requiring a supranational response. Regulation also serves as a tool 
for achieving this aim. Although it is more difficult to reach a consensus on market 
correction initiatives than on market integration policies, regulatory networks and 
agencies play a role in both.  
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 We found variation in the decision-making systems established; this has clear 
implications for how agencies and networks function. In particular, agencies and 
networks that make decisions using a simple or reinforced majority are expected to be 
more efficient and effective, as they can react rapidly to uncertain environments, quickly 
developing advice, and proposing the necessary regulations and sanctions. Thus, when 
governance boards need consensus in place of a simple or reinforced majority, the risk of 
stasis increases (Greenwood and Webster, 2000). Given this situation, most of the 
governance boards of agencies and networks included in the sample make their decisions 
based on a simple or reinforced majority; only 7.5% of the networks use unanimity 
procedures (see Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3. The decision-making systems used in governance boards 
  
Source: authors’ own compilation 
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effective decision-making, it can also produce stronger positions, which are more easily 
defendable in EU institutions and across the member states.  
Figure 3.4. Decision-making systems in executive boards 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
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 and Thatcher (2008) distinguish regulatory networks along a “soft–hard” continuum, 
which goes from coordination to drafting secondary legislation at the EU level.  
Our empirical analysis of 40 regulatory agencies and networks shows that all of them at 
least share information. However, as presented in Figure 3.5, there is more variation when 
it comes to performing tasks such as providing advice, conducting research, proposing 
rules and regulations, offering training, imposing authorizations to NRAs, conducting 
joint operations, sanctioning members who do not comply with agreed commitments, and 
carrying out campaigns.  
Figure 3.5. EU agencies/networks and tasks 
 
 Source: authors’ own compilation 
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“hard” functions. None of the voluntary regulatory networks have the capacity to carry 
out these functions. More importantly, only 10 out of the 29 EU agencies have the 
capacity to impose authorizations.  
As noted above, the tasks and functions of EU agencies reflect their organizational 
structure. Except in two cases, EU agencies with boards of appeal are able to produce 
authorizations. Even more importantly, the three EU agencies able to sanction national 
regulators also have boards of appeal.  
Like its organizational structure, an EU agency’s sector appears to influence its capacities 
and functions. On the one hand, agencies that operate in the economy and finance sectors, 
alongside the ACER (the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators), have “hard” 
functions, and are able to sanction national regulators. This list is expanded when we take 
authorizations into account: agencies within the medicine, aviation, and chemical sectors 
also have this capacity. On the other hand, 13 out of the 29 agencies do not have any 
“hard” functions (i.e., they do not propose rules and regulations, authorizations, or 
sanctions). Instead, they focus on providing advice, scientific research, training, and, in 
some instances, coordinating joint operations (particularly agencies that deal with 
security and policing issues). The same is true for the 11 networks included in the sample: 
their functions cannot be considered “hard,” as they mainly involve sharing information, 
providing advice, and externally lobbying the EU.  
From our analysis, the tasks and functions regulatory agencies and networks perform 
vary; they are sometimes related to the level of or need for market integration, and 
sometimes to the salience and sensitivity of different economic and/or social sectors. In 
fact, while some think that regulation is linked to neo-liberalist views that undermine the 
welfare state (Majone, 1994), others propose a social engineering role for regulation 
(Zedner 2006). The EU case illustrates this tension, as shown by the number of regulatory 
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 devices and the tasks they perform in all areas of European policy. Moreover, as 
mentioned, when delegating regulatory tasks to European-wide networks and agencies—
a shift initially triggered by the need to harmonize and coordinate activities in order to 
ensure the free movement of people and goods in Europe (market creation and 
integration)—it is important to guarantee, at the same European level, regulatory devices 
and practices that avoid negative externalities and execute the market correction activities 
that society demands.  
 
3.4. Conclusions 
The EU regulatory system is not fixed, as Levi-Faur has noted (2011b, 826): it is 
“constantly changing and reinventing itself in order to keep pace with Europeanization, 
liberalization, and market integration.” In addition, economic, social, and environmental 
crises can shape the universe of agencies and networks in the EU. EU regulation, a 
pervasive activity nowadays, is carried out partly by regulatory agencies and networks. 
This was apparent during the last economic crisis, which furthered the establishment of 
new agencies in the economic and finance sector and strengthened the capacities of old 
ones. Regulatory activities in the EU help to create an integrated market while at the same 
time preserving and safeguarding the common good. In other words, regulatory activities 
shape markets, but also correct them. 
As upwards delegation to EU institutions continues, the role of European-wide regulatory 
agencies and networks is crucial. Social and economic activities of all kinds depend to 
some extent on the activities performed by regulatory agencies and networks. Whether 
these activities merely share information or actually establish norms, authorize activities 
and/or sanction non-compliance, private actors must enrich their knowledge not only of 
what is being regulated, but also of how it is done and by whom. This chapter offers a 
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brief overview of the tasks that agencies and networks currently carry out at the European 
level when it comes to regulatory activities. More importantly, we briefly describe the 
characteristics of these organizations in terms of governance structure and decision-
making mechanisms.  
In a governance framework, the horizontal interaction between public and private actors 
is pivotal. Exchanging information and resources between social and economic agents 
requires a high-quality and in-depth analysis of the nature and characteristics of those 
public and private organizations, in order to determine how economic and social activities 
are to be performed in our societies.  
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Chapter 4:  
At the Core of Networks and Collaboration: Interdependence 
in Public Management 
This chapter was presented at a Public Management Research Conference  
held in Korea in June 2014. 
  
66 
 
  
Abstract 
This chapter develops a theoretical model on the antecedents and consequences of 
interdependence in public management collaborative settings. A systematic review of the 
interdependence construct in top peer-reviewed public management journals shows that, 
while the construct is widely used in our field, the literature shared definition or method 
of operationalization and does not analyze its effects in depth. After exploring and 
categorizing the ways in which public management scholars have understood the concept, 
we develop a framework that sheds light on associations among antecedents and 
consequences of interdependence. The paper ends with suggestions for potential future 
directions for research. 
Key words: interdependence, collaboration, systematic literature review. 
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 4.1. Introduction  
Collaboration, in all of its expressions, is becoming the quintessence of service delivery 
and policy making (Alter and Hage, 1993; Huxham, 2000). Characterized long ago as a 
society of networks (Castells 2000; Raab and Kenis 2009), modern social, economic and 
political contexts around the world are better understood when considering the multilayer 
linkages among decision-makers, stakeholders, and the multiplicity of actors involved in 
attaining policy goals. The scholarly focus on collaborative governance in all of its 
various forms is definitely not new. For the last few decades, public management scholars 
have helped to enhance our knowledge of the collaborative spectrum (i.e., public –public, 
public–nonprofit, public–private, public–private-nonprofit, partnerships, networks, and 
joined-up government) both by providing empirical illustrations and by theorizing about 
these phenomena. 
 In this vein, inter-agency collaboration through networks or similar arrangements is 
commonplace in many policy areas (Hudson et al., 1999; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). 
Governments and for-profit/non-profit organizations engage in public–private 
partnerships to provide infrastructure, welfare services, and urban regeneration programs 
among others (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002). Last but not least, co-production and co-
creation initiatives channel citizenship and public agency collaborations into public 
service design and implementation (Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2014). In this 
scenario, public value is not achieved by single actors in isolation (Isett et al., 2011), but 
result from the combined interactions of those with the capacity to decide, those who 
possess the necessary resources, and those who are interested in a particular issue. 
Underpinning this statement is the idea of interdependence as a theoretical construct. 
Our scholarly community has transposed, extended, and developed a concept drawn from 
organizational design and organizational studies. On the one hand, the literature on 
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organizational design relies on the concept of interdependence—generally, task 
interdependence (Mintzberg, 1973; Thompson, 1967)—to determine organizational 
structure. On the other hand, interdependence lies at the core of Resource Dependence 
Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Whiters and Collins, 2009), whose 
tenets explain why organizations interact with their environments to reduce uncertainty 
and to control the resources they need to succeed. 
To date, when it comes to interdependence, the literature on public management is 
blurred. The concept is defined contingently in accordance with the setting of each study; 
a nuanced and collectively agreed understanding of the construct is missing. As our 
review shows, although interdependence is frequently mentioned in our field, it is rarely 
empirically assessed or operationalized. It encompasses multiple explanations and is 
tackled from different theoretical backgrounds. Thus, our main aim is to shed light on 
how the construct of interdependence has been used, defined, and operationalized in the 
field of public management. More specifically, our research questions are as follows: 
According to the literature, what are the antecedents and consequences of 
interdependence? If the construct has been operationalized, how has this been done? 
The chapter carries out a systematic review of the use of the construct interdependence in 
public management literature. Following recent similar contributions in our field (Isett et 
al., 2011; Turrini et al., 2010; Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007; Voorberg, Bekkers, and 
Tummers, 2014), this literature review has the following structure. First, a brief 
conceptual section explores interdependence, disentangling its theoretical tenets. This is 
followed by a methods section that details our strategy for reviewing the construct. The 
third section provides an overview of our findings, derived from an analysis of 217 
articles published in top, peer-reviewed public management journals during the last few 
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 decades. We next present a theoretical model based on our findings. We conclude by 
discussing the model and proposing a series of future developments. 
 
4.2. Interdependence: power, inter-organizational relations, and more.  
In order to answer our research questions and to understand both the construct and its use, 
we execute a systematic review of published work that revolves around the construct of 
interdependence. We track down the use of interdependence as a theoretical construct in 
the literature of management and organization studies, back to the second half of the 
twentieth century. What follows is a brief historical overview, based on seminal articles 
and papers on dependence, power, resource dependence theory, and inter-organizational 
relations; these help to explain the theoretical roots of this construct. 
In 1962, Emerson’s power conceptualization identified patterns of mutual dependence 
(i.e., interdependence) among individuals (and organizations) as a core element of any 
relationship. Building on this contribution, Homans’s (1950, 1974) and Blau’s (1964) 
Social Exchange Theory based social and human interaction on the reciprocal exchange 
of rewards. Blau’s (1964) contribution extended beyond dyadic relationships, conceiving 
specific exchanges and rewards as a product of interactions in networks (Bienenstock and 
Bonacich, 1992, 1997; Cook, 1977, 1982; Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992). 
 Thompson’s (1967) book, Organizations in Action also represents a milestone in the 
literature on power and interdependencies. Thompson (1967) characterizes and defines 
three different types of interdependence on the basis of interaction intensity and the 
linkages required to deliver a certain task. With pooled interdependence, progress is 
independent among units, and the need for coordination is minimal. In a situation of 
sequential interdependence, progress is sequential (i.e., to progress, B requires A to 
finish) and, therefore, a certain degree of coordinative effort is needed. Finally, with 
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reciprocal interdependence, different units work simultaneously to execute a task, thus 
implying more complexity and the highest level of coordination. 
These studies on power and dependencies were the foundations for Benson’s (1975) 
explanation of why organizations establish inter-organizational linkages. In his classic 
piece, Benson (1975) defines inter-organizational networks as a form of political 
economy. In his view, organizations create, maintain, and develop patterns of 
communication and exchange that they use to acquire and offer scarce resources in a 
network of power relations. Thus, Benson (1975) draws on a utilitarian view of inter-
organizational interaction to explain why inter-organizational relations exist. 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) builds on the 
aforementioned contributions to focus on the interdependence of organizations in a given 
organizational environment. RDT has been applied to a wide array of inter-corporate 
relationships, including International Joint Ventures (IJV), strategic alliances, board inter-
locks, and networks (Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008; Hillman, 
Withers, and Collins, 2009). In essence, RDT revolves around two core ideas. 
Organizations are open systems that have at their disposal and possess valuable resources 
(tangible and intangible). At the same time, to achieve their aims, they need resources and 
capabilities possessed by other organizations. This imbalance creates uncertainty, which 
organizations cope with by controlling, accessing or acquiring the required resources 
(Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Thus, the way in which organizations manage their 
environments will enhance, hamper, or constrain their performance since they will be 
more or less well-equipped to fulfill their organizational goals. 
RDT tells us that when vital resources or competences are not available, organizations 
are more likely to establish ties with other organizations (Malatesta and Smith, 2014). 
Organizational environments are dynamic, since organizations manage their network of 
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 interdependences through a recurrent iteration of interactions that creates new patterns of 
dependencies. Each new scenario, in turn, affects both inter- and intra-organizational 
power (Hillman, Whiters, and Collins, 2009). 
To sum up, after more than three decades, RDT has been extensively applied, not only to 
studying mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances, and other inter-organizational 
relationships (Hillman, Whiters, and Collins, 2009), but also to the fields of health and 
social care and public policy (Wry, Cobb, and Aldrich, 2013; Davis and Cobb, 2010). In 
a way, “RDT has acquired the status of a powerful general metaphor” (Casciaro and 
Piskorski, 2005: 167). In the introduction to the second edition of Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
book, Pfeffer argues that, because the metaphor is so widely accepted and successful, 
researchers have not extended or provided sufficient empirical work based on the tenets 
of RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). In other words, its popular use as a metaphor—also 
acknowledged by Hillman, Whiters, and Collins (2009) and Wry, Cobb and Aldrich 
(2013)—should not deter scholars from empirically exploring and operationalizing the 
RDT perspective. Such research could provide interesting insights into the situations in 
which organizations manage complex environments. For instance, Casciaro and Piskorski 
(2005) encourage researchers to acknowledge the importance of conceptually separating 
the constituent constructs of the notion of interdependence: power imbalance and mutual 
dependence. In the same vein, Malatesta and Smith (2014), encourage public 
management researchers to build on RDT. 
Public management scholars are not immune to the popularity of interdependence; the 
concept has been widely adopted by our community. Two interrelated developments 
explain this academic interest. First, as societies become more complex, so do the 
problems facing organizations engaged in the provision of public goods (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973). Creating public value now, more than ever, requires the establishment of 
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mechanisms to coordinate, collaborate, and manage organizational interdependences. In 
response to the interdependence among organizations’ interests and goals, collaboration 
and inter-organizational innovations are commonplace in the public management 
environment (Mandel and Steelman, 2003; Vigoda, 2002; Hudson et al., 1999; Agranoff 
and McGuire, 2003). Second, organizational goals are no longer achievable in isolation 
(Agranoff, 2007). Resource dependencies lie at the core of collaborative efforts in the 
public management arena (Lundin, 2007). As Huang and Provan (2007) point out, when 
it comes to public management, resources include not only those which are highly 
tangible (i.e., funding) but also intangible resources, such as reputation or influence 
(Alexander, 1996). 
This chapter conducts a systematic literature review to produce a conceptual framework 
that accounts for the antecedents and consequences of interdependence, and facilitates the 
analysis, measurement, and operationalization of this construct. The following section is 
devoted to explaining our research strategy when reviewing the literature. 
 
4.3. Methods 
Following the research strategy of recent contributions (Isett et al., 2011; Turrini et al., 
2010; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers, 2014), we 
explore how our scholarly community uses the construct, “interdependence.” Aligned 
with Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers (2014), we base our eligibility criteria on the 
PRISMA Statement2 (Moher et al., 2009): 
2 Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses. For more information visit: 
http://www.prisma-statement.org/ 
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  Type of studies: The articles selected should deal with collaboration for the 
design, delivery, production, and/or implementation of public services and 
policies. 
 Topic of studies: The articles should contain the word “interdependence” in the 
manuscript (i.e., title, abstract, keywords, and/or full text). 
 Type of participants: the subject of study should be collaboration among at least 
a public agency and any private, nonprofit, or public counterpart.  
 Study design: empirical, theoretical and conceptual pieces are eligible. 
Only articles published in English in peer-reviewed journals have been included in the 
search. Papers published between 1962 (when the seminal Emerson piece was published) 
and 2014 were eligible. 
As part of our strategy, we selected a representative set of top peer-reviewed journals in 
public management, using their impact factors and editorial orientation to capture a 
landscape overview of the published research on interdependence. The journals we used 
are as follows: Public Management Review (PMR), Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory (JPART), Public Administration Review (PAR), Public 
Administration (PA), and the International Journal of Public Management (IJPM). 
Using computerized bibliographical databases and our search criteria, this strategy 
enabled us to identify 760 papers. These papers were entered into a preliminary database 
holding relevant information about the contributions: authorship, journal, year of 
publication, and title (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1. Method for systematic literature review 
Keyword search in the text Interdependence OR interdependences OR interdependencies 
Databases:  ISI-Web, JSTOR, EBSCO-Business Premier 
  Topic/English/article or review 
Search criteria Peer-reviewed journals: PMR; JPART; PAR; PA; IJPM 
  Text words/English/articles/full text/reviewed journals 
 Results Total no. of articles retrieved: 760 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
Two researchers reviewed the papers and selected the articles, taking into consideration 
the full manuscript content. To make the selection, the researchers read the papers and 
decided, on the basis of eligibility criteria, whether the paper was suitable. There were 
217 papers dealing with intergovernmental relations, networks and policy networks, 
contractual relationships, partnerships, and Private-Public Partnerships which, among 
others, were included in a secondary database. Those not fulfilling the eligibility criteria 
were excluded. In total, 534 articles were discarded because their use of the construct was 
not related to our study aim. The secondary database holds information on how the 
construct has been used and measured. Tables 4.2–4.4 describe the dataset. 
Table 4.2. Final dataset by methodology 
 Journal 
TYPE OF PAPER 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Normative/Conceptual/ 
Literature Review 
Mixed Methods 
JPART 15 14 7 3 
PMR 17 5 8 0 
PAR 46 22 19 4 
IPMJ 11 10 5 0 
PA 17 2 12 0 
TOTAL 106 53 51 7 
TOTAL % 48,85 24,42 23,50 3,23 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
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 Table 4.3. Final dataset by type of collaboration 
 Journal 
TYPE OF COLLABORATION 
Collaborative 
governance 
Networks Partnerships Contracting 
Inter-governmental 
relations 
Other3 
JPART 4 20 4 3 3 5 
PMR 4 13 8 2 1 2 
PAR 25 34 8 3 11 10 
IPMJ 2 10 5 1 2 6 
PA 5 11 7 0 0 8 
TOTAL 40 88 32 9 17 31 
TOTAL % 18,43 40,55 14,75 4,15 7,83 14,29 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
Table 4.4. Final dataset by policy arena 
 Journal 
TYPE OF POLICY 
Welfare 
Economy and economic 
development 
Infrastructure/ 
Environment 
Not specific service 
/policy area 
Other4 
JPART 11 4 6 7 11 
PMR 13 0 4 11 2 
PAR 32 10 7 22 20 
IPMJ 0 3 6 4 13 
PA 10 0 5 12 4 
TOTAL 66 17 28 56 50 
TOTAL % 30,41 7,83 12,90 25,81 23,04 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
To develop the final categories in which the data is organized, the co-authors coded the 
articles individually. Later, they tested inter-coder reliability; this allowed reviewers to 
harmonize the coding procedure and the final list of categories (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
3 The category “Other” includes: cooperation for development, specific programs set up in order to 
respond to crises, interdependence within organizations.  
4 The category “Other” includes papers that simultaneously take into account different types of policies.  
76 
 
                                               
  
These groups helped to categorize papers by their use of the construct of interdependence, 
and also to develop our findings. The emergent categories selected allowed us to reduce 
our dataset and to focus on the more frequently used meanings of “interdependence” in 
relation to collaborative efforts in public management. Table 4.5. provides information 
on the categories and papers in each category. 
Table 4.5. Final list of categories 
Categories 
Journal 
TOTAL TOTAL% 
PMR JPART PAR PA IPMJ 
Category 1—General description: 
Interdependence as a description of 
the environment in which public 
organizations and the delivery of 
public goods and services are 
embedded 
12 11 25 4 6 58 26.72 
Category 2—To define networks: 
Interdependence as a constituent 
element of networks/specific 
definition of a network 
4 8 12 9 9 42 19.35 
Category 3—Driver of 
collaboration: 
Interdependence as a driver for 
collaborations 
2 8 26 8 5 49 22.58 
Category 4—Resource dependency: 
Interdependence and its managerial 
implications 
3 9 3 3 4 22 10.13 
Category 5 —Element to be 
managed: 
Interdependence as specific 
resources dependencies 
3 2 9 2 2 18 8.29 
Other5 7 3 12 6 0 28 12.90 
TOTAL 31 41 87 32 26 217 - 
TOTAL % 14.28 18.89 40.09 14.74 11.98 - - 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
5 The category “Other” includes those papers that do not clearly fall or take sufficiently into account one 
of these categories. Since the goal of this chapter is to present a bold distinction between the different 
uses of interdependence, we have chosen to exclude them. 
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 4.4. Interdependence: buzz word or sound construct? 
This section provides a detailed account of the categories in which the papers were finally 
grouped. We acknowledge that these broad categories may sometimes overlap. However, 
for the sake of clarity and in order to provide a more fine-grained analysis, we kept them 
separate. We have therefore focused on those characteristics that distinguish each 
category from the others. 
 
4.4.1. Category 1: Public management in the era of interdependence 
Our findings suggest that public management scholars use the word interdependence 
profusely as a general metaphor for modern societies and to explain how public value is 
created. Twenty-six percent of the papers fall into this category, illustrating the 
remarkable amount of contemporary literature on the importance of interdependences 
(Castells, 2000; Ball, Krane, and Lauth, 1982; Pressman, 1975; Radin, 1977). Overall, 
the papers argue that, in contrast to traditional modes of representative democracy, 
boundaries among organizations are becoming less clearly defined, while organizations 
are increasingly more intertwined and interdependent. 
This increased interdependence among public, private, and civil society actors underlies 
a trend that some studies refer to as “horizontal governance.” First of all, governments 
and public agencies depend on community-based exchanges to expand and provide 
services, while non-public organizations involved in the provision of services rely on 
government to obtain resources and funding. Second, specific policy areas such as 
education, where a wide array of policies are implemented through schools, are becoming 
increasingly interdependent. Last, the papers report on how collaborative organizational 
forms are increasingly being adopted and promoted by governments (especially in 
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developed countries, an example being joined-up initiatives in the UK). Overall, our 
findings suggest that the literature acknowledges interdependence (at least referring to its 
existence) in the context of a growing need for public and private inter-organizational 
structures to address the increased complexity of interactions among societal, economic, 
and political actors. 
As for potential explanations, the reviewed literature suggests that actors can no longer 
achieve individual goals in isolation (Agranoff, 2007). They thus exploit their 
interdependences (which may be obvious or barely visible) to respond to client demands. 
As Provan and Sebastian (1998) argue, society asks for network-level outcomes when it 
comes to public services and policies. In this scenario, the production, delivery, 
implementation, and even the design of a given policy becomes a matter of collaborative 
activity. Organizations increasingly have interdependent interests, as the achievement of 
their goals depends on other actors. Additionally, the exploitation of otherwise dispersed 
knowledge can improve and create new and innovative ways to provide public services 
and to increase the legitimacy of a given policy or action. 
To sum up, based on contributions in this category, the literature implies that 
interdependence is an inherent characteristic of modern societies. The multifaceted and 
complex problems that need to be solved in this new scenario can be more effectively 
addressed when different interdependent agents (even across sectors) collaborate to 
develop and implement public policies and services. It is noteworthy that, in general, the 
papers included in this category neither provide any specific account of the nature of the 
interdependences to be managed through collaborative activity, nor operationalize 
interdependence as a variable. 
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 4.4.2. Category 2: Networks and interdependence 
Nineteen percent of the analyzed papers use the construct of interdependence to 
specifically define networks. The papers in this second category are slightly different 
from some of the contributions in Category 1. The decision to develop an exclusive 
additional category was based on two factors: on the one hand, contributions in this 
category deal mostly with networks or/and policy networks. The first category 
represented all kinds of collaborations in which representation and interdependence were 
used to characterize, not types of collaboration but environments that foster collaboration 
in the public sector. On the other hand, the contributions in this category frequently cite 
previous contributions on networks and policy networks. In this category, we find the 
following well-known works on networks: 
 Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997) define policy networks as the strategic response 
of rational, self-interested policy actors to the need to exchange material and 
immaterial resources within a public sector fragmented by New Public Management-
inspired reforms. 
 O’Toole’s (1997, 45) definition of networks as structures of interdependences. 
 Rhodes’ (2000, 61) characterization of networks: “these networks are characterized 
by interdependence between organizations... there are continuous interactions 
between network members caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate 
shared purposes.” 
 Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) and Isett and Provan (2005) define networks as a group 
of goal-oriented interdependent but autonomous actors that join efforts to produce a 
collective output which no single actor can produce on its own. 
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In this category, the literature uses interdependence as a defining element of the network 
concept. With regard to the nature or underlying rationale for the existence of this 
interdependence, the contributions refer to interdependences among interests in a 
particular area of public policy. The papers acknowledge that interactions in the public 
domain are increasing among multiple autonomous yet interdependent nodes. However, 
the majority of the contributions neither specifically assess interdependence within the 
network nor operationalize or characterize it. 
4.4.3. Category 3: Let’s collaborate: interdependence as a driver of collaboration 
The third set of papers (twenty-two percent) refers to interdependence as a driver of or 
prerequisite for collaborative endeavors. Overall, the contributions do not provide 
specific definitions of the construct; instead, they use interdependence to describe the 
situation or scenario leading to collaboration. Thus, papers in this category use 
interdependence to explain why collaboration emerges: organizations that choose to 
collaborate are interdependent to some extent or embedded in a network/environment of 
interdependences (Thomson and Perry, 2006). They do not provide any information about 
the specific nature of interdependence (i.e., resources, goals, or competencies) or about 
the consequences of these interdependences. 
In this category, some authors refer to the concept of mutuality (Powell, 1990), which 
describes situations in which shared interests create mutually beneficial interdependences 
to achieve a goal that surpasses any individual objective. Intriguingly, some authors point 
out that this situation can create a virtuous cycle, in those participating in a collaborative 
endeavor come to perceive themselves as interdependent, thus creating a sense of shared-
fate that fosters new collaborative interactions. Indeed, Larson, Rottinghaus, and Borgen 
(2002) find that when managers perceive their goals as interdependent, collaborative 
activities tend to be more successful and sustainable. 
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4.4.4. Category 4: Resources and interdependence 
Category 4 includes papers in which the authors refer unequivocally to the existence of 
specific resource dependencies among actors participating in collaborations. This 
category only accounts for ten percent of the contributions analyzed. The authors 
profusely quote Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), although most of the resource dependences 
cited are exclusively financial. Building on the tenets of RDT and Social Exchange 
Theory (Blau 1964), cooperation is seen as a direct consequence of resource 
interdependence. In other words, organizations involved in the creation of public goods 
that do not possess or control the resources (financial, staff, information, legal authority,) 
they need to achieve their goals, are highly incentivized to establish and maintain 
collaborative ties (O'Toole and Montjoy, 1984; O'Toole, 2003; Krueger and McGuire, 
2005). In short, Category 4 articles stand out for analyzing the nature and consequences 
of specific resource dependencies. 
Some authors point out that the amount of resources actually exchanged and the degree 
of interdependence among actors may affect the benefit achieved through collaboration 
(Aldrich, 1976; Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; Van de Ven and 
Ferry, 1980). Aiken and Hage (1968) suggest that, as the number of shared resources 
increases, decision making processes become more constrained. However, these papers 
also support the opposite view, arguing that the more resources exchanged (i.e., the more 
interdependences), the higher the commitment to cooperate. 
Organizations tend to exchange resources in a diversified net of interactions that includes 
both tacit and material resources. Interestingly enough, resource dependences are reported 
as an inherent part of new government-vendor relationships —contracting regimes, Smith 
and Lipsky (1993, 43)—in which resource dependencies between public agencies, 
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nonprofits, and private actors involved in the provision of welfare and other human 
services are mutual and deep. However, the papers specifically report on the resource 
interdependences that exist between funders (i.e., public agencies that provide financial 
resources) and social service providers, although this is characterized as an asymmetric 
relationship. The type of resources being exchanged (i.e., tangible vs. intangible 
resources) and the degree to which a given resource is widely dispersed among 
collaborative partners, influences how centralized or de-centralized the collaboration will 
become, thus having implications for how collaborations are actually managed and 
governed. 
 
4.4.5. Category 5: Interdependence and its managerial implications 
The literature (eight percent of the analyzed papers) also builds on the idea of 
interdependence as a contingency to be managed within collaborations. As Kettl (1996, 
9) argues, “interdependencies have radically changed the jobs of public administrators, 
who must now know not only manage the functions of their own agencies but also build 
critical linkages with others.” In fact, interdependence is here considered, reflecting 
Ansell and Gash (2008), a meta-contingency that affects the collaboration’s outcomes. 
Studies suggest that managers need to actively manage current and future 
interdependencies by creating common frameworks and new interdependencies (if 
necessary), and by building trust. Trust is intertwined with interdependence in this 
category. As Rhodes (1999) argues, regular resource exchanges may be rooted in trust. 
At the same time, when interdependences are high, the management of interdependence 
breeds trust, since opportunistic behavior offers few benefits. 
Some of the contributions suggest that repeated interactions relate to the degree of 
complexity and interdependence in a given task (Thompson, 1967). In fact, this creates 
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 new linkages of interdependence (for instance, in social care, where task complexity is 
high and the participation of diverse specialists required), shared values and beliefs. 
Moreover, collaboration will be more successful and sustainable over time if 
organizations perceive their goals as interdependent (Larson, Rottinghaus, and Borgen, 
2002). Trust, time, and interdependence can thus be managed to impact positively (or 
negatively) on collective goals and outcomes. 
Some papers refer to managerial activities and competences, such as networking and 
boundary-spanning skills, that become crucial when managing interdependences. The 
literature suggests that professional and technical knowledge may not be determinant, 
unlike relational and interpersonal skills. In addition, previous inter-organizational 
experience, the ability to integrate knowledge from different disciplines, and the ability 
to learn are crucial when managing interdependencies. 
 
4.4.6. Interdependence as a variable: how do we measure it? 
The final section reports our findings on the way in which interdependence is 
operationalized in the public management literature, one of our main research objectives. 
As previously mentioned, few qualitative or quantitative contributions included 
interdependence as a variable in their analysis. Nevertheless, we did find some instances 
in which authors made an effort to do so. 
In our sample, interdependence is usually operationalized as the number and/or 
importance of interactions among organizations or individuals (i.e., dyads). In such cases, 
data collection relies on surveys or interviews in which respondents are asked to 
subjectively report on their interactions (with whom and how often they interact). 
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Other authors link interdependence to resources; their measures reflect either specific 
financial or funding dependencies (i.e., state aid versus a diverse range of funding 
sources) or complementary resources (i.e., various types of clients brought into the 
collaboration). Saidel (1991) provides a way of measuring resource interdependence 
through a survey, in which three different dimensions of the interdependence construct 
are measured using Likert-scales: the importance of the resource; the availability of 
alternatives; and the ability to guarantee provision of the resource. 
 
4.5. Understanding interdependence: a preliminary framework  
Based on this systematic literature review, we would emphasize the need for more 
research on the specific nature, measurement, antecedents, and consequences of 
interdependence. As shown, interdependence is taken as a given in most studies, neither 
broken down into its components (i.e., people, resources, tasks, goals), nor measured in 
any way that allows the establishment of testable hypotheses regarding its effects. 
We used our categories to build a comprehensive framework to better understand the 
antecedents and consequences of interdependence in public management (see Figure 4.1). 
First of all, category 1 (general conditions) and category 4 (resource dependence theory) 
include research that identifies the antecedents of interdependence, which provide a 
context conducive to collaboration. Category 4 refers to specific exchanges, while 
category 1 depicts the general environment in which collaboration emerges. The 
framework depicts category 3 papers as ones that view collaboration as a general 
consequence of interdependence or interdependence as a driver for collaboration. From 
there, the framework distinguishes two specific consequences of interdependence. It 
presents networks as an overarching consequence of collaborative endeavors (category 
2) and notes the managerial implications of interdependence (category 5). 
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 These categories allow us to distinguish two levels of abstraction. At the more general 
(less specific and detailed) level are categories 1 and 2, which identify interdependence 
as a general precondition and outcome, respectively. This approach is dominated by the 
idea of networks as antecedents or results of interdependence. At the more specific 
level, some authors detail concrete resource interdependences as antecedents (category 
4) and explore the actual managerial implications of interdependence (category 5). 
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Figure 4.1. Interdependence: A preliminary framework 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation 
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 The model also suggests that, given certain preconditions, the way interdependences are 
managed will redefine the landscape of a specific public service or policy. 
The framework shows that interdependence (whether or not a formalized collaboration 
exists) will affect: 
 The organizational structure (for both individual actors and the collaboration). 
 The governance and decision-making criteria (for both the policy area and the 
 collaboration). 
 Organizational and individual goals. 
 Trust. 
 Accountability and lines of authority. 
 Strategy. 
As interdependence will be mediated and changed, as part of an iterative process (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), time, contextual variables, managerial decisions, and trust affect not 
only the process described above, but also future relationships among actors. This 
framework suggests the existence of an interdependence loop created by an iterative 
process, which modifies the power relationships among actors in a given public domain. 
In other words—how, when, and what type of interdependences are dealt with can change 
the landscape of a service delivery, policy design, or implementation, generating a new 
baseline at which new or different interdependent relationships appear. 
 
4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
Interdependence is profoundly embedded in our scholarly community’s efforts to analyze 
and study a wide array of inter-organizational innovations (Mandel and Keast, 2008). As 
a multifaceted construct, interdependence primarily expresses an interconnectedness 
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among actors, resources, and/or tasks (Blau, 1964; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). At the 
same time, interdependence reflects the networked nature of our world (Castells, 2000). 
It also enables the enactment of certain institutional arrangements in the public sphere 
(Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
interdependence is both a cause and a consequence of collaboration and coordination 
among agencies and organizations (Hillman, Whiters, and Collins, 2009). As we have 
shown, the literature on public management and collaborations is full of references to 
such ideas. Thus, our first contribution to the literature is to systematically assess the use 
of this popular construct. This study aims to disentangle and unravel the meaning of 
interdependence for our scholarly community. 
As our analysis suggests, the construct of “interdependence” is generally used to 
characterize scenarios involving public management (Castells, 2000; Aiken and Hage, 
1968, Rhodes, 1997). As a substantive assumption, the natural consequence of being in 
an interdependent world is collaboration. In fact, twenty-six percent of the articles we 
reviewed use interdependence as a general concept. Importantly, our findings suggest 
that, under the surface, researchers find it difficult to assess the specific context, 
antecedents, or consequences of the existence, creation, exploitation, or even elimination 
of the interdependences they discuss. Since the construct is treated as elusive and broad, 
it is seldom operationalized or measured. The first answer to our research question, 
therefore, is as follows: interdependence, as a construct, has been used as general 
metaphor rather than a research variable. 
To further develop this finding, we have produced a preliminary framework for the 
analysis of interdependence that we hope will help future researchers. It takes into account 
both antecedents and consequences at different levels of analysis. We believe, in line with 
Malatesta and Smith (2014), that a better understanding of the different kinds of 
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 interdependencies and how they are managed will allow our scholarly community to more 
deeply understand collaboration, including how patterns of governance and control are 
established and why some collaborative efforts thrive while others perform poorly. The 
preexistent conditions for interdependence promote the use of collaborative devices in 
public sector environments. It will be important to assess whether this is always the case, 
what types of collaborations can be expected (given certain preconditions), and how these 
preconditions are modulated or affected by the policy stage, managerial activities, or 
administrative reorganizations and changes. This applies not only to more traditional 
collaborative devices in public management, which engage public and private 
organizations (contracting out, networks, and partnerships), but also to more novel 
scenarios derived from co-creation, co-production and co-design of public services. It 
may also shed light on rationale for mandated collaboration. 
In light of our findings, we suggest and encourage researchers to enrich and enhance our 
knowledge by further exploring and defining: 
 The nature of interdependence (goals, tasks, human resources, and competencies). 
Although it is an elusive construct, interdependence must be measured and 
operationalized through future research. 
 The spillovers and consequences of interdependence and how they affect the 
provision of public services and goods. 
 Advice for practitioners on how to better manage and lead in an interdependent 
environment. 
 RDT’s links to public management and collaborative projects, using recent examples 
(Malatesta and Smith, 2014). 
We acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. First, due to time and resource 
constraints, we decided to limit our search to a set of top-tier, peer-reviewed public 
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management journals. Including other sources, such as books and references to known 
experts, would surely have enriched this study. Second, the categories included in this 
analysis may be differently reformulated or regrouped; although we have carried out a 
systematic analysis, it may have been influenced by nuanced research criteria. Finally, 
the nature of this chapter precludes us from empirically analyzing the proposed theoretical 
model or developing a valid scale to measure and operationalize interdependence and 
endeavor; these are challenges we intend to tackle in the future.  
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Chapter 5:  
The Power Dynamics of Mandated Network Administrative 
Organizations (NAOs)6 
This chapter analyzes the role of power in the development and design of two distinct 
European regulatory networks belonging to two different regulatory arenas: Energy and 
Telecommunications. We perform a longitudinal case study on both networks, to unveil 
the role of power dependencies in the design of Network Administrative Organizations. 
 
 
  
6 Saz Carranza, A., Salvador Iborra, S. & Albareda Sanz, A. (2016). The power dynamics of mandated 
network administrative organizations. Public Administration Review, 76 (3), pp. 449-462. DOI: 
10.1111/puar.12445. 
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 Abstract 
In understanding what drives the development of network administrative organizations 
(NAOs) of mandated networks, we find that power bargaining is central. We execute a 
comparative longitudinal case study of the NAOs of two policy-mandated networks. The 
study focuses specifically on the role of power in these developments and concludes that 
the differences in NAO development arise from power dependencies, in part due to sector 
characteristics. We propose that mandated networks members’ greater interdependence 
and greater dependence on external non-members, as well as whole-network dependence 
on external actors, partly determine mandated networks’ NAO design. These networks 
will have larger and more capable NAOs (with more staff), will accept sharing control of 
the NAO executive with the mandating party, and will have broader responsibilities.  
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5.1. Introduction 
This study explores how the governance forms of networks, in particular network 
administrative organizations (NAOs), develops and why. More focused attention on the 
governance structure of whole networks is critical, since formal network structures are 
expected to impact policy outcomes (Wonka and Rittberger, 2000). So far, there is very 
little research on this issue. Apart from a few empirical articles about the governance of 
networks (Raab, Mannak, and Cambré, 2013) and other interorganizational ventures (Yan 
and Gray, 1994; 2001), as well as theory by Provan and Kenis (2008), there is no 
empirical work on the development of governance forms of networks.  
We focus on mandated networks, a sub-group of goal-directed networks. Mandated 
networks are common in the public sector, where a legislative or administrative 
superordinate actor or a contracting party can impose coordination and collaboration on 
other actors by creating a mandated network in which members are obliged to participate 
(Rodríguez et al., 2007; Isett and Provan, 2005; Moynihan, 2009).  
Provan and Kenis (2008) propose that the governance forms of networks evolve as a 
lifecycle. We argue that power bargaining is the key driver behind the development of 
NAOs, particularly for mandated networks. Modification to the governance of mandated 
networks often depends on the mandating party, which has the legislative, administrative, 
or contractual power to impose it, rather than network members. Thus, our research 
question is: How does power bargaining affect the NAO development of mandated 
networks? Our research strategy is a longitudinal comparative case study of two 
regulatory mandated networks. First we explore how the NAOs of the two mandated 
networks develop over time. We then compare the development of each and identify the 
sources of their differences. We find that power bargaining, rather than a deterministic 
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 lifecycle process, is central and that differences in NAO development are due to power 
dependencies, in part because of sector characteristics. 
After describing our theoretical starting point—power and the development of the 
governance of mandated networks— we present our methods and cases. In the findings 
we analyze both development processes and find a bargaining dynamic around three 
specific issues. Subsequently, we explain the differences in NAO development in terms 
of power differences between the networks. We conclude with a discussion of our 
findings. 
5.2. Mandated Networks, Forms of Governance, and Power 
5.2.1. The Governance of Mandated Goal-Directed Networks 
Network-like forms of organizing have proliferated in the private, non-profit, and public 
sectors (Isett et al., 2011; Kenis, Provan, and Kruyen, 2009). While networks can be 
understood as emerging entities developed out of serendipitous interactions among 
organizations, we focus on goal-directed networks whose inception is driven by pre-set 
goals (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003; Provan and Lemaire, 2012).  
Goal-directed networks are consciously set up as interorganizational mechanisms to reach 
network-level objectives (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In these networks, collaboration is 
not always grassroots; it can be mandated by a third party (Siddiki et al., 2015; Brummel 
et al., 2010) that attempts to impose collaboration on others, whether legislatively, 
administratively, or contractually (Rodríguez et al., 2007). Public management scholars 
have long recognized the emergence of mandated service-provision networks enacted 
through an administrative contracts in the healthcare and social sectors (Graddy and 
Chen, 2006; Isett and Provan, 2005; Isett and Miranda, 2015). Where not contractually 
driven, mandated networks can also be created by policy rule-making (legislatively or 
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administratively) that affects different layers of government and policy players in sectors 
such as crisis management, homeland security, or transport planning (Brummel et al., 
2010; Caruson and MacManus, 2006; Moynihan, 2009). Among these are regulatory 
networks, which bring together different regulatory authorities (Slaughter, 2004), and act 
as paradigmatic vehicles to foster policy harmonization and cooperation. 
The literature provides a two-fold rationale for mandated collaboration: a powerful third-
party non-member might mandate (either contractually, legislatively, or administratively) 
collaboration among stakeholders and/or other organizations (1) to shape policies or 
activities (e.g., limit actions, create economies of scale, and simplify processes); and/or 
(2) when actors do not participate voluntarily if they see collaboration as contrary to their 
needs or dominant position (Gray and Hay, 1986; Rodríguez et al., 2007; Compagni, 
Gerzeli, and Bergamaschi, 2011; Moynihan, 2009; Isett and Miranda, 2015).  
Mandated collaboration characterizes many public goal-directed networks (Herranz, 
2008), and limits a network’s autonomous capacity to define or modify its characteristics 
(i.e., purpose, rules, membership), constraining the enactment of change. Changes to 
mandated networks might have to be approved externally by the mandating non-member.  
Further, the membership of mandated networks is often set by the network’s mandate and 
tends to be obligatory. The mandate determines who is eligible to join in the network. 
Participation in many mandated networks happens by right rather than as a result of 
credible commitments (Kelemen and Tarrant, 2011). The network’s mandate may also 
predetermine the distribution of benefits among network members (Grafton, Abernethy, 
and Lillis, 2011; Caruson and MacManus, 2006), the scope of the network (Compagni et 
al., 2011), social learning activities within the network (Brummel et al., 2010), and 
network control mechanisms (Rodríguez et al., 2007). 
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 This study analyzes longitudinally the evolution of forms of governance of mandated 
networks. The governance form, understood as the combination of mechanisms and 
institutions enacted to coordinate joint action towards the attainment of network-level 
goals, is a salient but still under-researched phenomenon (Provan and Kenis, 2008).  
The contingent model for ideal types of a network’s governance devised by Provan and 
Kenis (2008) includes three distinct forms. We focus on one of them, the Network 
Administrative Organization (NAO), an entity “set up specifically to govern the network 
and its activities (Provan and Kenis, 2008, 236)”.  In a recent analysis of service 
implementation networks, Huang (2014) defines a NAO as a distinct third party with 
whom network members establish ties. The NAO helps to build and direct the network, 
allocates resources, supports the partners to achieve network goals, and provides a 
centralized location to perform network activities” (Human and Provan, 2000, 236; 
Provan and Kenis, 2008).  
As an organization, the NAO has an executive body dedicated to coordinating and 
facilitating collaboration among network members. It also has its own “governance” 
body, which is where network collective decisions are made by all members. We have 
chosen to consider this body (often called assembly, meeting, board, committee, or 
similar) as part of the NAO, although we are aware it is arguable whether this body is part 
of the network rather than part of the NAO. Figure 5.1 illustrates a network and an 
organizational view of the NAO.  
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Figure 5.1. Network and Organizational View of an NAO-governed Network 
 
Source: authors’ own  
Empirical qualitative research on local and advocacy networks (Agranoff, 2007; Ospina 
and Saz-Carranza, 2010) suggests that the design of NAOs varies in terms of the number 
of structural components they incorporate (e.g., number of boards) and the characteristics 
and relationships (e.g., size and roles) of these components. Our research conveys new 
insights into the role of power in the development of the NAOs of mandated networks 
and provides a better understanding of these variations. 
A power-based approach allows interorganizational relations to be analyzed beyond 
dyadic and/or transactional exchanges and can enlighten the power dynamics in networks 
(Malatesta and Smith, 2014). Yet, with the exception of studies by Milward and Provan 
(1998), Agranoff and McGuire (2003), and Agranoff (2007), power has not received 
much attention in previous analyses of goal-directed or mandated networks. By 
definition, power-based explanations seem well-suited to the study of developments in 
mandated networks. Since members of mandated networks have limited capacity to 
modify the network,  is constrained, ex-ante decisions about the network’s governance 
structure might be crucial to safeguard individual member stakes and align the network’s 
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 aims with the aims of members (Neumann, 2010; Dekker, 2004; Bacharach and Lawler, 
1981). Recent studies of mandated regulatory networks (e.g., Blauberger and Rittberger, 
2014) also suggest that power-based approaches may shed light on variations in network 
development.  
5.2.2 Power and the Governance of Networks 
Previous research on interorganizational relations points to the importance of power 
dynamics in shaping collaborative endeavors (Ospina and Saz-Carranza, 2010; De Rond 
and Bouchikhi, 2004; Yan and Gray, 1994). In this study, we understand power to be an 
inherent part of social relations, where “power resides implicitly in the other’s 
dependence [on oneself]” (Emerson, 1962). Thus, the power of A over B is directly 
proportional to B’s dependence on A (Malatesta and Smith, 2014). Power-based 
explanations of interorganizational sets are appealing (Huxham and Beech, 2008), given 
that autonomous units with different interests, aims, and resources interact and maneuver 
to shape the relationship and its outcomes to their advantage, by holding or controlling 
key resources (Pffefer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009).  
Yan and Gray (1994; 2001), looking at the governance of interorganizational alliances, 
explore and test an explanation of how partner interdependence affects joint-venture 
management control. They identify the partners’ bargaining power—or bargaining set—
in three resource-dependence terms:  their level of dependency on the venture’s outcome, 
the availability of alternatives to the venture, and the possession or control of critical 
resources for the venture. Their results suggest that this bargaining set determines the type 
and form of the venture’s control, through mechanisms such as participation in decision-
making on the venture’s board, top-management appointments, and rule definition. 
Bargaining power therefore refers to the interacting parties’ ability to shape the contexts 
in which they maneuver, win accommodations from others, and influence the final 
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outcome of an interaction (Yan and Gray, 1994; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). Power 
and power dependencies (Emerson, 1962) are thus neither constant nor fixed but the result 
of a dynamic process in which the parties engage, bargain, attempt to overcome 
uncertainties, and change their environment (Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978; Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981). Bosse and Alvarez (2010) agree. In their study of biotech alliances, they 
find that bargaining power, not just efficiency considerations, explains the outcomes of 
negotiations about governance mechanisms. In the same vein, the literature has 
consistently shown that organizational dependencies are closely related to the structure 
of a collaborative (Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Huang and Provan, 2007; Pfeffer and Salacnik, 
1978; Thomson, Perry, and Miller, 2009). In fact, interdependence (whether based on 
material institutional resources or on social structural processes) creates a new 
organizational landscape among autonomous network members that has quasi-
hierarchical aspects (Rethmeyer and Hatmaker, 2008).  
Therefore, it is legitimate to expect power dependencies among organizations (Rethmeyer 
and Hatmaker, 2008; Lundin, 2007) and dependencies on external parties (Hillman et al., 
2009) that also affect the development of governance structures in mandated networks.  
5.2.3. The Development of NAOs 
This chapter aims to explore the process of NAO inception and development in mandated 
networks. Van de Ven and Poole (1995, 512) define development as “a change process, 
i.e., a progression of change events that unfold during the duration of an entity’s 
existence—from the initiation or onset of the entity to its end or termination.” Processual 
analysis (Langley et al., 2013) helps researchers not only to delineate the events leading 
up to a particular outcome but also to shed light on the change mechanisms underlying a 
specific development (Dahl, 2014; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Van de Ven and Poole, 
1995). 
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 The development of the governance form of networks is tackled from the theoretical 
standpoint of life-cycle processes (Provan and Kenis, 2008). These maintain that change 
occurs through a set of predetermined stages (i.e., from shared to NAO governance) to 
reach a final, also predetermined, stage (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Provan and Kenis 
(2008) suggest that, as contingencies affecting choice evolve (i.e., trust density, need for 
network-level competencies, goal consensus, number of members), so does the form of 
governance. To the best of our knowledge, the literature has yet to show how such change 
processes unfold (Provan, Beagles, and Leischow, 2011).  
More concretely, in mandated networks, the dynamics are fundamentally political 
(Rodríguez et al., 2007). In this context, the equation that determines how relations are 
structured needs to include the interplay of power, partners’ interests, and values (Baraldi 
and Strömsen, 2009; Pettigrew, 1973). In addition to controlling resources and possessing 
authority, a powerful player will must also enjoy sufficient legitimacy (Hardy, Lawrence, 
and Philips, 1998). 
The literature on interorganizational settings has long recognized the existence of this 
more convoluted landscape by referring to tensions between single organizations and the 
collective (Ospina and Saz-Carranza, 2010; Lewis, 2000; Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 1993). 
Alliance researchers (Das and Teng, 2000; De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004) posit that 
partners need to solve a wide array of dichotomies (e.g., competition/control, 
trust/distrust, design/emergence, long-term/short-term orientations). To date, the 
literature has not analyzed how these tensions play out in the development of a network’s 
governance form; rather, it focuses on how tensions affect networks or alliances as a 
whole. Despite some early applications of Emerson’s (1962) power theory to the public 
sector (Perry, and Levine, 1976), to our knowledge, in recent times only Katila, 
Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt (2008) have applied a dynamic power approach to the study 
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of forms of interorganizational governance. Their findings suggest that alliance members 
push for autonomy (attempting to influence value distribution rules, control decision-
making, and minimize their subordination to the alliance) while simultaneously valuing 
the alliance’s endeavors.  
In theory, the inception of mandated networks and posterior changes to them are 
constrained by the mandate of the powerful convener, which sets the rules of the game. 
However, it would be naïve to assume that the mandating party does not face resistance 
from future mandated network members. In taking a power-based approach, this chapter 
responds to recent calls to offer a more dynamic and less deterministic perspective on 
networks, their governance, and the change processes within them (Provan, Beagles, and 
Leischow, 2011). 
Equipped with this theoretical framework, our study addresses the research question: 
How does power bargaining affect the development of mandated network NAOs?  
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Research Design and Methods 
Our study is based on a mixed deductive/inductive research design suitable for 
generating theory about how the governance of mandated networks unfolds over time. 
Although we expected power to play an important role in NAO development, we have 
consciously allowed and looked for other emergent concepts. We have drawn on 
qualitative data to analyze events and choices made over time (Bizzi and Langley, 
2012). The absence of previous empirical research on the role of power in the 
development of NAOs justifies an in-depth qualitative approach (Greenwood and 
Miller, 2010). We have carried out a comparative case study to provide a more robust 
basis for theory building (Yin 2003), as this approach often yields more accurate and 
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 generalizable explanations than single case studies (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A 
comparative case study suits the multi-party character of the object of study (Agranoff 
and Radin, 1991).  
5.3.2. Case Sampling 
The sampling strategy was purposive (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We based our 
selection on several criteria, chosen to illuminate the processes we intended to analyze 
(Walsh and Bartunek, 2011). First, both networks were selected from two regulatory 
regimes in the EU: telecoms and energy. Second, both had a mandating party that imposed 
collaboration on others (Rodríguez et al., 2007; Halpert, 1982). Third, their creation 
pursued similar regulatory coordination goals and they evolved in parallel over time. 
Fourth, they are similar in terms of membership size (28) and members’ institutional 
characteristics—the members of both networks are independent National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs). Finally, the two regimes have been pioneers in regulatory 
coordination in the EU.  
Our most-similar case research design aimed to maximize the comparability of the cases 
by controlling for as many dimensions as possible (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994): 
geographic context, age, and synchronized policy-making waves. The sectors were 
similar but distinct and the initial conditions differed slightly—one started off with a 
small NAO while the other was lead member-governed.  
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5.3.3. The Cases: Regulatory Networks and the EU 
Public goal-directed networks increasingly populate the intergovernmental supranational 
arena (Slaughter, 2004). Among these transnational networks, regulatory networks 
(Maggetti and Gilardi, 2014) stand as paradigmatic vehicles to foster cooperation among 
diverse political actors. Within the European Union, regulatory cooperation among EU 
institutions and member states has recently been promoted through European NRA 
networks (Coen and Thatcher, 2008), the final aim of which is to harmonize 
implementation of the rules. In the following section, we briefly describe the two cases 
studied.  
European Network of Telecoms Regulators. In 1997, different European telecom 
NRAs set up a voluntary network—the International Regulators Group (IRG)—to be an 
unofficial forum to share information and best practice. IRG currently includes 33 
regulatory authorities from the EU, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) 
countries, and candidates for accession to the EU. Initially, IRG was governed by one of 
its members, on a rotating basis. In 2002, the European Commission created the 
mandatory European Regulators Group (ERG) as an official advisory network (Kelemen 
and Tarrant, 2011). ERG—one of our objects of study—was in essence IRG, as it had 
exactly the same members and governance system, but the Commission attended the 
network’s meetings as a non-voting member. But despite the creation of ERG, the NRAs 
did not disband IRG, which is a voluntary network. In 2009, the European Council and 
Parliament created legislation that evolved ERG into the Body of European Regulators 
of Electronic Communications (BEREC). BEREC consists of 27 EU national regulators 
plus the Commission as a non-voting member. The BEREC Office, with a staff of 18, 
governs the network. 
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 European Network of Energy Regulators. In 2000, NRAs established a voluntary 
network, the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER). At that point, CEER had 
only 10 members because not all EU national energy markets were liberalized and had 
independent NRAs. From its inception, CEER was governed by a small NAO.  
Soon after, in 2003, the Commission created its own advisory body by mandate, the 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)—our second object of 
study. ERGEG was equivalent to CEER but included the Commission as a non-voting 
member. Similarly to the response of the telecoms sector to the same action, the energy 
NRAs did not disband CEER after ERGEG was created. In fact, ERGEG and CEER 
shared a governance secretariat (NAO). By assessing the implementation of current 
regulation and proposing future regulation, ERGEG acted as an official advisory body to 
the Commission in relation to the integration of European gas and power markets.  
On July 13, 2009, the Parliament and Council adopted the decision establishing the 
Agency for the Cooperation of European Regulators (ACER), which replaced ERGEG. 
ACER is governed by a 40-person NAO.  
5.3.4. Data Collection 
The data are based on in-depth interviews and documentation. Our interviews combined 
purposive and snowball sampling (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Initially, we talked to one 
network member and an NAO staff member who provided access to other central network 
members and Commission officials (the mandating party) involved in the NAO 
development process. Through this strategy, we were able to interview 25 informants, 
including NAO staff (i.e., the network managers/NAO directors heading the NAOs, and 
others), the mandating party (i.e., Commission officials), and staff from different NRAs 
(i.e., the equivalent of directors of international affairs—those most involved in 
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negotiations, who prepare and attend network meetings). Individual interviews lasted 45–
60 minutes. Table 5.1 summarizes the profiles of interviewees by regulatory regime.  
Table 5.1. Interviewee Profiles  
 
Interviewees Telecoms regulatory regime Energy regulatory regime Total 
NRA officers 8 (6 different NRAs) 7 (6 different NRAs) 15 
Commission officers 3 1 4 
Staff members of mandated network NAO 1 1 2 
Staff members of voluntary network NAO 1 0 1 
National electricity distributors - 2 2 
Total 13 11 24 
 
Source: authors’ own  
 
Although we have focused our analysis on the two mandated networks, we acknowledge 
the parallel history and intimate connections of voluntary networks in both regimes. For 
this reason, we have included them as interviewees.  
The interviews were semi-structured and elicited descriptions of personal experience. We 
asked interviewees to narrate how governance mechanisms were designed and why, to 
identify the most difficult and conflicted moments during the development of these 
mechanisms, and to explain how conflicts were resolved. A questionnaire based on broad 
open questions gave us the flexibility to move the conversation in any direction, so as to 
capture this information broadly and deeply. We also used the interviews to gain access 
to and familiarize ourselves with the documents have used in our analysis. We stopped 
sampling new interviewees when we reached a point of saturation (Boeije, 2010).  
We analyzed documents proposing and determining the networks’ governance forms and 
procedural rules (i.e., Commission legislative proposals and open consultation reports; 
the legislative debates among the European Commission, Parliament, and Council; and 
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 rules of procedure and other internal documents relating to the networks). We also 
analyzed correspondence between the main stakeholders involved in network 
development. The documents went back to the mid-1990s, allowing us to counterbalance 
possible interviewee biases, as well as to overcome the limited and imprecise knowledge 
interviewees might have about the network’s early history.  
5.3.5. Data Analysis 
Two of the authors coded the interview transcripts (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Thereafter, quotes and codes were exported to Excel to organize and further refine them 
(Meyer and Avery, 2008). For the first stage of transcript analysis, we used three 
sensitizing concepts: network development, network design process, and conflict and 
disagreement. From there, we coded the text in relation to key events in the process, basic 
network activities, diversity and conflict between parties, conflictual issues about NAO 
design, and differences between the networks’ NAOs. In order to avoid research bias, the 
coders approached the interviews independently and subsequently agreed upon themes, 
categories, and codes.  
In the second stage of analysis, we conducted—using the codes previously developed—
a document analysis of every directive, regulation, and formal and informal EU document 
that directly affected the development of the case studies (see online Appendix: List A17). 
When necessary, we coded parts of these documents and integrated the respective quotes 
and codes with our interview data. Thus, the evidence from the interviews was 
crosschecked and complemented with document analysis, improving the validity and 
reliability of the findings. Triangulating the documents and interview data enabled us to 
present richer and more reliable descriptions of each case (Denzin, 1989; Graebner and 
7 This appendix appears at the end of this chapter. 
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Eisenhardt, 2004) and to improve internal validity (Yin, 2003; Walsh and Bartunek, 
2011). After several coding waves, the final set of codes was produced (Table 5.2). This 
ultimately led to the narrated findings presented in the next section. 
Table 5.2. Code Development 
 
Sensitizing 
concepts 
First set of codes Final set of codes Final finding 
Network 
development 
 
 
 
 
Network design 
process 
 
 
 
 
Conflict and 
disagreement 
NRA vs. Commission 
Integration/ 
Autonomy 
Bargaining dynamic among mandated and 
mandating parties. 
Collaboration 
Legislators 
Diversity 
Mobilizing 
Mobilization Mandated network members to mobilize to influence mandated network NAO design. 
Facilitation 
Evaluation 
Framing 
Harmonization 
Compromise 
Shared diagnostic 
Decision-making in 
NAO 
NAO 
characteristics/Network 
purpose 
Key bargaining issues: NAO size, control of NAO, 
network tasks. 
Strong NAO 
Limiting the NAO 
NRA strength 
NRA independence 
Telecoms vs. Energy 
Telecom vs. Energy 
Power differences between sectors: network 
member interdependence, network members’ 
external dependence, whole network external 
dependence. 
External dependence 
Physical dependence 
 
5.4. Analysis and Findings 
In this section, we provide an in-depth analysis of the raw findings extracted from the 
cases. First, we give the sequence of events, showing that development and changes are 
not predetermined but rather the result of an iterative process of proposals and 
counterproposals leading to a compromise between the mandating party and the mandated 
network members, both of whom push their diverse preferences in relation to the network 
and its NAO. Second, we find that bargaining revolves around NAO control, NAO size, 
and network-level tasks. Finally, the comparative nature of our study allows us to 
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 understand not only how power dynamics affect the design, but also how specific power 
dependencies impact differently the design and development of forms of governance in 
mandated networks. Our findings suggest that the inception, design, and development of 
mandated network NAOs are affected by the power dynamics between (1) network 
members, (2) network members and key stakeholders in their domestic policy regime, 
and (3) the whole network and its domain. Figure 5.2 illustrates our findings. To make 
these findings easier to read and understand, Table A2 in the Appendix provides a list of 
acronyms used in this analysis. 
Figure 5.2. A Power-Bargaining Model of NAO Development 
 
 
Source: authors’ own   
 
5.4.1. The development of a network’s form of governance: a bargaining process 
The analysis of the rich information drawn from the cases allows us to track longitudinally 
the process of design and development of the mandated networks studied. The original 
mandate was modulated by several rounds of proposals and counterproposals in a process 
in which the final result is widely recognized by the actors as a “compromise.” A national 
regulatory officer recalls: “BEREC is a compromise. The Commission wanted a Euro-
regulator” (NRA4). In the energy network, the resulting NAO also stands as a 
compromise among players. As an interviewee stated, “The final design … is a political 
compromise” (NRA26). 
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The event sequence of the bargaining dynamic. Figures 3 and 5 show the development of 
the governance forms of both mandated networks. They depict proposals (dotted arrows) 
as well as actual developments (solid arrows). It is clear that the tension between 
hierarchy (or full subordination of NRAs to a European-level authority) and a looser 
network form is constantly present. This tension is tangible in the decisions and 
discussions about the mechanisms used to govern the network. As one regulator stated, 
“Tension between the Commission and national authorities is that between uniform 
regulation versus jealous autonomy” (NRA10). 
Figure 5.3. Development of the Telecom Network’s Form of Governance  
 
Source: authors’ own  
In 2006, as a need for further regulatory consistency in Europe’s telecom markets 
escalated, the Commission sent a letter (Figure 5.3, dotted arrow 1) to the ERG, stating 
that the regulatory diversity in EU telecoms markets was worrisome, and that it 
considered the ERG’s governance a hindrance to regulatory convergence: 
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 You are aware about the…present lack of consistency [with] regards [to] the 
application of the regulatory framework [.] The institutional set-up of ERG does 
not allow it to achieve, even with the best intentions, a consistent application of 
...a common regulatory approach to cross-border issues. (26/11/2006: COM to 
ERG) 
 
The Commission further communicated that it would seek greater powers to be able to 
overrun some regulations written by NRAs. As the Commissioner for Information Society 
and Media wrote in a letter to ERG:  
I envisage… to include in the future regulatory framework a clause allowing the 
Commission to: (1) request that a national regulatory authority replaces an 
inappropriate measure by a regulatory action that will remedy the competition 
problem effectively; (2) request a national regulatory authority to undertake an 
analysis of a market and/or to adopt a remedy within a reasonable timeframe. 
(26/11/2006: COM to ERG) 
The response by the telecoms network was to upgrade its governance structure, setting 
up an NAO (Figure 5.3, solid arrow 2). By early 2007, this NAO had a four-person 
secretariat set up in Brussels. In its response to the Commission, the mandated network 
underscored the strengthening of its governance: “In Bratislava, national regulators 
agreed to establish a permanent … Secretariat, composed by two to four junior and middle 
officials seconded by the national regulators” (18/01/2007: ERG to COM). 
The national telecoms regulators again restated their opposition to accepting any 
subordination to the Commission: “ERG maintains its opposition to the 
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Commission’s…proposal of a… ‘veto on [national regulations]’ …on the grounds of 
subsidiarity” (02/27/2007: ERG to COM). 
The Commission marched ahead and proposed a new mandated network (the European 
Electronic Communications Markets Authority, EECMA), which was to be governed by 
a large NAO (Figure 5.3, dotted arrow 3). The proposed governance system was 
composed of a board of regulators, tasked with making regulatory decisions, and an 
administrative board, responsible for budgetary and administrative oversight of NAO 
staff (COM 2007a).  
The national regulators would decide on regulatory matters in the Board of Regulators. 
The 12-person Administrative Board would be composed of six people appointed by the 
Commission and six by the Council. Both boards would function via voting. 
The final mandated network, BEREC, created by the 2009 telecoms legislation (Figure 
5.3, arrow 4), is responsible for providing de-facto binding opinions about the decisions 
of national regulators. As a result of this enhanced responsibility, the mandated network 
has become far more influential; previously it was merely an information-sharing 
advisory network. The main difference between BEREC’s NAO and EECMA’s (the 
original proposition) is that the national regulators (i.e., the network members) maintain 
control of the Administrative Board (later renamed the Management Committee),  
where the Commission has only one vote out of 28 (see Figure 5.4).  
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 Figure 5.4. The Structure of the Telecom Mandated NAO  
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own  
Figure 5.5. The Dialectics of Regulatory Networks’ forms of governance (Energy) 
 
 
Source: authors’ own   
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A similar process unfolded in the energy network: in early 2007, the Commission 
published “An Energy Policy for Europe” (COM 2007) proposing to set up a single 
European regulator (Figure 5.5, dotted arrow 1). 
ERGEG replied by proposing an improved version of itself, the European System of 
Energy Regulators (ESER), where it would acquire binding responsibilities with respect 
to cross-border issues (Figure 5.5 dotted arrow 2). “Rather than creating a ‘single 
European regulator,’ ERGEG proposed a network model to undertake the functions 
necessary to fill the ‘regulatory gap’ at a European level” (NAO28). 
The proposed ESER would have had two decision-making boards, one regulatory and 
another administrative. The former would be composed solely of the national regulatory 
authorities, while the latter would be made up of representatives from the Commission 
and the Council (ERGEG, 2007). 
Shortly afterwards, the Commission put out its proposal for a revamped mandated energy 
network to be called Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (Figure 
5.5, dotted arrow 3). According to the initial proposal, the Commission would be part of 
the Board of Regulators and it would be able to give instructions to the director of the 
NAO (COM 2007c; EC 2009).  
At last, in 2009, ACER was created—taking over ERGEG—and had the capacity to set 
the terms, conditions, and operational requirements for cross-border energy 
interconnections and settle member disputes (Figure 5.5, solid arrow 4). The mandated 
energy network now has strong influence over national authorities (i.e., its members) 
(Article 5, Regulation (COM) No 713/2009). Figure 5.6 shows the final structure of 
ACER’s NAO. 
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 Figure 5.6. The Structure of the Mandated Energy Network NAO 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own  
Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the event sequence for both networks. 
Mobilization of voluntary networks to influence the NAOs of mandated networks 
Underscoring the bargaining nature of the process, we find that network members 
(national telecoms authorities) mobilized support in the European Council and Parliament 
to try to modify the proposed design so that they would control the Administrative Board 
as well as the Board of Regulators. As one national regulator put it, “National authorities 
lobbied to remain independent” (NRA1).  
The energy regulators also mobilized support for their counterproposal. As a Commission 
official told us: “[National energy authorities] are very well connected to [the European] 
Parliament [and they] also lobbied the Council.” National regulatory officers agreed: 
“These connections to the Council and the Parliament” allow national authorities to 
“monitor the entire [legislative] process” and to “lobby all three powers (Commission, 
Parliament, and Council)” (NRA29). 
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Not only did network members mobilize to influence the design of the mandated network 
NAO, they also used the voluntary network to do so. Thus, as one interviewee told us: 
“[That] only the Board of Regulators can directly instruct ACER’s director (while the 
Commission cannot) is the result of CEER [voluntary network] lobbying the Parliament” 
(COM25). 
5.4.2. Mandated network NAOs: key bargaining issues  
NAO control: members vs. mandating party. In both networks, members tried to 
increase their own control over the NAO’s key units and roles. In BEREC, NRAs 
managed to reduce the presence of EU institutions on governance boards, while in ACER, 
NRAs managed to secure unique oversight over the NAO’s director-general.  
In ACER, the key issue of negotiation was whether the executive director would take 
directions only from the Board of Regulators. In essence, “differences in opinion among 
national authorities and the Commission regarded the competencies of the Board of 
Regulators vis-à-vis the Commission’s role. National authorities wanted enough 
competencies and resources,” recalls one of the regulators (NRA26). As another network 
member stated: “Board of Regulators’ responsibilities with respect to the executive 
director [were] a key issue of debate” (NRA24). Finally, the Council modified the 
Commission’s proposal so that members maintained high levels of control over the 
NAO’s staff and its director. As the legislative transcripts state: “The Council has 
accepted [that] the Director [has] to act strictly in accordance with the Board of 
Regulators’ instructions” (Council27). 
Similarly, with respect to telecoms, an interviewee (NRA12) states: “An important 
discussion was voting power of the Commission in BEREC. Now, it can only vote in the 
Management Committee but is only observer in the Board of Regulators.” As mentioned, 
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 both boards remain under the control of NRAs since the mandating party, contrary to its 
initial proposal, is not present on the Board of Regulators and has only one vote (out of 
28) on the Management Committee.  
The size of the NAO: large vs. small. The size of the NAO was also important for BEREC. 
When the Commission proposed EECMA in 2007, the eventual size of its NAO was a 
crucial issue for national regulators, which were wary of the initial proposed size of more 
than 100 employees. In practice, at the time of our study, the NAO employed 18. As a 
national officer recalls, “The danger was that the BEREC Office could turn into an 
instrument of the Commission. Now, there is a balance between the BEREC Office and 
the national authorities” (NRA10). 
Network-level responsibilities: strong vs. weak. A main issue in ACER’s bargaining was 
the responsibilities of ACER vis-à-vis the distribution networks, the European Network 
of Transport and Supply Organizations, ENTSO-E (electricity) and ENTSO-G (gas). The 
first Commission proposal gave ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G considerable power, leaving 
ACER a consultative role (COM, 2007c). The distribution network would have been 
responsible for defining the guidelines and codes for the gas and electricity transport 
grids. Discussions related to the power balance between the regulatory network and the 
two distribution networks. Lord Mogg, Chair of ACER, argued:  
We welcome a number of improvements notably the reinforcement of powers and 
independence of national regulators, the enhanced role for ACER in the process 
for developing the EU [cross-border] codes and the fact that the codes, which lie 
at the heart of an integrated EU energy market, may now become legally binding. 
It is of course sensible for ACER to ... provide guidance to the ENTSOs [i.e. 
distribution networks] for drafting the [cross-border] codes, and then to monitor 
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the ENTSOs in the execution of their tasks in relation to the EU-wide [cross-
border] codes and development plans. (CEER, 2007c) 
5.4.3 How internal and external dependencies explain the governance form of 
mandated networks 
Our comparative case strategy allows us to understand the role of power dependencies in 
the process of inception and development of the form of governance of mandated 
networks. In the cases studied, the end results of the processes (i.e., the development of 
the networks’ governance mechanisms) are quite different. The executive board 
(Management Committee) of the telecoms network is dominated by national regulators. 
This is not the case in the energy network. Moreover, the energy network’s NAO clearly 
outnumbers the telecoms NAO in terms of employees. Telecoms national regulators 
managed to keep the NAO’s staff to a minimum.  
The opposition from national authorities to the Commission’s call for further integration 
was lower in the energy than in the telecoms sector. All energy-related actors were aware 
of “structural problems” (COM25) and “regulatory gaps” (NAO28) in the energy market 
and “all were in favor of an institutional response” (NRA9). 
We found no such reasoning in the telecoms sector. On the contrary, regulatory officers 
emphasized that countries have different markets that require contingent regulatory 
regulations: “National authorities opposed centralization because the proximity to diverse 
national markets is essential … For instance prices vary all over Europe even in markets 
[as close as] Austria and Germany, in Germany prices are 10 times those of Austria…” 
(NRA4). 
Our research suggests that the difference in attitudes between those forced to collaborate 
(i.e., national regulators) has its underlying rationale in the interplay of internal and 
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 external power dependencies among members, the mandating party, and other players in 
the policy regime.  
Reciprocal interdependence among mandated network members. Compared to the 
telecoms sector, the energy regime has certain specificities that make players converge 
on a diagnostic and support regulatory integration across Europe. Integrating the energy 
market, unlike the telecoms market, requires physical interconnections between countries. 
As interviewees from different regulatory authorities pointed out: “Energy has clear 
cross-border physical problems” (NRA9), and “energy requires a physical network” 
(NRA30). 
National energy regulators manage the tariffs of international energy transactions, make 
technological standards compatible, actively manage interconnections—for electricity in 
particular—and coordinate investments in interconnection from the regulated 
monopolistic grid and pipeline operators. These connections are physical and far more 
costly than wave-based telecoms interconnections.  
External dependencies of mandated network members. The data suggest that the visions 
of national regulatory authorities and the Commission coincide far more on the 
appropriate European policy for energy than for telecoms because national energy 
authorities are relatively less powerful than their telecoms counterparts. Energy regulators 
are less independent from ministries (Gilardi and Maggetti 2001) and the energy 
regulatory regime encompasses more and larger players than that of telecoms. As one 
energy regulator stated: “The Council represents EU member state governments while 
national authorities are independent from governments. The relationship can be 
weird…The Council prefers giving more power to ministries than to [independent] 
national authorities” (NRA26). 
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Another interviewee explained:  
National authorities’ relations with the Commission are much more antagonistic 
in telecoms than in energy. [This could] be due to the [difference] in independence 
of regulatory authorities in each sector. National energy authorities are not as 
independent from ministries nor do they have as many competencies. Thus, the 
Commission and regulatory authorities create an alliance. (NRA9) 
Energy authorities not only deal with large energy producers, they also have to deal with 
monopolistic distributors. Their rivalry with these companies, which are powerful public 
or private monopolies, nudges the authorities closer to the Commission: “This is so 
because [energy regulators] have to work with the powerful [Transport and Supply 
Organizations],” reasoned an energy regulator (NRA9). 
Whole-network external dependencies. Additionally, the greater will to integrate among 
energy actors may be due to Europe’s energy dependence or, as one interviewee put it 
bluntly, the “Russia factor.” This is related to Europe’s dependence on a few foreign 
external providers of energy (Russia, Norway, and Algeria). 
In summary, differences between the NAOs of the energy and telecoms networks may be 
explained by the degree of external dependence of network members. Unlike their 
counterparts in telecoms, national energy regulators have greater dependence on third 
parties and national ministries and have to regulate both private operators and large, 
powerful monopolistic grid operators. Furthermore, Europe is known to have external 
overall dependence on foreign suppliers of energy resources. These dependencies, 
common to all EU energy national regulators, explain why energy NRAs are far more 
sympathetic to sacrificing NAO control in exchange for network and NAO capacity. 
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 Thus, they have no say in the mandated network’s administrative board and they tolerate 
a larger NAO.  
 
5.5. Discussion  
A main finding of this study is that the inception and development processes of policy-
mandated networks are far from conflict-free; they do not fit the image of a network in 
which where one powerful convener sets the rules and mandated members have no choice 
but to go along with them.  
Bargaining power (Yan and Gray, 1994; 2001) refers to an actor’s capacity to influence 
the outcome of a given situation; in our case studies, the given situation was the design 
of the NAO. The longitudinal nature of our analysis allows us to show how actors 
maneuver to shape the final design of an NAO. More concretely, we find that over time 
tension over the design of the governance form of the network is solved by an iteration 
of proposals, counterproposals, and synthesis process (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). In 
fact, the creation and development of an NAO can be seen as a multiple-principals 
scenario in which the competing pressures and conflicting demands of the principals 
shape the final relationship with the agent, the NAO executive (Whitford, 2005). It is thus 
not surprising that the key issue in the negotiations was how the NAO would operate and 
be structured.  
Proposition 1a. The development process of the NAOs of policy-mandated 
networks follows a bargaining pattern of proposals and counterproposals between 
the mandating party and mandated network members.  
The process studied broadly shows signs of path-dependence, in that a prior event (e.g. a 
proposal) limits the options available in a later event (e.g., a counterproposal). In fact, 
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power itself is predicated on situation; that is, dependencies and interdependencies are 
not only dynamic but also to some extent fostered or constrained by previous events 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, we did not find path-dependence conforming to 
the strictest definition of path-dependence analysis— (1) an event that (2) transforms 
itself in a self-reinforcing dynamic (3) resulting in a lock-in (Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2011). A self-reinforcing dynamic resulting in a lock-in does not seem to fit our data. 
Our results also clearly show how mandated network members mobilize their structural, 
relational, and discursive resources (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013) to influence 
the design of the NAO. This is in agreement with the literature on advocacy, which 
predicts organizations will try to influence the policy process whenever the latter affects 
the opportunities and resources available to them (Buffardi et al., 2014). The tension plays 
out, as mandated network members draw on their power sources: access to the two 
ultimate legislative decision-makers—the European Parliament and Council—and build 
legitimacy through public communication efforts. The mandating party, the Commission, 
on the other hand, is the only actor in the EU system capable of initiating legislative 
processes. The Commission also has sufficient legitimacy to publicly scorn a mandated 
network member. It is thus a game between mandated network members and the 
mandating party using two key resources, influence and legitimacy (Lundin, 2007; Huang 
and Provan, 2007).  
Mobilizing is a central activity in networks (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Our finding, 
however, contrasts with the network management literature where mobilizing occurs 
continually throughout the life-cycle of the network (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). 
Mandated networks often require an external non-member to modify the network 
structure (Herranz, 2008). Thus, members of policy-mandated networks are expected to 
become involved in political activity, in particular during the NAO definition stage, as 
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 the different parties try to establish a governance form where they can maximize power 
(Pinto, 1998; Sabherwal and Grover, 2010). 
Proposition 1b. During the NAO definition stage of policy-mandated networks, 
members will mobilize to influence the design of the NAO. 
While the main interest of our research is the development of the form of governance of 
mandated networks, NAO design, and how mandated collaboration is structured, on 
another level the cases also shed light on how the mandated network affects voluntary 
collaboration among the parties involved. Here, our findings are aligned with Benson’s 
(1975) views on coalition formation. The national regulatory authorities maintain their 
voluntary interorganizational networks (the telecoms and energy voluntary networks 
remain fully active to date) and use them to influence the final characteristics of the NAO 
in line with their interests (Butterfoss, Goodman, and Wandersman, 1993). Our findings 
suggest that mandated networks do not undermine or hinder voluntary collaborations; 
however, it is worth noting that such a mandate might well create dissension in a scenario 
where competition is present and/or interests are not aligned (i.e., individual stakes 
supersede coalition stakes), (Huang, 2014). However, as Isett and Provan (2005: 162) 
argue in their analysis of a contract-mandated service provision network, the nature and 
the environment in which these networks operate have an important “effect on how 
relationships among its members evolve over time.” 
Our study also pinpoints the key issues that mandated network members contest most 
strongly. Boin, Busuoic, and Groenler (2013) suggest that there are diverse ways of 
distributing coordinating tasks, control, and executive capacities among the NAO and 
network members in regulatory mandated networks. Yan and Gray (1994) find joint-
venture partners bargain to determine participation in decision-making in the venture’s 
board, top-management appointments, and rule definition. We find that the issues most 
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contested are control of the NAO executive (i.e., whether it should be fully controlled by 
members or whether the mandating party should also have some say); the size of the NAO 
executive; and network-level tasks.  
Proposition 1c. The bargaining process of NAO development in a policy-
mandated network will revolve around who controls the NAO, NAO staff size, 
and network-level tasks. 
The differing ways in which these issues may be resolved point to a blurred frontier 
between hierarchy and network in NAO-governed networks. Further conceptualization 
and research on the limits and boundaries of these two ideal types is warranted. We agree 
with Moynihan (2008: 206) that “stark differences between hierarchies and networks rest 
on overstated ideal types, and that governance structures can usefully exist between these 
two types.” In fact, EU meta-governance, with its so-called experimentalist architecture, 
is widely recognized as an evolving process of hybrid structures (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). 
In the case of European regulation, the tension between a full plenipotentiary 
superordinate European authority and looser regulatory networks is an ongoing process 
(Levi-Faur, 2011).  
This chapter also specifies how resource dependencies affect the structuring of NAOs. 
Our findings complement earlier contributions (Huang and Provan, 2007; Malatesta and 
Smith, 201; Thomson, Perry, and Miller, 2009), which identified trust and the need for 
network-level competencies as contingent elements that determined the form of network 
governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008) and the control of joint ventures (Yan and Gray, 
1994), respectively.  
We conclude that the NAOs of policy-mandated networks are determined in part by the 
power dynamics between (1) network members, (2) network members and key 
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 stakeholders in their domestic policy regime, and (3) the whole network and its domain. 
It is well known that interdependence increases uncertainty, thus potentially fostering 
cooperation between the parties involved (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). We have found 
three types of dependency that affect the power bargaining process around NAO design. 
First, greater interdependence (in our case studies, this is both physical and financial) 
among network members increases the size of the NAO (i.e., more capability) but also 
results in the network being less controlled by its members (Gulati 1995).  
Proposition 2a. Policy-mandated networks, whose members have higher levels 
of interdependency among themselves, will execute more tasks, have larger 
NAOs, and have NAOs whose decision-making bodies are less controlled by the 
network members.  
Second, the dependency of network members on their national environment will affect 
NAO design. The pattern of power relationships among national ministries and national 
regulators prior to the creation of the network differed in the two sectors studied here. In 
fact, as Yesilkagit (2011) confirms, the creation of the energy sector network represents 
an opportunity to reduce national regulators’ dependence on relevant ministries. 
Presumably, the latter will be less inclined to contradict the regulatory independence 
principle or meddle with their national regulators if other national regulators and the 
Commission are watching. As the network helps to manage these external dependencies 
better, internal power dynamics are structured accordingly (Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and 
Singh, 2010; Pfeffer and Salacnik, 1978; Blauberger and Rittberger, 2014). 
Proposition 2b. Policy-mandated networks, whose members have higher levels 
of external dependency on third parties, will execute more tasks, have larger 
NAOs, and have NAOs whose decision-making bodies are less controlled by 
network members. 
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Third, whole-network external dependency seems to be at play. The need to 
counterbalance an external threat (i.e., Europe’s dependence on third-party countries for 
energy) favors integration; members value collaboration more highly, believing that 
participation benefits outweigh participation costs (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001). This 
external dependency is different from those discussed earlier, in that the entire network 
is externally dependent, as opposed to each member being externally dependent on its 
own national ministry. 
Proposition 2c. Policy-mandated networks, which are collectively dependent on 
an external third party, will execute more tasks, have larger NAOs, and have NAO 
decision-making bodies that are less controlled by network members. 
These propositions related to sector-based differences among mandated network NAOs 
resonate with Gormley’s (1986) salience and complexity model (Neshkova, 2014; Koliba 
et al., 2014), which argues that salience (i.e., an issue of interest to laypeople) and 
complexity (i.e., an issue requiring high levels of expertise) determine which actors will 
have the lead in a policy regime. Salient issues will be closely managed by elected 
politicians, while complex issues will be delegated to specialized bureaucrats. In terms of 
Gormley’s model, the energy sector is more salient than the telecoms sector. According 
to the Eurobarometer number 81 (European Commission, 2014), energy ranks as the ninth 
most important issue, while the field of telecoms is not included in the ranking (Wlezien, 
2005). As for complexity, network industries, including telecoms and energy, require 
high degrees of expert knowledge—although according to practitioners interviewed for 
this research, energy (in particular electricity, as opposed to gas) may be slightly more 
complex than telecoms. Taking into account the difference in salience, it may be 
significant that politicians lead the energy sector at the domestic level—this accords with 
the fact that energy regulators are less independent of ministries than telecoms 
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 regulators—resulting in greater incentives for national regulatory authorities to band 
together at the European level. Given that we sampled most-similar cases, our research is 
not well suited to testing Gormley’s model. However, this seems a promising avenue for 
future research on regulatory networks. 
5.6. Conclusions 
This study addresses the research question: How does power bargaining affect the NAO 
development of mandated networks?  We first show how the design of the governance 
form of mandated networks is a bargaining process. The cases studied here illustrate how 
network members struggle to influence the governance form of the network. Until now, 
the literature has seldom focused on the challenge posed by networks whose inception 
was driven by a mandate (Rodríguez et al., 2007) determining membership, structure, 
design, size, task, and/or any other network features.  
We must state a caveat regarding our findings. We draw a strong distinction between 
mandated networks and voluntary collaborations. Mandated networks encompass both 
contractually “enacted” networks, that is, mandated networks of social or health service 
providers (Graddy and Chen, 2006; Isett and Provan, 2005) as well as policy-mandated 
networks that aim to shape, harmonize, or govern a policy activity or regime, such as the 
regulatory mandated networks studied here, crisis management networks (Moynihan, 
2009), homeland security networks (Caruson and MacManus, 2006), and transport 
planning networks (Brummel et al., 2010).  
Our analysis zeros in on policy-mandated networks, which has implications for the 
transferability (Yin, 2003; Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of our findings to the general 
universe of mandated networks. Members of policy-mandated networks do not have an 
exit option (Hirschman, 1970). Hypothetically, at least, members of contract-mandated 
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networks can opt out by not entering the public contract and so avoid participation in the 
mandated network (albeit at the great cost of renouncing the contract and the resources 
drawn from it). Thus, we limit the propositions drawn from our findings to policy-
mandated networks.  
This chapter drives the emergence of a new set of questions on the nature of NAOs: are 
there different typologies of NAOs? Importantly, in some service-delivery networks, 
governance tasks are outsourced to consultants or other for-profit third parties. Thus, are 
our findings directly transferable to contract-mandated networks (such as service delivery 
networks) and to other types of goal-directed networks? Is the NAO form in contractually 
“enacted” networks static, or are participants able to influence the design of governance 
forms over time? Alternatively, given that the key interest for a public service provider is 
the public contract, do these providers have less interest in the network itself as long as 
they receive revenues from the contract? In both cases studied, mandated network 
members maintained their voluntary networks. Is this to be expected whenever there is a 
policy-mandated network? Lastly, when it comes to regulatory networks, are our findings 
transferable to other regulatory contexts outside the EU? Do they inform subnational 
mandated regulatory networks? These questions may be especially relevant since the 
oldest existing regulatory network is American - the National Association of Regulatory 
Utilities Commissioners (Berg and Horral, 2008). 
One limitation of our study relates to our decision to sacrifice breadth for depth. 
Quantitative research based on larger samples will enrich our knowledge of network 
governance and the design of NAOs. The context of our study—regulatory networks in 
the EU—may affect the transferability and generalizability of our results. Nevertheless, 
we believe that our findings serve as a useful departure point for future research. 
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 Appendix 
Table A1 Event-sequence table for both networks 
 Actor  COM NRAs COM FINAL 
Te
le
co
m
 
Event: date Letter: 06/06 ERG+: 1/07 EECMA: 11/07 BEREC: 11/09 
Description Proposes setting up a 
European central authority—
or—being capable of vetoing 
national regulations. 
ERG and CEER set up a joint 
secretariat in Brussels 
Proposes a network with a 
large NAO which would be 
partially controlled by EU 
institutions  
Network’s NAO is smaller 
than expected and controlled 
solely by NRAs 
En
er
gy
 
Event: date Report: 1/07 ESER: 5/07 ACER+: 9/07 ACER: 1/09 
Description Proposes setting up a 
European central authority —
or—upgrading ERGEG.  
Proposes upgrading ERGEG 
by increasing responsibilities 
and set decision-making via 
voting 
Proposes a network with a 
large NAO that would be 
partially controlled by EU 
institutions, from whom the 
NAO’s director may take 
orders. 
Only network members can 
give orders to the NAO’s 
director. 
 
Table A2 Acronyms 
 
Organizations 
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
BEREC Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications 
CEER Council of European Energy Regulators 
EECMA European Electronic Communications Markets Authority [proposed, not created] 
EFTA European Free Trade Agreement 
ENTSO-E European Network of Transport and Supply Organizations—Electricity 
ENTSO-G European Network of Transport and Supply Organizations—Gas 
ERG European Regulators Group [for Electronic Communications] 
ERGEG European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
ESER European System of Energy Regulators [proposed, not created] 
EU European Union 
IRG International Regulators Group [for Electronic Communications] 
NRA National Regulatory Authority 
Interviewees 
COM Representative of the European Commission 
NAO Representative of a Network Administrative Organization 
NRA Representative of a National Regulatory Authority 
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Chapter 6: 
The governance of Goal-Directed Networks: An Empirical 
Analysis of European Regulatory Networks.  
This chapter empirically analyzes the factors associated with the structural complexity 
of Network Administrative Organizations of European Regulatory Networks. 
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 Abstract  
In this chapter we answer the research question, “What factors affect the structural 
complexity of network administrative organizations (NAOs)?” This question warrants 
further research because there are few empirical studies on the topic. We have designed 
a quantitative study of the structure of all 37 European regulatory networks. Using 
Bayesian statistics, we have analyzed the new dataset and tested hypotheses, derived from 
the literature, about factors that affect the structural complexity of NAOs. We find that 
networks with rule-setting tasks are strongly related to less complex NAOs, while 
networks with member-sanctioning and rule-enforcing tasks are strongly related to more 
complex NAOs. Contrary to expectations, younger and less socially dense networks are 
mildly related to less complex NAOs. Theoretically, NAO complexity appears to be 
affected by both the implied uncertainty and the network-level operational requirements 
of its tasks.  
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 6.1. Introduction 
Public goal-directed networks are increasingly popular nowadays (Agranoff, 2007) and 
have attracted growing scholarly attention (Isett et al., 2011; Turrini et al., 2009). 
However, despite these advances, some crucial dimensions still remain to be explored 
(Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007). These include network evolution and change, the 
mechanisms that facilitate the emergence of collaborative outcomes, and how networks 
are governed. The governance of whole networks (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003) is a key 
dimension that requires further research, since it affects the success or failure of the 
collaborative endeavor (McGuire, 2006). Governance encompasses joint decision-
making processes, how power is shared within the network, and how collaboration is 
enforced among members (O’Leary and Vij, 2012). Few scholars have built on the initial 
work led by Provan (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Kenis 2008) in this area. 
Provan and his colleagues argue that “network governance...is critical for effectiveness” 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008, 231). Provan and Kenis’s (2008) triad of ideal types of 
governance—shared, lead-member, and network administrative organization (NAO)—
represents a sound first attempt to theorize goal-directed network governance. There is 
still much to learn about the design of the mechanisms and structures introduced to 
effectively govern, manage, and operate these inter-organizational sets. Only two studies 
have attempted to test Provan and Kenis’s (2008) network governance typology 
empirically (Kenis, Provan, and Kruyen, 2009; Raab, Mannak, and Cambré, 2015).  
In research on goal-directed networks, governance design is a key theoretical and 
practical gap. Why do goal-directed networks set up different network administrative 
organizations (NAOs, or central secretariats) to govern themselves? Scholars describe 
different types of NAOs, some of which make decisions through consensus, others by 
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 voting; some employ eight staff members, others more than 20; some have a single board 
made up of network members; others have a plenary and an executive board (Agranoff, 
2007; Saz-Carranza et al., 2015). Our goal in this chapter is to fill this void in our 
knowledge of NAOs. To achieve our aim, we study the universe of European regulatory 
networks.  
Scholars studying the EU have researched regulatory networks for at least a decade (Coen 
and Thatcher, 2008; Kelemen, 2002). However, these small-n qualitative studies have not 
explored in detail the form of governance, management, and brokerage of these regulatory 
networks. Instead, they have focused on the political dynamics among member states and 
European institutions (Bach et al., 2016; Boin, Busuioc, and Groenleer, 2014). We differ 
from previous studies produced by EU scholars in that we look specifically at the form of 
network governance from a network and organizational perspective.  
Our aim is to contribute to the advancement of existing knowledge on the governance of 
goal-directed networks, complementing Kenis, Provan, and Kruyen (2009) and Raab, 
Mannak, and Cambré (2015) by focusing on the NAO. Instead of exploring when or why 
networks adopt one of the three ideal forms of governance proposed by Provan and Kenis 
(2008), we have researched how and why NAOs differ in their structural design 
complexity.  
NAOs are purposively designed and set up by network members. The structure of NAOs 
is highly relevant because, as Greenwood and Miller (2010) assert, structure is a driver 
for the successful formulation and implementation of strategies. In goal-directed 
networks, NAO design creates preconditions for attaining the collective aim of the 
collaborating members. As Provan and Kenis (2008, 233) argued, “there is a rationale for 
utilizing one form over another and that there are consequences for selection of each form 
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 of governance.” Similarly, we assume that there is a rationale for selecting different NAO 
designs and specific consequences as a result of doing so. By identifying and 
understanding different NAO structures, we aim to deepen and complement Provan and 
Kenis’s (2008) shared/lead-member/NAO triad.  
Our research question is as follows: What factors affect the structural complexity of 
network administrative organizations (NAOs)? To address it, we have created a new 
dataset of all 37 European regulatory networks, which are public goal-directed networks 
composed of European national regulatory authorities.  
We find that tasks play a central role: rule-setting networks are strongly related to less 
complex NAOs, while networks with tasks that require member sanctions and rule 
enforcement are strongly related to more complex NAOs. Contrary to expectations, we 
find weak evidence that younger and less socially dense networks are loosely related to 
less complex NAOs. Weak evidence also points to economy- and finance-related 
networks being less complex than networks operating in other sectors. Being mandated 
(rather than voluntary) does not seem to have any significant relationship with NAO 
complexity.  
The first section of this chapter develops our theoretical framework and concludes with a 
series of hypotheses related to the drivers of NAO structural complexity. Before 
presenting our methods and results, we provide information about our dataset and the 
criteria we have adopted to build it. In the final section, we report our results and discuss 
them in light of previous literature.  
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 6.2. Theoretical Framework  
6.2.1. The governance of goal-directed networks  
Following Provan and Kenis (2008, 231), we define inter-organizational goal-directed 
networks as “groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work 
together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal.” Scholars have 
studied several such networks: for example, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) studied 
economic development networks; Isett and Provan (2005) mental health services delivery 
networks; and Raab, Mannak, and Cambré (2015) Dutch networks managing crime 
prevention services.  
Goal-directed networks must be governed precisely because they aim to achieve a 
collective goal (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2010) Specifically, the governance of goal-
directed networks is “the use of institutions and resources to coordinate and control joint 
action across the network as a whole” (Provan and Kenis, 2008, 231). Network 
governance has both a behavioral and a structural dimension (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 
2010) ); in this chapter we refer to the latter.  
There are three ideal structural forms of governance for whole goal-directed networks: 
shared governance among all network members; governance by one of the members (i.e., 
the lead organization); and delegation of governance to an NAO (Provan and Kenis, 
2008). Provan and Kenis (2008) also identify the key predictors of network governance 
forms: namely, trust, the number of participants, goal consensus, and the need for 
network-level competencies. In essence, low trust, a low level of consensus, a large 
membership, and the need for network-level competencies all increase transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1975) related to governing the network, thus making a central broker far 
more efficient than multilateral coordination and implementation.  
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 Choosing between two brokered forms—NAO or lead organization—will depend on the 
number of network members and the need for network-level competencies. When there 
are high values for both factors, the NAO will be the optimal form.  
Two studies have drawn on large or medium N samples in analyzing forms of network 
governance. Raab, Mannak, and Cambré (2015) have tested which factors contribute to 
the effectiveness of Dutch-mandated information-sharing networks in the field of crime 
prevention. They that effective networks have high durability, system stability, 
centralized integration, and either resource munificence or NAO (as opposed to lead 
member) governance.  
Kenis, Provan, and Kruyen (2009) conduct a meta-analysis of network research and find 
no relationship between task (whether exploitative/explorative and/or 
ambiguous/unambiguous) and governance form. However, they find that trust among 
parties may substitute for an NAO.  
This chapter is related to both of these studies but deviates from both in that it focuses on 
the particularities of the NAO form.  
6.2.3. The structure of NAOs  
Provan and Kenis’s (2008) valuable typology stops short of detailing the variations within 
each of the three governance modes. It does not point out the differences among NAOs, 
nor does it characterize an NAO. Yet, empirical qualitative research on NAO-governed 
networks (Agranoff, 2007) casts light on the components of NAOs’ structure and 
acknowledges the differences among them.  
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 We start our exploration of the structure of NAOs with the traditional definition of an 
organizational structure: a recurrent set of organizational units composing the 
organization, relationships between them, the rules affecting behaviors, and decision-
making and communication patterns (Galbraith, 1987; Greenberg, 2011; Pennings, 1992). 
The study of traditional organizational structure is primarily concerned with issues related 
to the executive component of an organization: aspects such as the number of units (Blau, 
1970; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Modarres, 2010); degree of departmentalization 
(Aiken, Bacharach, and French, 1980); specialization (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011); 
and degree of differentiation (Damanpour, 1987; Hage and Aiken, 1967). However, it is 
crucially important for research on NAO structure to explore and explain an NAO’s 
organizational apex. This is where network members come together—in a governance 
board, plenary, general assembly, or equivalent—to make decisions and monitor the NAO 
staff (Agranoff, 2007; Graddy and Chen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2007). Decision-making 
among the NAO’s multiple principals (Miller, 2005) and their relationship with their 
broker, and with NAO management and staff, is central to its functioning.  
Compared to a traditional organization, the governing bodies of the NAO—a plenary 
composed of network members and, sometimes, an additional “executive” board—are 
disproportionally important, in comparison with small numbers of management and staff. 
For example, Saz-Carranza et al. (2015) study four goal-directed networks whose NAO 
plenary bodies bring together all of their members—ranging from 16 to 164—but whose 
NAO staff headcounts are 4–19. In other words, NAOs are organizations with oversized 
apexes in relation to their management and staff.  
Given the relevance of the apex in NAO functioning, we build on the corporate 
governance literature (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and 
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 the limited available knowledge in the field of public and non-profit organization 
governance (Monteduro, Hinna, and Ferrari, 2011; Hinna and Monteduro, 2010). 
Corporate governance scholars have identified three relevant levels in organizations: 
shareholders, corporate directors (i.e., Boards of Directors) and top management 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2008). The 
interplay between ownership and management is the key vector driving governance 
choices (Fama and Jensen, 1983) in for-profit organizations. Business-oriented corporate 
governance is concerned with the structure and processes that facilitate and determine the 
relationship between principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate 
governance determines the power delegated to the agent (Fields, 2007) and the roles 
played by the board: providing resources, safeguarding accountability, and controlling 
and monitoring the agent (Davis, 2005).  
This logic also plays a part in public sector and non-profit governance arrangements, since 
agency issues persist (Cornforth, 2003; Hinna and Monteduro, 2010). However, other 
issues, such as transparency, compliance, stewardship, and a strong focus on stakeholders 
are more relevant (Edwards and Conforth, 2003). Since public organizations are 
concerned with the production of socially valuable outputs and outcomes, their 
governance aims to incorporate different political standpoints and social preferences into 
the decision-making process (Hinna and Scarozza, 2015; Blair and Stout, 1999; Rajan 
and Zingales, 2000). Thus, delegation of strategic decision-making from the board to the 
agent—the organization’s executive component—is limited in public sector and non-
profit organizations (Lynn and Heinrich, 2000; Stone and Strower, 1999; Seibert, 2007).  
The governing bodies of public organizations are in charge of strategic decisions, in 
accordance with the distribution of rights and responsibilities (Hinna and Scarozza, 2015; 
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 Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Fields, 2007). This has important implications for the 
board’s involvement in strategy (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Hendry and Kiel, 2004). 
They must also deal with the challenges that inevitably arise from diverse and even 
conflicting goals (Wright, 2004). It is noteworthy that these boards are often 
conceptualized as decision-making groups facing highly uncertain environments 
(Hambrick, 1994), where the interests of diverse stakeholders must be safeguarded 
(Hinna and Monterudo, 2016; Tirole, 2001). Thus, the board is designed to pursue and 
balance the goals of the organization’s stakeholders, rather than to focus solely on 
financial performance or holding the chief executive to account (Ellwood and García-
Lacalle, 2015).  
Collaborative contexts, and goal-directed networks in particular, experience tension 
between unity and diversity (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2010) because bring together 
diverse members to accomplish a collective goal. For this endeavor to succeed, the 
collaborative goals must be acknowledged by all members (Huxham and Vangen, 2000, 
Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Ansell and Gash, 2008). However, differences in 
expectations and visions will hinder agreement and cooperation (Agranoff and McGuire, 
2001; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006). Networks therefore need adequate governance 
to balance power and to manage, and eventually solve, group conflicts (Jenh, 1997).  
NAOs, in particular, face an acute collective action problem, involving a multiple-
principals scenario (Miller, 2005) in their governing bodies. Collective decision-making 
among members of the board(s) is even more important to an NAO than to a standard 
public or non-profit organization (Agranoff, 2007). Researchers claim that decision-
making in networks happens through consensus rather than voting (Agranoff, 2007). 
However, some networks with deep-rooted democratic and town hall-meeting cultures do 
142 
 
 make decisions by voting. In multi-organizational settings with a large number of 
members—such as European regulatory networks (Salvador et al., 2015 ) or international 
governmental organizations (IGOs) (Lockwood Payton, 2010)—voting is often the norm. 
In NAO-governed goal-directed networks, power imbalances can be compensated for 
through design (Saz-Carranza et al., 2015).  
A NAO’s structure must therefore provide a decision-making arena adequate to overcome 
problems of collective action and cope with the principal-agent dilemma between 
members and NAO staff, while keeping coordination costs at a minimum. Figure 6.1 
shows an NAO prototype with its basic structural units.  
Figure 6.1. NAO Prototype (authors’ own) 
 
Source: authors’ own  
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 Qualitative studies have pointed out the differences in NAO structures (Saz-Carranza et 
al., 2015). Some NAOs have two boards, others just one. Some have large executive units 
with tens of staff, while others have an individual broker. Thus, NAOs may be more or 
less elaborate (i.e., with more differentiated jobs and units, more developed 
administrative and governance components, and more sophisticated decision-making 
rules)—just like any other organization (Mintzberg, 1983).  
Taking stock of Mintzberg’s definition of structural organizational elaborateness 
(Mintzberg, 1983), we build on Rescher (1998) to develop our conceptualization of the 
structural complexity of NAOs. In this chapter, “complexity” primarily refers to the 
quantity and variety of constituent elements in the network’s governance structure. 
Complexity also reflects the degree of elaboration of the rules and norms governing a 
phenomenon. The complexity score we attach to an NAO apex represents an attempt to 
operationalize and aggregate these different elements (i.e., the number and type of units 
and the types of norms used in decision-making processes).  
For example, a more complex NAO will have two boards rather than one, non-members 
on its boards, an appeal board, a director general, and sophisticated decision-making 
rules—i.e., double majority voting or weighted-voting as opposed to consensus (see 
Figure 6.2 for extreme NAO models). The key question driving this research—What 
factors affect the structural complexity of NAOs? —aims to explore these differences 
among NAOs.  
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 Figure 6.2. Simple and Complex NAOs  
Simple NAO  
 
Complex NAO 
 
 
Source: authors’ own  
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 6.2.3. Factors affecting NAO structural complexity  
We identify four variables (network task, network age, mandated nature of the network, 
and network density) plus a control variable (sector) that are theoretically expected to be 
associated with different levels of NAO structural complexity.  
Task  
Public goal-directed networks are consciously created to achieve specific goals by 
executing certain tasks (Raab and Kenis, 2009). Complex organizations are, in general, 
better understood when the study of their structure is linked to the tasks it will execute 
and its related demands (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Provan and Kenis (2008) also 
identify network-level tasks as a key contingency factor that affects network governance. 
The more of these tasks there are, the greater the need for an NAO. Arguably, network 
tasks are the most idiosyncratic characteristic of goal-directed networks, as compared to 
serendipitous networks.  
Networks can execute different tasks (Popp et al., 2014), and different network tasks can 
imply different degrees of interdependence among members (Alter and Hage, 1993). 
While scholars of classical organization have found a relationship between the 
interdependence of (operational) tasks and organizational structure (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967), research on inter-organizational relations (mainly corporate joint ventures 
and networks) has found that interdependences of (network) tasks affect NAO structure. 
This reflects the fact that network-level tasks have an impact on information 
requirements, coordination efforts, and transaction costs (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 
1995; Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000, 2004; Provan and Kenis, 2008).  
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 Agranoff (2007) identifies different types of public management networks that deal 
incrementally with exchange, concerted action, and joint production (Alter and Hage, 
1993). At one end of this continuum, Agranoff (2007) places networks that only exchange 
information; at the other end, interagency adjustments that formally adopt collaborative 
courses of action. In the middle, his typology positions networks that deal with 
information exchange, exchange resource opportunities, sequence programming, pool 
client contacts, and produce member services.  
Agranoff (2007) finds that networks institutionalize (i.e., have larger and more complex 
NAOs) as they move along the continuum towards joint production. He builds on the 
organization-theory work of Alter and Hage (1992), who maintain that the increasing 
institutionalization of collaborative ventures is based on the interdependencies implied 
by their purpose. Thus, joint-production networks imply far greater interdependencies 
than those that simply share information. This logic is used by Provan and Kenis (2008), 
who predict that networks that require network-level tasks will tend to adopt brokered 
governance mechanisms such as NAOs or lead-member governance (as opposed to 
shared governance).  
Focusing specifically on regulatory networks, Slaughter (2004) identifies three basic 
network functions: information sharing, rule setting, and rule enforcement. In a similar 
vein, and focusing on EU regulatory networks, Coen and Thatcher (2008) place 
regulatory networks along a soft-to-hard continuum, which runs from coordination to 
drafting secondary legislation at EU level.  
Thus, as the network moves from simply sharing information, toward setting rules, and 
even enforcing rules to regulate entities, the more complex its NAO is likely to become. 
(Recall that complexity, in our study, means moving away from the basic model of a 
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 plenary that works by consensus and directly overseeing the executive component of the 
NAO.) The more tasks an NAO must execute, the more it will require operational 
capacity, improved supervision by members, and streamlined decision-making processes 
(i.e., moving away from consensus). Scholars who study international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) have found that IGOs often use simple majority rules to avoid 
blockages (Snidal, 1995). If a network can sanction regulated entities or members, then 
we can expect an appellate body as well.  
In addition, more and different tasks might imply greater difficulties in monitoring 
operational performance (Gulati and Singh, 1998), executing members’ strategic choices 
(Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden, 1999) and managing stakeholders’ competing demands 
(Stone and Brush, 1996; Green and Griensinger, 1996; Herman and Renz, 1998).  
From this, we derive that, at at the very least, all networks involve information sharing. 
Additionally, some may be charged with jointly producing awareness-raising campaigns, 
member training, or any other executive tasks (H1a). Regulatory networks may propose 
or even set regulations (H1b), as well as directly enforcing regulation on third-party 
entities (H1c). Lastly, networks are capable of sanctioning members if they do not comply 
with previously agreed commitments (H1d). Thus, we develop four task-related 
hypotheses:  
 H1a Networks that perform executive tasks will—ceteris paribus—have more 
structurally complex NAOs than those that do not.   
H1b Networks that set rules will—ceteris paribus—have more structurally 
complex NAOs than those that do not.   
H1c Networks that enforce rules on third-party entities will—ceteris paribus—
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 have more structurally complex NAOs than those that do not.   
H1d Networks that can sanction members will—ceteris paribus—have more 
structurally complex NAOs than those that cannot.  
Age  
As time passes and the network evolves, the relationships among members evolve as well 
(i.e., partner uncertainty decreases and trust is expected to increase). Raab, Mannak, and 
Cambré (2015), following Van Raaij (2006), point out that in intra-organizational 
networks, the development of optimal monitoring, accountability, and control 
mechanisms takes time. Young and old networks therefore differ in terms of the 
mechanisms used to monitor and lead the network (Hite and Hersterly, 2001; Human and 
Provan, 2000). Mintzberg (1983) establishes age as a key contingent element affecting 
the degree of formalization and the implementation of more elaborate structures in 
organizations. Provan and Kenis (2008) also lean in this direction, expecting the form of 
network governance to have a life cycle and develop over time, from shared to NAO-
governed. In this regard, we expect NAOs to become incrementally complex as they age.  
H2 Ceteris paribus, the older the network, the more complex the NAO.  
Mandated collaboration  
Public goal-directed networks may be mandated by a third party (Provan and Kenis, 
2008). As a process, mandated collaboration involves design and implementation stages 
(Rodriguez et al., 2007). In mandated networks, membership, overall goals, and network 
governance are not defined solely by network members. During the design phase and 
prior to formalization, network members and the mandating party interact to establish the 
network’s design and governance structures. Given that membership is obligatory, rather 
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 than voluntary, in a mandated network, future members play an active role in framing the 
safeguards and collective decision-making rules of the network’s governance structures 
Saz-Carranza et al., 2015). This is because members in mandated networks do not have 
the option of “exiting” (Hirschman, 1970) the network in cases of strong disagreements. 
Instead, they aim to maintain some “veto” power by advocating consensual decision-
making and minimizing delegation to an executive board or executive director. We thus 
expect the NAOs of mandated networks to have a less integrated, complex structure. 
H3 Ceteris paribus, the NAO structure is likely to be less complex when 
collaboration is mandated than when it is not.  
Network density  
The social relational pattern among network members affects the form of network 
governance. Raab, Mannak, and Cambré (2015) find that effective networks usually have 
either high network density or a centralized governance structure, such as an NAO. (The 
density of a network is a measure of how many connections there are between nodes, 
compared to the maximum possible number of connections that could exist between 
nodes: the higher the proportion, the higher the density.) In fact, Provan and Kenis (2008) 
predict that when trust is densely dispersed among members, they may govern themselves 
using a shared-governance mode. We expect networks with greater density to have less 
complex NAOs.  
H4 Ceteris paribus, the less dense a network, the more complex its NAO.  
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 Policy sector as a control variable  
The policy sector can affect the form of an NAO for several reasons. First, the policy 
sector may require a specific amount of coordination from network members. Different 
but interrelated organizations constitute a policy sector (Bähr, 2010). The interrelations 
among parties are specific to and characteristic of that policy sector; they depend to a 
large extent on the interdependencies among parties. Interdependence has been found to 
be a good predictor of integration in inter-organizational collaborations (Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009; Kogut, 1988; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Van 
de Ven, Walker, and Liston, 1979).  
Different policy sectors imply different interdependencies. As an illustration, physical 
operational interdependence among regulators is much higher in the rail and energy 
sectors than in environmental sectors. In the former, national regulators have to agree on 
intensive reciprocal investments to build interconnections. Such interconnections are not 
necessary in the environmental sector.  
Policy sectors can also have different levels of political salience (Gormley, 1986). 
Politicians tend to delegate work to technical experts far less in sectors with greater 
political salience. For example, public safety (highly salient) tends to be delegated less 
frequently to technical officers or civil servants than insurance regulation (low political 
salience). However, this tendency is mediated by the technical complexity of the sector 
(Gormley, 1986).  
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 Figure 6.3. Illustration of the hypothesis 
 
Source: authors’ own  
Figure 6.3 graphically illustrates our hypotheses. Other factors that can determine NAO 
structure. Membership size and diversity among members may have an effect, but our 
empirical sample based on EU regulatory networks kept both variables constant across 
the 37 networks.  
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 6.3 Methods  
To answer our research question and test our hypotheses we have constructed a new 
database of all EU regulatory network NAOs. We have used Bayesian statistics to analyze 
the results.  
6.3.1 Sampling  
For this study we took into account 37 European regulatory networks. Our sample was 
based, firstly, on Levi-Faur’s (2011) work on European regulatory networks and, 
secondly, on the European Union’s official decentralized agencies’ list.i  
Levi-Faur (2011) maps 36 regulatory regimes:ii “Regulatory regimes encompass the 
norms, the mechanisms of decision-making, the various institutions, and the networks of 
actors that are involved in regulation” (Levi-Faur, 2011, 811).  
Within these regimes, Levi-Faur identifies 28 regulatory agencies and 51 networks. On 
the one hand, an agency is defined as “an administrative organization with a distinct 
formal identity, an internal hierarchy, functional capacities, and, most important, at least 
one principal” (Levi-Faur, 2011, 813). He focuses on regulatory agencies, those that carry 
out at least one of the four functional tasks of regulation—information gathering, rule 
setting, monitoring, and enforcement—and excludes agencies that deal with planning, 
administration of services, distribution, and redistribution (Levi-Faur, 2011). At the same 
time, he defines a network as “a set of relatively stable relationships of a non-hierarchical 
and interdependent nature which link a variety of actors” (Levi-Faur, 2011, 813) (cf. 
Ahrne and Brunsson, 2011, 6; Börzel, 1998, 254; Podolny and Page, 1998, 58).  
As Levi-Faur recognizes, it is far from straightforward to determine whether an institution 
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 is an agency, a network, or something else. Nevertheless, his definitions suggest that 
NAOs may fit his (2011) definition of agency. An NAO, according to our definition, has 
a distinct identity, an internal hierarchy, functional capacities, and principals. In this 
study, we have distinguished between a European-level agency and an NAO on the basis 
of the unit’s relationship with its principals. When the organization has a governance 
board that incorporates all network members—in other words, all national regulatory 
agencies or units that are members of the network—and makes decisions collectively, via 
consensus or voting, we consider it to be an NAO.  
Conversely, when the organization’s principals on the governance board are delegates 
from a European-level institution, such as the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, and/or the Council of the EU, we then consider that organization to be a 
European-level agency. Similarly, if the EU agency is accountable solely to the 
Commission, the Council, or the Parliament—as opposed to the network members 
collectively—then we do not consider it an NAO.  
The official EU list includes 32 decentralized agencies. Again, we ignored those that did 
not fit our definition of a network and/or did not incorporate regulatory members. Thus, 
from Levi-Faur’s (2011) 28 regulatory agencies and 51 networks, and the EU’s 32 
agencies, our dataset came down to 37 networks. More information on how we 
constructed the sample, including a table with key information about all of the networks 
studied, can be found in the Appendix.  
Our sampling criteria were as follows:  
• Following our characterization of NAOs, the units considered in this study include 
national network members that are, collectively, the top decision-makers.   
154 
 
 • Networks had to be regulatory in the sense of bringing together national regulatory 
authorities. The network itself may not have regulatory functions; it may simply 
share information among members, but these members must themselves be 
regulators. Thus, networks whose members are executive agencies, such as 
national vocational training centers, were not included. Importantly, some of the 
NAOs studied also carried out executive tasks, in addition to their minimal 
regulatory task requirements. However, we were unable to ascertain what 
percentage of the staff was dedicated to brokering the network as opposed to 
carrying out executive tasks. We will take up this issue again in the discussion 
section.   
• Our sample included only active networks; it excluded agencies or networks that 
had finalized their mandate or no longer existed for various reasons.   
We ignored terminology when selecting our sample. The diversity of terms and 
definitions in circulation prevented us from using names or terms as selection criteria. We 
named the entities studied agency, network, body, office, center, authority, foundation, 
institute, college, council, unit, group, conference, committee, and platform. Provan, Fish, 
and Sydow (2007, 480) acknowledge that goal-directed networks may be called 
partnerships, strategic alliances, inter-organizational relationships, coalitions, 
cooperative arrangements, or collaborative agreements. As the Appendix shows, some of 
these NAOs depart from the ideal type proposed by Provan and Kenis (2008)—employing 
100 staff members and having complex oversight structures. However, these authors do 
not specify the characteristics of the ideal type. The variations among NAOs are precisely 
what we explore in this study, adding a layer of nuance to Provan and Kenis’s (2008) 
shared/lead-member/NAO triad. We acknowledge that the most complex NAOs approach 
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 the fuzzy boundary of the hierarchical ideal type.  
It is worth noting that the 37 European regulatory networks included in our analysis bring 
together different types of actors. This reinforces our assumption that the 37 cases are 
independent and identically distributed and enables us to use a pooled variance model, as 
described below. More specifically, 13 regulatory networks have independent national 
regulatory agencies as their members, 24 networks incorporate both independent national 
regulatory agencies and national ministries in different proportions; only one regulatory 
network is composed exclusively of national ministries. Moreover, depending on the 
sector and policy area in question, we find that independent national agencies and national 
ministries are significantly different when it comes to capacities, resources, and size. As 
an illustration, even though the European Regulators Group for Postal Services and the 
European Banking Authority include only independent regulatory agencies, their 
members come from different policy areas and their resources and capacities are highly 
divergent. Importantly, membership overlap among the 37 European regulatory networks 
only occurs with the seven mandated regulatory networks that also have parallel voluntary 
networks (see Table A1 in the Appendix).  
6.3.2 Data collection and coding  
Our research began with data collection, which involved identifying and codifying the 
data (Boyatzis, 1998) and carrying out a statistical analysis of the resulting database. Each 
network’s statutes and legal documents became sources for the database we were 
constructing. We supplemented these sources with publicly available information from 
organization websites, and directly contacted the organizations if their information was 
unclear or unavailable. Thematic analysis, a method of identifying, analyzing and 
reporting patterns or themes within qualitative sources of data (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and 
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 Clarke, 2006), was well-suited to our research goals. Previous studies have indicated the 
robustness and suitability of this method of analyzing the broad and complex topic of 
governance (Dooley, 2007; Cicon et al., 2012). Data collection was completed during the 
second semester of 2012; the information included in our database refers to 2011.  
Building on previous research and the literature of corporate governance, we codified a 
total of 16 NAO structural characteristics (i.e., outcomes).iii Most variables were codified 
as binary (i.e., zero signifying absence of the characteristic; 1 its presence). The dataset 
also contained information about the number of seats on the governance board, budgets, 
staff numbers, and categorical information about the policy sector each organization 
belonged to (see Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1 Structural Design Items Included in the Analysis 
 
Source: authors’ own  
During the data collection period, we also coded independent variables that our 
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 hypothesis suggested could be potential drivers of NAO complexity. Thus, we collected 
data relating to tasks (binary indicator); age (i.e., years passed since the first 
institutionalized collaboration—irrespective of any change in name); the network’s 
mandated or voluntary nature (binary indicator); and policy sector (categorical indicator). 
Two researchers coded tasks based on the networks’ statutes and founding regulations. 
Both researchers coded all of the networks and checked for inconsistencies in a second 
round, to strengthen the reliability of the codes. Table 6.2 provides a list of the indicators 
used as covariates or independent variables.  
In relation to age, we counted the years passed since the first institutionalized 
collaboration. This is important for mandated networks, which do not evolve organically 
but are created and transformed legally. Mandated networks can be refounded and 
artificially reset to age zero by the mandating party. This is the case with telecoms: ERG 
(with a simple NAO) was created mandatorily in 2001 and later refounded as BEREC 
(with a much more complex NAO) in 2009. To be able to capture the temporal effects in 
these cases, we used the creation of the first mandated network as the founding date.  
The most relevant operationalization of our independent variables was network density. 
We followed the proxy logic of Raab, Mannak, and Cambré (2015) in measuring network 
density indirectly. They use network plenary formal meetings as a proxy for network 
density: i.e., the more plenary meetings, the more relationally dense they assume the 
network to be. Similarly, we operationalized network density as a binary indicator—high 
vs. low—but only for the mandated networks. We coded as high density those mandated 
networks that existed alongside equivalent voluntary networks. Our rationale was that 
members of a mandated network are more densely interconnected if they voluntarily set 
up a network before EU institutions mandated the creation of an official regulatory 
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 network. Thus, we coded regimes in which the mandated network had an equivalent 
voluntary network incorporating the same national regulators as 1 (i.e., high density).  
Lastly, for our control variable, we used three policy sectors: justice and security, 
economy and finance, and “other” (services, health, energy and transport, environment, 
employment, social affairs, and culture). This classification was derived from the data. 
We tried several different categorizations, but these three groupings consistently 
emerged.  
Table 6.2 Covariates Included in the Analysis  
 
6.3.3 Data analysis  
We perform an encompassing analysis in a single model with two parts: measurement 
and explanation. Measurement is based on item response modeling technique. We use 
our binary outcomes (whether a certain institutional characteristic of the NAO’s structure 
is present or absent) to estimate a score of “structural complexity” based on the number 
of characteristics each organization has. But instead of adding up all the characteristics 
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 and counting the raw number, we employ a more refined measure using item response 
theory. Developed in psychology, item response models allow us to generate a score of 
“structural complexity” that gives different weights (or discrimination) to each of the 
characteristics. So instead of assuming that the significance of each characteristic is equal 
to its score, we let the model estimate the discrimination, based on the number of NAOs 
that have such a characteristic (difficulty) and their relative position in the final score 
(discrimination).  
Formally, we are interested in ξn, which represents the structural complexity score of 
each NAO (n) in a standardized scale that has, by definition, mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. The two-parameter (α for discrimination and β for difficulty) logistic model 
for data on n NAOs that have a different set of X characteristics (1 having the 
characteristic j and 0 not having it) can be expressed as follows:  
Equation 1 
logit (Xj)=αj(ξn-βj) 
Once the scores are obtained we explore their associations in the second part of the 
process using a mixed linear model against a set of covariates based on our variables 
(task, age, mandated, density, and sector, see Table 6.2). Our main goal is to explain the 
structural complexity score based on the NAO’s set of common covariates. The second 
part of the formal model describes the association between the structural complexity score 
and the covariates X by means of the θ parameters, which are our ultimate parameters of 
interest.  
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 We use Bayesian inference following Gill and Witko (2013) for several reasons. First, 
the ratio of available data to hypotheses is low (37 organizations and seven variables plus 
a sector identification), and Bayesian inference is especially suited to such an endeavor. 
Second, we incorporate the uncertainty of the scores obtained in the measurement part to 
the associations with the covariates through a transparent process. This strengthens our 
confidence in the results, as we do not rely on the organizations having a simple value for 
their structural complexity; instead, we assume that our uncertainty about their positions 
is passed on to the inferences about the parameters of interest. Third, we do not have to 
rely on the null hypothesis test to report our confidence in the hypothesis. Our data are 
drawn not from a sample but from the entire universe of European regulatory networks, 
making assumptions of repeated sampling unnecessary and not having to rely on the 
“flawed” and “arbitrary” null hypotheses significance test (Gill and Witko, 2013, 4 & 8). 
Finally, Bayesian inference allows us to “systematically include [...] previous 
information, both qualitative and quantitative” (Gill and Witko, 2013, 4) as formal priors, 
which we do in one of the three models used. No evidence of non-convergence is found 
in the chains, according to formal and visual Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
convergence tools: this implies that inferences from the parameters can be extracted 
safely.  
Equation 2 
𝜉𝜉𝑛𝑛~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝜎𝜎) 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶𝜃𝜃 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠  
𝜎𝜎 ~ (0, 1) 
𝜃𝜃 ~ (0, 10)  
𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 ~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾,𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾)  
𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾~(0,1)  
𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾 ~(0,1)  
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 Each NAOs score on complexity (ξn) is explained by a linear combination of the 
covariates (C) and their effects (θ), which are the relevant parameters of interest. The 
equation for the explanatory model can be read as follows: the matrix of outcomes for 
each of the NAOs (N) is distributed normally with a systematic component μ and standard 
deviation σ. μ is a linear combination of the covariates (Cθ) plus a varying intercept (also 
known as random effect) for the three sectors. The last five lines in Equation 2 are the 
non-informative priors necessary for the Bayesian set-up. In the case of the model with 
informative priors, we use priors for age and network density, as they are the only 
variables that have been empirically tested previously. We use rather strong informative 
priors in both cases, where age is a priori expected to have a positive association with 
complexity (Hite and Hersterly, 2001) and network density a negative one (Raab, 
Mannak, and Cambré, 2015). The priors are normally distributed with mean 1 and −1, 
respectively, and standard deviation 0.5, giving only around five percent probability of 
having an association the reverse of that found by previous research. Continuous variable 
age is standardized to half standard deviation to be able to compare its effect directly with 
the binary variables.  
6.4 Findings  
6.4.1 Item response modeling  
Using the 16 structural characteristics included in our analysis (see Table 6.1) we 
developed a structural complexity score for each NAO. Structural complexity refers to 
the number of governance units an NAO has, in addition to a governance board (executive 
board, appeal board, executive director, and expert committees), who approves the budget 
and working program, appoints the executive director (regardless of whether the board 
departs from unanimous decision-making or simple majority voting), and whether the 
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 mandating party—any EU institution, in essence the Parliament, the Commission, or the 
Council—is present and votes in the governance unit. The aim was to identify the 
relationship between the contingent elements we included in the analysis (i.e., age, tasks, 
mandated nature, network density, and sector) with each network’s complexity score.  
Figure 6.4 shows the median of the estimated discrimination value, along with the 95 
percent credible interval. The median value of the parameters indicates how strongly the 
inclusion of that item increases (or decreases, if negative) the complexity of the NAO. 
High discrimination means that the indicator conveys more information about the 
complexity of an NAO. As the figure shows, the best single indicator for providing 
information about whether an NAO has high or low complexity is whether the NAO’s 
executive board appoints the executive director.  
The most highly discriminating parameters are the executive board appoints the executive 
director; the executive board is not a reduced version of the governance board; and the 
existence of observers at the executive board. These parameters convey a great deal of 
information, giving an NAO a high or low score in the latent trait of complexity.  
At the opposite end of the non-discriminating parameters, we find that the EU has the 
right to vote on the governance board. This item does not convey any significant 
information that enables us to calculate whether the NAO will be complex or not.  
By applying the discrimination scores to the items characterizing each NAO, the model 
produces scores for the estimated latent complexity of the NAOs. Figure 6.4 shows the 
median of estimated complexity along with the 95 percent credible interval. Recall that 
this score has an arbitrary scale restricted to having a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1.  
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 Figure 6.4 Networks ranked according to their NAO complexity 
 
There are four NAOs with substantially higher complexity, namely the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA), and the European Banking Authority (EBA).  
According to our analysis, the most complex NAO by a significant margin is ACER’s 
governance structure. ACER has a two-tiered structure with a plenary (the Board of 
Regulators) and an executive board (the Administrative Board).  
The Board of Regulators includes a senior representative from each of the European 
national regulatory agencies and one representative from the EU Commission, the 
mandating party. However, the Commission does not vote on the governance board. The 
executive board’s central role in the governance structure of ACER is notable: the 
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 executive board is in charge of supervising the administrative and budgetary activities of 
ACER, and of appointing its director. Interestingly, this second board is not a reduced 
version of the plenary but a significantly different structure, whose members are 
appointed by the EU institutions.  
ACER’s structure is completed with an appeal board. This third board, composed of six 
members selected from senior staff at national regulatory agencies (i.e., the network 
members), decides independently on appeals presented by national regulatory agencies, 
individuals, or legal entities.  
Decision-making in ACER is not by consensus or unanimity. Both the Board of 
Regulators and the Administrative Board act on a two-thirds majority of members 
present. The Appeal Board decides by qualified majority.  
At the other end of the scale, the European Police College (CEPOL) is the least complex 
NAO, significantly simpler than the rest. CEPOL is governed by one governance board 
that comprises the head of each national police college. The governance board gives 
strategic guidance and also decides on the budget and work program. Its decisions are 
made by a two-thirds majority. Figure 6.5 illustrates the structure of both CEPOL and 
ACER.  
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 Figure 6.5 Organigraphs 
 
Source: authors’ own  
In classical or frequentist statistics, hypotheses are either accepted or rejected. In 
Bayesian statistics, researchers directly report their degree of support (see Gill and Witko, 
2013, 8–9). Figure 6.7 shows the values for the θ parameters in equation 2. The full model 
includes all variables, whereas the restricted model includes only the variables that, in the 
full model, show values above or below one inter-quartile range (0.6745 standard 
deviations) away from zero on the absolute scale. The dots represent the median of the 
posterior density and the thick and thin lines correspond to the 90 and 95 percent credible 
intervals (or highest posterior densities). Given that all variables have been standardized, 
the values of the parameters are directly comparable. Table 5.3 reports similar 
information, namely the probability that every hypothesis is true, given the data and the 
model, in a one-tailed test (vs. the two-tail intervals shown in Figure 6.6).  
In all model specifications, the strongest effect corresponds to the network task of rule-
setting. It is strongly related to NAO complexity, albeit negatively—contrary to our 
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 expectations. We find moderate support for the other two network tasks: authorizations 
(i.e., rule-enforcing) and (network member) sanctioning are both associated with higher 
complexity. Age and network density are both weakly associated with network 
complexity (93 and 86 percent, respectively). However, they are negatively correlated, 
contrary to our hypothesis.  
With regard to the varying coefficients that account for sector differences in complexity, 
the results (see Figure 6.7 and Table 5.3) show that the lowest level of complexity 
corresponds to NAOs in the economy and finance sector, followed by the justice and law 
enforcement sector. The remaining NAOs have higher complexity. NAOs in the economy 
and finance sector are less complex than NAOs in other sectors by 0.6±0.57, which 
indicates that, although there may be a systematic difference, we do not have enough 
variation in the data (too few organizations in the sector) to make a strong claim.  
Figure 6.6. Results per Parameter (Contingency) on NAO Complexity 
 
Source: authors’ own  
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 Figure 6.7. Varying Intercepts (γ) 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of Results (probabilities of hypotheses being true, according to the 
posterior distributions of the parameters θ and γ)  
Hypotheses  
  
  
Support  
Full   Full priors  Restricted  
1a: networks that perform executive tasks 
will have more structurally complex NAOs 
than those that do not  
0.41  0.44   No  
1b: Networks that set rules will have more 
structurally complex NAOs than those that 
do not.  
0.0023  0.01  0.001  
Opposite 
effect. Strong  
1c: Networks that enforce rules will have 
more structurally complex NAOs than those 
that do not.ix  
0.95  0.92  0.96  Yes. Moderate  
1d: Networks that can sanction members will 
have more structurally complex NAOs than 
those that cannot.  
0.95  0.97  0.96  Yes. Moderate  
2: The older the network, the more complex 
the NAO.  0.067  0.54  
0.062  
Opposite 
effect Weak.  
3: The NAO structure is likely to be less 
complex when collaboration is mandated 
than when it is not.  
0.51  0.062   No  
4: The less dense a network, the more 
complex the NAO.x  0.14  0.095  
0.053  
Opposite 
effect. Weak  
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 Control: sector  
       
Economy and finance is less complex than 
others  
  
0.87  
 
0.89  
0.88  Yes. Weak  
Justice and law is less complex than others  0.65  0.75  0.64  No  
Source: authors’ own  
This basic model has an explanatory power of 25 percent (residual standard deviation 
[RSD] of 0.754). The restricted model has an explanatory power of 28 percent (RSD of 
0.72). Figure 6.8 shows which covariates are related to NAO structural complexity.  
Figure 6.8. Graphical Representation of Hypothesis’ Support 
 
Source: authors’ own  
  
169 
 
 6.5 Discussion 
Network tasks and NAOs  
Among our first four hypotheses (H1a–d) related to tasks, rule-setting has a significant 
(albeit negative) effect on NAO structural complexity. Rule-enforcing and member-
sanctioning both have a strong positive effect, while, in the case of non-regulatory 
executive tasks carried out by the network, we find no relationship to less complex NAOs. 
One explanation for this is that different logics are at play. Our definition of NAO 
complexity implies that more integration and fewer control points are available to 
individual members. Our findings suggest that network members prioritize control over 
tasks with uncertain outputs, such as rule-setting: members want to control and avoid 
negative rules. Following Agency Theory, a network member tends to value its own 
control points in situations of uncertainty or contract incompleteness (Hooghe and Marks, 
2014; Lake and McCubbins, 2006), both of which could affect it adversely. When the 
uncertainty or incompleteness involves the behavior of fellow members or the broker (i.e., 
the agent, in this case the NAO executive), members typically guard their capacity to 
block decisions (Hooghe and Marks, 2012). They will try to maintain a “veto” power by 
advocating consensual decision-making in networks where new rules can be designed, 
more so than in networks that merely implement regulations.  
Recall that the boards of public organizations are collective decision-making arenas 
where different viewpoints, political preferences, and values interact (Hinna and 
Scarozza, 2015). This is even more the case for NAO boards, due to the diversity of 
members represented. For this reason, members in public networks tasked with rule-
setting—where collective decision-making impacts the adoption of each new rule—will 
want to retain maximum control. Information-sharing and executive and enforcement 
tasks involve far fewer options and a narrower span; for this reason, they represent a much 
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 lower threat or risk to members.  
In the case of regulatory enforcement (i.e., measured via authorizations) and member-
sanctioning, uncertainty is low and the rules are understood. Moreover, once the rules 
that regulate entities and members have been set, authorizations (rule-enforcement) and 
member-sanctioning become routinized activities that require operational capacity. This 
is particularly true for regulatory enforcement—perhaps the most operationally intensive 
of the three regulatory tasks (rule-setting, enforcement, and member-sanctioning). The 
four most complex NAOs are all tasked with delivering authorizations for regulated 
entities and sanctioning members.  
All in all, coordination and organizational prerogatives drive NAO complexity whenever 
there is relatively low uncertainty about outcomes. Conversely, the cautious attitude of 
members will prevail in settings with uncertainty (rule-setting).  
We find no effect for non-regulatory executive tasks. This is because our sample was 
made up of regulatory rather than executive networks, where non-regulatory executive 
tasks are secondary in importance.  
Age  
We find weak evidence that age has a weak negative effect on the structural complexity 
of a network. The top five most complex NAOs all belong to networks whose history of 
collaboration is average to short, starting between 1997 and 2004; the first network 
studied was set up in 1955 (the European Aviation Safety Agency). In relation to 
traditional organization structure, classic contingency posits that organizations grow more 
complex over time. This aligns with Provan and Kenis’s (2008) proposal that the 
development of goal-directed network governance of evolves as a life cycle. Even in an 
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 extreme case, where our prior information gives only a five percent probability of age 
being negative, no association seems to exist. The regulatory nature and context (i.e., EU) 
of the networks included in our analysis may well offer an explanation for this finding. 
European-level regulatory networks are an evolving phenomenon, in which the 
organizational and policy domains interact, resulting in an ongoing redefinition of the 
European Regulatory Space (Levi-Faur, 2015); more integration seems to occur in areas 
where coordination efforts are more recent.  
Isomorphism (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004) also seems to be at play, since the five 
networks redesigned on or after 2009 all have important similarities and highly complex 
NAOs. Qualitative and anecdotal evidence from the Commission indicates that the 
energy-sector ACER design was proposed first; from there, the model was used as a 
starting-point for mandated regulatory networks in the fields of securities, insurance, 
banking, and telecoms (ESMA, EIOMA, EBA, and BEREC, respectively). 
Network density  
Low relational network density mildly and negatively relates to NAO complexity. This 
result is not in line with a major premise of network theory, whereby relational informal 
density and formal centralized coordination are substitutes (Kenis, Provan, and Kruyen, 
2009; Raab, Mannak, and Cambré, 2015). One possible interpretation is that, to integrate 
and pull strongly to an NAO, members require a minimum amount of prior trust, given 
that our conceptualization of complexity requires simple majority voting. Thus, mandated 
networks without sufficient network density will not have complex and integrated NAOs.  
A second explanation may be methodological. Arguably, our measure of network density 
cannot be proved, since it reduces our sample significantly: we compared mandated 
networks from regimes with an equivalent voluntary network (involving the same 
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 network members) to mandated networks from regimes without voluntary networks. This 
reduced our sample to 26 mandated networks, out of which only seven mandated 
networks coexist in a regime with an equivalent voluntary network.  
Policy sector  
We found weak evidence that networks operating in the economy and finance sector will 
tend to have less complex NAOs compared to other sectors. It would seem reasonable for 
members of relevant and important sectors like economy and finance to try to retain 
control—thus avoiding pooling decision-making—if it were not for the fact that the 
justice and law sector has no association with more integrated networks. Justice and law 
networks deal with an even more sensitive issue in terms of sovereignty than economy 
and finance. This is probably one of the areas in which the least European integration has 
occurred.  
Networks operating in the economy and finance sector tend to have less complex NAOs 
compared to other sectors, despite the second, third, and fourth most complex NAOs 
belonging to the economy and finance sector (ESMA, EIOPA, and EBA) ranking, 
respectively, 2, 3, 4 and 11 in terms of complexity. These four are all tasked with rule-
setting, which, according to the model, is the variable most strongly and positively related 
to complexity. One way to explain this apparently contradictory result is that, all things 
being equal, a network that brings together economy and finance regulators will have 
lower complexity, as complexity is driven by dimensions other than sector.  
Mandated  
Although the top five most structurally complex NAOs belong to mandated networks, 
whether or not a network is mandated does not affect NAO complexity. In fact, the least 
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 complex NAOs, CEPOL and EUROPOL, are also mandated. This contradicts previous 
qualitative research (Saz-Carranza et al., 2015), which proposes that mandated networks 
will have more complex NAOs, since members will negotiate and try to include 
safeguards (for example, an appeal board) for themselves, given that the members of 
mandated networks do not have an “exit” clause.  
6.6 Conclusions  
This chapter is a medium-N analysis of NAOs. The aim of our study is to go beyond 
Provan and Kenis’s (2008) shared/lead-member/NAO triad by identifying and better 
understanding the different NAO structures.  
In essence, we find that network-level tasks strongly affect NAO design. Networks with 
rule-setting capacities have less complex NAOs, while networks with member-
sanctioning and rule-enforcing tasks are mildly related to more complex NAOs. We also 
find that younger and less socially dense networks are mildly related to less complex 
NAOs. Our measures for NAO sector and being mandated do not seem to have any 
meaningful relationship with NAO complexity. Theoretically, what seems at play with 
NAO complexity is operational capacity and the management of uncertainty.  
The need to reduce uncertainty seems to push regulatory networks toward less complex 
NAOs, where members retain control and veto points. An uncertainty reduction strategy 
for rulemaking seems to operate here; to avoid negative outcomes, network members 
retain individual control, veto points, and do not delegate decision-making to a board. 
This might explain our finding that networks tasked with rule-setting have less complex 
NAOs.  
Alternatively, the most cumbersome regulatory task is supervising regulated entities. 
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 When networks take on such tasks, they need to delegate to a large and complex NAO. 
Networks capable of member-sanctioning will require the necessary safeguards, such as 
a board of appeal (see Figures 2 and 6).  
6.7 Limitations and future research  
EU regulatory networks have specific characteristics that affect the generalizability of 
this study. International regulatory networks are more politically sensitive than service 
provision (Isett and Provan, 2005) or economic development (Agranoff, 2007) networks, 
the traditional subjects of research on public management networks. Further testing is still 
needed to confirm Provan and Kenis’s (2008) and Agranoff’s (2007) propositions that 
structure increases in complexity as more interdependent tasks are assumed by the 
network.  
We have not been able to disentangle causality relationships in this chapter—our methods 
do not allow it. This would be another avenue of future research. Do tasks drive structure 
or does NAO complexity drive network task adoption?  
While items were identified based on the definition of complexity drawn from our 
literature review, the IRT-derived index is specific to this study. Further studies using 
alternative measures of complexity, or replicating ours, should add nuance to our 
knowledge of NAO complexity.  
Overall, 37 networks are far from being an optimum sample size. Studies using larger 
samples of networks are needed.  
Likewise, our density indicator is not an ideal measure. Moreover, the indicator we used 
reduced our sample significantly. Further research could focus specifically on the 
density/structure relationship in NAOs.  
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 Finally, Provan and Kenis (2008) draw on classical transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1975), particularly when predicting that networks with more members (i.e., 
with higher coordination costs) are best governed by an NAO. Unfortunately, we were 
not able to analyze the effects of membership or diversity, as these were fairly consistent 
in our sample (one member per EU member state or associate state). Future studies might 
redress this.  
As the world becomes more fragmented and interrelated, the relevance of goal-directed 
networks will continue to increase. This form of governance will be used to coordinate 
public action. It is thus fundamental to understand how these networks can best be 
governed. This research is an initial building block in understanding this crucial topic 
better.  
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Chapter 7:  
Conclusions 
The design of Network Administrative Organizations: the role of strategic interdependence and 
outcome uncertainty avoidance 
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 The overarching research objective of this thesis was to reveal the factors associated with 
different configurational designs of Network Administrative Organizations. The literature 
on the governance of goal-directed networks is heir to Provan and Kenis’s (2008) seminal 
contribution. As we have already highlighted, their model not only stands as the 
paradigmatic theoretical framework for understanding and empirically analyzing network 
governance, but also represents the stepping stone for our work in this Ph.D. thesis. 
Surprisingly, given the remarkable presence of goal-directed networks as relevant players 
in the delivery of public goods and policies, little empirical research has been done to 
further develop Kenis and Provan’s (2008) model. Our work contributes to the literature 
by providing an empirical answer to the following research questions:  
Does design of Network Administrative Organizations associate to certain factors that 
can be empirically examined, or is it just the result of idiosyncratic variables that only 
allow understanding the phenomenon on a case-by-case basis? 
In either case, which factors play a role when deciding on NAOs?  
Does the interplay of power and/or uncertainty help to explain the appearance of NAOs? 
The findings included in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this Ph.D. thesis contribute to the 
literature by advancing our knowledge of the governance of goal-directed networks and 
more specifically of NAO-governed public goal-directed networks and their design. We 
are contributing to the literature on public-goal directed-networks by empirically 
identifying two specific factors associated with the design of Network Administrative 
Organizations. On the one hand, we propose that strategic interdependence is associated 
with NAO design-linked decisions. “Strategic interdependences” refer to the expected 
impact of a goal-directed network’s role within the external organizational environment 
(i.e., individual organizational domain) of each individual member (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), as well as in the new interdependent organizational 
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 environment (i.e., encompassing each of the new individual organizational domains and 
the joint goal-directed network’s organizational domain). On the other hand, we 
empirically identify that outcome uncertainty linked to the tasks and operational capacity 
of the network is a crucial factor associated with NAO design-linked decisions. In both 
cases, NAO design mirrors the decision-blocking capacity that network members are 
willing to retain and execute. 
A better understanding of the rationale underlying the structure and mechanisms enacted 
to govern goal-directed networks through a Network Administrative Organization not 
only helps to advance the theory, but also has managerial implications and political 
relevance, in this case, as we deal with the specific subset of European regulatory 
networks. In this section, we provide an integrated discussion of our findings and their 
implications. 
 
7.2 Implications for theoretical knowledge 
Nowadays, inter-organizational relations permeate public management (Klijn, 2005). 
This realization reflects the interdependent environment in which public agencies and, 
more concretely, goal-directed networks provide the public goods essential to their 
organizational goals. Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) points 
out that, whenever possible, organizations manage dependencies by trying to harness and 
control the dependent situation, in which an agent has the discretion to act in a way that 
affects the interests of other agents. The public management literature has built 
extensively on the concept of interdependence. However, in line with Malatesta and 
Smith (2014), we hope that a more fine-grained approach to the construct will help 
researchers in the public management arena to better understand the antecedents, nature, 
and consequences of interdependence, and to apply it as a variable in their own empirical 
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 investigations (Malatesta and Smith, 2014). Our first theoretical contribution helps to 
bridge this gap. In Chapter 4, we develop a framework on interdependence in public 
management contexts. In line with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the framework signals 
the existence of an interdependence loop (i.e., an iterative process) that affects present 
and future relationships among actors, modifying their power relationships. As we argue, 
“how, when, and what type of interdependences are dealt with can change the landscape 
around a service delivery, policy design, or action, thus generating a new baseline where 
different or new interdependent relations appear.” Based on the five different categories 
in which we have grouped the literature reviewed (i.e., Interdependence as a general 
description; Network; Driver of Collaboration; Resource Dependence Theory; 
Managerial Implications), the framework illuminates different stages and moments of 
interdependence that are connected and have differentiated structural and contextual 
consequences. More concretely, we argue that consequences embrace the organizational 
structure of the collaboration—the governance decision-making criteria, individual and 
organizational goals, trust distribution, accountability mechanisms, and overall 
collaboration strategy. In this vein, the framework may serve as a first step toward 
acknowledging how the organizational environment is modulated by both exogenous 
variables (i.e., the policy stage) and endogenous variables (i.e., managerial activities and 
administrative reorganizations). The findings reported in Chapters 5 and 6, regarding the 
role of interdependence and uncertainty on the design of network administrative 
organizations, partially build on this rationale. 
In response to our research objectives, the main theoretical contribution of this Ph.D. 
thesis is to show how NAO design is driven by network partners’ attempts to manage 
their external organizational environment to avoid outcome uncertainty (i.e., generated 
by the public-goal directed network). According to our findings, they do so by defining 
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 and consciously designing the structural characteristics of the Network Administrative 
Organization. The requirement for a negotiated environment (Cyert and March, 1938) is 
not new in the literature; in fact, our findings link to the broader literature on Resource 
Dependence Theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) signaling that coordination among 
organizations is a natural response to individual organizations’ need to create a more 
stable and controllable context.  
In line with these arguments, Chapter 5 empirically contributes to the literature on goal-
directed networks by investigating and showing how the agencies confronted with a 
newly created mandated goal-directed network react by attempting to define the new 
network’s steering mechanisms’ (i.e., Network Administrative Organizations). Analyzing 
longitudinal cases sheds light on the degree and type of interdependences that influence 
the design of the NAO through the power bargaining dynamic. Concretely, we identify 
three main interdependence sources: a) the members’ dependence vis-à-vis their 
proximate environment (in this case their relationship to national ministries or other 
relevant stakeholders in the policy arena); b) the interdependence among network 
members (based on shared  public goals or planned regulation); and c) the 
interdependence between the new public goal-directed network and its external 
environment (i.e., the role assumed by the network in the wider policy context and 
expectations regarding this role). The findings suggest that, due to these 
interdependences, network members envision Network Administrative Organizations 
differently. Network members anticipate their situation once the goal-directed network is 
fully operative and modulate delegation to the network administrative organization in 
terms of operative capacity (NAO size), control (the decision-power balance between 
members vis-à-vis the mandated party or a potential powerful convener), and the 
network-level responsibilities assumed (strong versus weak capacity). Larger Network 
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 Administrative Organizations, which carry out more tasks and are less controlled by 
network members, are associated with financial and physical interdependence and 
external dependences, both at the members’ and the whole-network level. In the cases 
analyzed, power dependencies related to structural problems and regulatory gaps act as a 
centripetal force in favor of integration. In fact, the creation of a public-goal directed 
network generates a new organizational environment in which a new player, the network, 
assumes a network-level goal, partly subsuming the interests of individual members and 
generating a new dependence scenario. As our research shows, network members, even 
when they are in a position of weakness (e.g., mandated public goal-directed networks) 
don’t stop trying to control the source of their different dependences. These attempts and 
their consequences mirror the design of NAOs, as Chapters 5 and 6 show. In the specific 
case of mandated networks, the competing pressures and conflicting demands of their 
multiple principals (Miller, 2005) shape the final relationship with the agent (i.e., the 
NAO). Network members mobilize their power sources by using their structural, 
relational, and discursive resources. As Chapters 3 and 6 illustrate, existing voluntary 
networks are not dismantled when a mandated network is created. Rather, network 
members maintain them as a source of influence. Strategic interdependence is actively 
managed both at the mandated-network level and at the voluntary-network level. On the 
one hand, NAO design is contested and negotiated via the voluntary network. On the 
other hand, voluntary networks offer individual organizations a looser space in which to 
coordinate political influence over other stakeholders, including the mandating party and 
the NAO itself. 
In Chapter 6, we empirically address the challenge of establishing the factors associated 
with different typologies of NAOs. It is important to highlight that, although previous 
qualitative studies on Network Administrative Organizations (Saz-Carranza, 201) have 
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 observed different typologies of NAO, these configurations and the factors that determine 
them have so far been overlooked by the scholarly community. This Ph.D. thesis 
contributes to bridging this gap.  
Network Administrative Organizations act as external brokers to public-goal directed 
networks, introducing a new source of power dependence within a given policy realm. As 
Moyhihan (2008) mentions and we argue, the boundaries between a hierarchy and a 
network blur, when it comes to NAOs. Public goal-directed networks as popularly seen 
as flexible, unstructured, and low-bureaucratic mechanisms that provide public goods; 
according to our findings, this is not the reality of NAO-governed networks.  
The contributions in Chapter 6 develop a more fine-grained insight into the rationale 
underlying the design of Network Administrative Organizations, based on the network 
members’ attempts to control interdependences and avoid outcome uncertainty by using 
the network’s governance mechanisms. From our empirical analysis of the subset of 
European Regulatory Networks, we are able to show how the level of complexity of 
Network Administrative Organizations differs. Complexity is linked to the number of 
structural characteristics a given NAO, in the form of decision-making bodies and 
collective decision-making instruments and mechanisms.  
Our findings regarding the design of NAOs tie in with contingency theory (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961) one of the most influential approaches for determining how organizations 
are designed. Contingency theory builds on the idea of fit to suggest that structure must 
fit contingencies as organizations achieve efficiency (Donaldson, 2001). The literature 
reports multiple contingencies (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Gresov, 1990) while goal-
directed management scholars have identified contingent elements linked to the selection 
of different modes of network governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Our findings 
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 suggest that uncertainty avoidance tied to network expected outcomes is a key contingent 
element in the design of Network Administrative Organizations.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) define uncertainty as an organization’s capacity to anticipate 
and accurately predict the future state of the world. According to our findings, as shown 
in Chapter 6, the design of NAOs belonging to regulatory public goal-directed networks 
is strongly associated with the expected impact of network tasks on individual members. 
Together with the role of power bargaining and interdependence in the design of NAOs, 
this finding is one of the most important theoretical contributions of this Ph.D. thesis. We 
contend that the literature of public goal-directed networks, and, more specifically, the 
literature on network governance, would benefit from introducing members’ uncertainty 
avoidance strategies as a key determinant.  
Provan and Kenis (2008) include trust, a multidimensional construct somehow related to 
uncertainty and risk (Noteboom, Bergen, and Noordehaven, 1997; 2002) as a contingent 
element to explain the selection of various network governance modes. In our view, while 
trust density helps to partially overcome uncertainty associated with a partner’s or agent’s 
behavior, it remains a substantial non-predictable and non-controllable factor which 
stems, as our research highlights, from the functional content and tasks assumed by the 
public goal-directed network, and the outcome derived from these tasks. Our findings tie 
in with the literature on organizational theory, which acknowledges the uncertainty 
associated with tasks (Barnard, 1938; Burns and Stalker, 1966; Thompson, 1967; 
Galbraith, 1977). Task uncertainty has many causes, including task features: time to 
completion; ambiguity about the means and end; interdependence among work units 
needed to complete the task (Benson and Venkrataman, 1995; Holmström and Milgrom, 
1991). Inter-organizational scholars also point out that alliances and other collaborative 
inter-organizational agreements create a tension between relational risk (the likelihood 
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 and consequences of unsatisfactory collaboration) and performance risk (the expectation 
of changes in the market or possible damage to partners) (Das and Teng, 1999). Designing 
network governance structures therefore entails a trade-off between trust and control 
mechanisms to retain flexibility and boost the network’s chances of success (Das and 
Teng, 1998). Our findings are aligned with those of inter-alliance governance scholars 
who argue that partners tend to negotiate complex contracts to govern strategically 
important collaborations (Rouen, 2004). In this situation, partners tend to anticipate 
contingencies and to design mechanisms to safeguard themselves from unforeseeable 
outcomes. As a consequence, they are willing to bear the burden of more complex 
structures and provisions. Governance costs, in accordance with the tenets of Transaction 
Cost Economics points, must be aligned with exchange-hazards.  
The networks studied in this Ph.D. thesis assume different regulatory tasks, ranging from 
mere operational-executive tasks to a larger responsibility for rule setting, implying 
different degrees of outcome predictability. According to our findings, when the network 
assumes the power to set new rules, thus increasing the degree of uncertainty in the policy 
environment, NAOs tend to be less complex. In other words, uncertainty avoidance is 
associated in our study with NAOs that are more controlled by members, with fewer 
decision-making bodies (i.e., boards) and decision-making processes constrained by 
members through veto power. In public goal-directed networks, the collective-decision 
making role is salient; when confronted with outcome uncertainty (where the rules must 
be designed rather than just implemented) network members prefer to maintain their veto 
power by advocating consensual network decision-making. At the same time, tasks with 
a narrower span, such as information-sharing or executive tasks or enforcement, are seen 
as being a lower threat or risk. The underlying rationale links to the tasks’ outcome 
uncertainty, which makes it difficult to define and/or measure desired outcomes 
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 (Tomkins, 2001; Buvik and Andersen, 2002; Prendegarst, 2002). Thus, when exchange-
hazards are perceived as high, NAO design becomes more complex. Overall, the 
complexity of Network Administrative Organizations reflects decisions made by partners 
to clarify the rights, obligations, and processes used to achieve network and individual 
goals.  
The shadow of the future, as Fearon (1998) points out, afftects Network Administrative 
Organizations in two ways. While future benefits and expectations may facilitate and 
encourage long term cooperation, partners are also more willing to bargain in order to 
establish by design mechanisms to govern the network. The design of the NAO and its 
level of complexity link to decisions-makers’ preference for a certain, predictable, and 
stable organizational environment (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Zucker, 1977).  
 
7.3. Managerial and policy implications 
The findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 reveal managerial implications for practitioners. 
Overall, this Ph.D. thesis analyzes the processes (i.e., power bargaining) and factors (i.e., 
strategic interdependence and outcome uncertainty) associated with NAO design.  
First, the findings provide a rationale for the existence of different NAO configurations 
and a process-based explanation of their development. Organizational structure is a 
popular topic that focuses the attention of managers and consultants involved in designing 
and redesigning organizations (Birkinshaw, Nobel, and Ridderstrale, 2002; Burton, 
DeSanctis, and Obel, 2006; Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Siggelkow, 2002; Siggelkow and 
Rivkin, 2005; Turner and Makhija, 2012; Wasserman, 2008). In this regard, this 
dissertation measures organizational structural complexity by analyzing different 
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 governing bodies, their relations, and the collective decision-making procedures found. 
This measure offers detailed information on the structure of public goal-directed 
networks, which could be valuable for designing or choosing an NAO structure.  
Second, the findings of this dissertation illustrate the competing interests that emerge 
from the design of public-goal directed network governance structures. Practitioners, 
managers, and consultants must understand the bargaining power dynamics affecting 
participation in the decision-making process and the overall definition of NAO 
governance mechanisms. As seen in this Ph.D. thesis, some issues are more contested 
than others, since members try to stabilize their organizational context through diverse 
ways of distributing tasks, maintaining control, and assigning executive functions among 
network members and the NAO. This is particularly true in the case of mandated 
networks. The mandate may create dissension; even when there’s a powerful convener 
mandating the network, network members will mobilize their resources to contest aspects 
of the NAO structure, including its executive control, size, and network-level tasks. Thus, 
policy makers establishing a policy-mandated network should expect political activity 
during the NAO design phase before implementation. Mandated network members 
should focus their mobilizing efforts on the mandating party during the formal NAO 
design stage. 
Third, practitioners and policy makers should give serious consideration to the role of 
uncertainty avoidance and strategic interdependences in the design of NAOs: these 
contingencies affect design and may play a critical role in determining the extent to which 
a network is able to achieve a collaborative advantage. The form of governance of goal-
directed networks does seem to affect network effectiveness or performance, as Provan 
and Milward’s (1995) seminal empirical work shows. The underlying assumption is that 
a certain organizational configuration (Mintzberg, 1983; Miller, 1987, 1990) will 
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 establish a foundation for achieving network goals more efficiently in a given setting. 
After decades in which public networks have emerged as an effective way of tackling 
hard issues, scholars in the field now see the need to assess network effectiveness in order 
to enlist broad public support for this approach (Turrini et al., 2009). The final 
configuration of an NAO reflects its members’ uncertainty avoidance tactics, thus 
providing useful information about who holds or retains power over specific issues. This 
is particularly important, not only for managers of public goal-directed networks, but also 
for the network’s stakeholders and interest groups. All involved practitioners should 
assess the interdependencies of mandated network members and their dependency on 
external non-members to understand which members will be willing to give up full 
control over the NAO executive. In this regard, our findings may be of relevance for 
practitioners aiming to lobby European Regulatory Networks because they convey useful 
information about the multilevel institutional context that constitutes the European 
Regulatory Space. For politicians, practitioners, and citizens, it is of utmost importance 
to track who has the power and ability to design, establish, and enforce regulations in 
different domains. 
Last but not least, practitioners, policy makers and managers should be aware of the 
blurred edge between vertical hierarchy and networks in NAO-governed networks, and 
specifically in European Regulatory Networks. These are situated by design in a 
continuum of hybrid organizations, in which control, decision-making power, integration, 
and operational capacity are the subject of ongoing debate. In the specific case of the 
European Regulatory Space, the so-called European experimentalist architecture reflects 
the different approaches to organizing regulation across the European Union and 
promoting coordination between national governments, EU institutions, and other 
relevant stakeholders.  
188 
 
  
7.4. Limitations and further research 
The limitations of this Ph.D. thesis open up additional avenues for further research on the 
governance of public goal-directed networks and, more specifically, on the design of 
Network Administrative Organizations. Firstly, this dissertation focuses on a specific set 
of public goal-directed networks, regulatory networks, within a specific political and 
geographical context, the European Union. The extent to which our findings are 
generalizable and transferable to other typologies of public-goal directed networks (e.g., 
service delivery networks), and other regulatory spaces is a question that warrants further 
investigation. Secondly, this dissertation’s methodologies have established an association 
among contingent factors and NAOs, for which the causality is still to be explored. Future 
research may disentangle the causation, revealing the antecedents to NAO design. 
Thirdly, this study focuses on the structural design features of Network Administrative 
Organizations; future research should include deeper analyses of specific governance 
mechanisms and provisions, such as public goal-directed networks’s boards relations vis-
à-vis the executive component of Network Administrative Organizations. Fourthly, while 
we have examined the governance mechanism of these networks, investigating their 
accountability measures and established mechanisms could advance our understanding of 
the way in which public-goal directed networks are governed. Last but not least, a 
promising line of future research could establish the relationship between different 
degrees of complexity in NAO design and the effectiveness and performance of the 
network.  
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